*William Clontz**

I will try to present a little bit of perspective from an official position. I am from North Carolina, and I believe it was not Larry Johnson's cousin who made those comments referred to in his presentation, but our senior senator. Those in Washington are convinced that we all have been captured by the United Nations. Those in the U.N. are convinced that we are seized of the spirit from Washington to poke at them. On some days both are right, and on some days, both are wrong. I will try to share with you from a personal point with the same disclaimer Larry Johnson issued.

On the topic of sanctions, a couple of things should be pointed out. The Secretary-General recently expressed his concerns about the use of sanctions and their side effects. He has, in a sense, asked the Security Council to take another look at sanctions, how they are implemented, and how to use them. The Council is going through this process of replying to the Secretary General's statement, which he recently issued. For our own government, we state that we think sanctions still have utility, have great use, and we continue to support using them.

That having been said, there are four or five characteristics that are inherently present in sanctions. First and foremost, sanctions are by nature a blunt instrument. It may seem like a precision instrument, but there is always a spill-over effect. Some people will be inadvertently affected by sanctions. Second, there are a number of things that can be done to dampen the effect, but they will not eliminate it. I do not know of any case where sanctions have been implemented over time in a large scale where only those we wished to hurt were hurt. Third, sanctions take time. If one is looking for a quick resolution of an international problem, sanctions are not the most effective choice. Fourth, sanctions have a degree of porousness. They always leak in two directions. In many ways the leakage occurs beyond the targeted population. That means that the relative effect is greater on those at whom the sanctions are not aimed. Lastly, from a military perspective, I always compare sanctions to air power. Sanctions are a frequently necessary but not sufficient condition in the international arena. I do not know of anyone who has won a war with air power, but I know powers that have lost for the lack of air power. The same may be said about sanctions. One is not likely to resolve an international problem with sanctions, though

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they can help the process. They are an adjunctive tool, not a principal tool. They will continue to have some difficulties but will continue to be used.

Sanctions consume a great deal of interest and time in the U.S. Mission to the U.N. We do have a sanctions committee inside the Mission which is a standing group largely run by economic and social affairs people, but that operates on a task force basis depending on the sanction or issue at hand. Shortly after the multinational force was deployed to Haiti, there was a substantial need for a number of commercial products to come in, both to support the multinational force and humanitarian needs and to get the Haitian government started up again. Technically, there were U.N. sanctions in place against any of those items being delivered. So there was a steady flow of information requested from various commercial concerns from other countries to the sanctions committee at the U.N.

I will very briefly address the issue of Security Council expansion. A number of us thought that perhaps this might be the year of the Security Council expansion. I am less inclined to believe that will happen this year. It will likely take more time. In expanding the Security Council, how many more members and under what sort of construct can be expected? It is one of the more lasting things we will do in the U.N. institutionally over a long period of time. As Mr. Johnson indicated, the Security Council actually has become a more powerful and effective instrument over the years. Today, it is an extraordinarily important organization. What it does and what it fails to do very much affect the rest of the U.N.'s capability. As we expand it, there are many cautions floating about. The process should be of interest. The closest analogy can be made to that of electing a Pope. Some of it is visible, while some of it is invisible on certain days. People convene, and smoke comes out and we know we have an agreement on this point and it goes forward, but it is a very arcane and twisted process. The U.S. government has been clearly in support of Security Council expansion, but how large and to whom has yet to be worked out.

There is a practical and functional concern in that making the Security Council too large, you can lose the focus and hence, the effectiveness. In a subjective manner, you lose the group dynamics effect. I am convinced that the Security Council does its best work late at night and on weekends. It is just about large enough that it is possible under certain settings for people to set aside their disagreements from time to time and make things happen when their respective governments have given them adequate latitude to do so. When you have fifteen principals doing things in off hours, without a large number of staff persons, and in informal sessions, it is

possible for a significant number of issues to go forward. If you raise the Council to the range of twenty-five, thirty-five, or forty, you will begin to have a smaller version of the General Assembly. That may be desirable in some aspects, but there is a cost for doing that, so the relative size is as important as the composition of the Council.

There have been great efforts to make expansion happen, and this is the fiftieth anniversary year, but this is probably not going to be the time for expansion. Most of the permanent members of the Security Council acknowledge that the process has not been what it should be.

There is a phenomenon that I refer to as the "lounge lizards." The Security Council meets most frequently in informal sessions in small rooms. Adjacent to that is the diplomatic lounge. The Council goes in and meets for extended periods to discuss whatever the issues of the day are. When they take a break, they generally go out to the lounge where the diplomats from other countries that are not in the Council but who have great interests in what is going on are sitting and waiting for their friend in the Council to tell them what is transpiring. In some cases, these are countries, for example, taking part in peacekeeping operations who have significant numbers of soldiers and civilians on the ground. They wait for tidbits of information, hoping someone will take time to tell them what is going on. That is not a satisfactory way to do business. Ambassador Albright has been President of the Security Council twice since she took office and has instituted a more rigorous procedure which seems to work well. A number of other countries like New Zealand have followed it as well and have expanded on the concept. There is a tradition that says when someone moves into the Chair of the Security Council, they will go through the bilateral consultative process with other members of the Council, do some work with the Secretary-General and the Secretariat and perhaps some others. That is vaguely defined. What has developed of late is a procedure that expands to include any organized identifiable groups that may have serious business before the Council, troop-contributing nations for major peacekeeping operations, or anyone else. The President of the Council sits down with those groups and listens to their concerns. Whether he agrees with them or not, he conveys those concerns to the Council and someone will report back to them on a regular sustained basis of how those negotiations are going. That is not a substitute for those who would like to see the Security Council get larger, but it is a much improved process that gives more dignity to the people who are trying to find out what is going on so that they can report to their people.

The other change that was instituted about four months ago has been very useful. The Secretariat has increased the frequency of troop contributor meetings for those countries that are participating in peacekeeping operations. Those meetings are now co-chaired by the Secretariat and by the sitting President of the Security Council so that for the troop contributor it is the primary forum to talk about its concerns and hear the concerns of the Secretariat; it is a method for the troop contributor to ensure that that information gets directly back to the Security Council without going through any filter. The people who attend those meetings report back to the Security Council about what those discussions were about and what the concerns were.

I have spent a significant amount of time talking with different groups regarding the pros and cons of an independent U.N. armed force or a standing army. With regard to the idea of a standing army, the bad news is that there is not likely to be one. The good news is that there are a number of other reforms and changes that are in the works literally as we speak. I think we will give an 80 percent solution over time to those people who are looking for a standing army. The U.S. government and a number of others have indicated that they do not support a standing U.N. force. A number of our allies do support such a force, the Canadians and Dutch having been the most active this year in that regard.

We have not supported a standing force for a number of reasons. While there is a great deal of interest by many countries, globally and within the United States certainly, there is not sufficient commitment within our Congress or presidential administration. Also, there is not sufficient commitment, interest, or resources within the General Assembly at large, so the idea of a standing army is not going to materialize.

What has been interesting this year is that a great number of individuals who worked this issue in the past changed from speaking about a "rapid deployment force" to a "more rapidly deploying force." There is a significant difference in terms of how you target the resources and how you try to build the capability. It is important to note the differences between standing forces and stand-by forces and how you make the stand-by forces something other than forces on paper. For those who have looked at the standing force idea, it is not difficult to be seduced by the easy part of the concept: raising a standing force of four or five to ten thousand soldiers is the easiest part of the equation. The difficult part is the same thing that plagues the United Nations peacekeeping operations. It is generally not forces; rather, it is the logistical and support architecture that has go with it:

strategic transportation, local transportation, engineering, medical assistance, communications—extraordinarily mundane things, but these things do not exist in the areas where these forces would be deployed. There are a number of options without having a standing army that will in fact give you the ability to deploy the peacekeeping force much quicker. Rwanda was the exception; in the time that I have been there, we could not get enough forces committed to put the mission together. Week after week we could not get a coherent force together. In fact, in most U.N. peacekeeping operations, the force is not a problem. Bosnia, the larger mission in the former Yugoslavia, has been somewhat short, but again, that is a rather extraordinary mission. For the most recent missions to Haiti and Angola, both of those missions are oversubscribed; they have more troops pledged than they can use. They were able to pick and choose, which is a luxury they have not always had, but it is more common than one might think.

As for financing the operations, I will divide the issues of how one pays for the operations to two sides, although they are obviously interconnected in many ways. From the U.N. perspective, peacekeeping operations are a separate budget within the United Nations, separate from the standard assessment and from voluntary contributions. The cost for peacekeeping operations is beginning to undergo rather marked decline. It topped out last year at an estimated $4 billion or more. Somalia is obviously the largest example.

As was indicated, the U.S. pays a little over 31 percent, but there is a very real problem, as mentioned before: What happens if the U.S. goes with 25 percent? The legal issues and the moral issues aside, we have legislation that has passed the U.S. Congress that says we pay no more than 25 percent. It may not be appropriated. The focus of the U.S. has been twofold. One, they are trying to convince others that this is a serious problem; this is not a negotiating tactic. The U.S. government has instructions under its own laws to go with 25 percent. Secondly, the U.S. has been trying to find a way among the other partners in the U.N. to redistribute that other portion (5.5 percent to 6 percent) so that there is not a net loss to the U.N. There are a number of formulas floating about. I would not underestimate the seriousness of this for the U.N. The U.S. mission does not do so. We are talking about a great sum of money, particularly in light of the debt the U.N. has to move around anyway due to the fact that many countries, like the U.S., have not been current in the payments.

Another important topic under the U.N. rubric is the business reform inside the organization. This is a good news story in terms of how the U.N.

does business, how it writes contracts, how it procures the resources, and how it attracts money. Mr. Conner is working with that responsibility inside the U.N. The U.S. government is trying to undertake a parallel effort. Almost everyone here knows Ambassador Albright by name: she runs the U.S. Mission with a lot of help from four other ambassadors and officers in the Mission. One of those is specifically there to do the same thing Mr. Conner is doing, to bring together the resources of the U.S. government and in some cases the U.S. private community, if there are ways in which we can help some of the processes. And in some cases, we cannot. We are certainly not the only government doing that. There are many governments who are doing that simply because it makes sense for us all. If there are ways for the U.N. to do its business better and more efficiently and more transparently, it makes it easier for the resources to spread about and easier for us to explain to our legislators where the money is going. It is probably the single most active area of the U.N. operations. There are practical, well-focused reform efforts going on in a dozen areas every day, and they are starting to make an impact.

From the U.S. government's perspective, the first issue is the 25 percent rule. Again, it is a problem for us. We are trying to find a way to work it, but it is not just a matter of politics. It is a matter of legislation for us. Peacekeeping supplementals are extremely difficult to procure from the U.S. Congress these days. That is aggravated by the U.N. billing system. There is not a unified peacekeeping budget; each mission is budgeted generally six months at a time. We have not in the past had great predictive tools in terms of what those budgets were going to be. So we, like other countries, have some difficulty coming back during a fiscal year to our legislators to try to budget for that.

There are two subsidiary areas for the U.S. side that need to be worked as a matter of policy. One of these is the lack of a peacekeeping contingency account. This Administration has gone to Congress on two occasions to try to salvage a separate peacekeeping account. There are great arguments about where that money will come from. The idea is that you do your best predictive analysis; for example, if we think for humanitarian systems and peacekeeping related types of operations that we will spend a certain amount this year, that money is set aside and drawn from that account as these crises occur. We do not have that for a number of reasons inside the Congress. The end result of what happens is that, now, if a crisis evolves and the U.S. participates, those funds come directly out of the operation and training and maintenance accounts of the various services. Before I was in my current

capacity, I was commanding The Aviation Brigade in the 82nd Airborne Division, and we were starting to see it even a year and half ago. What that means is for people at the working end of the military business, one plans training, maintenance and budget cycles over a two year period. When a major crisis comes out, resources have to be drawn out for that, and one has no assurance when those funds will be replenished. The last quarter of the last two quarters of the two year cycle in training now goes back up in the air. Will you do that training for those forces or not? If you will not, you certainly do the preceding three quarters differently. But you will not know until the fourth quarter if it comes back in or not. So it is simple accounting, but it drives a great deal of turbulence in the armed services. Therefore, establishing an account is an essential part of how we ought to be doing our business in the peacekeeping arena.

Let me tell you one short story. There are a number of good news stories in about 10 or 12 areas that the U.N. is doing some very positive reform. I will close my remarks with a money story because so much of this does come down to money: the U.N.'s lack of it, need for it, and our problems with money as well. The very first mission that I had, literally the first phone call on my first day as I walked in my office was from a three-star general from the Army, who was the Comptroller General of the Army. His problem was the following: because there is a constant debt and lag cycle between the United States government and the U.N., the U.N. had not paid some $61 million in goods and services from Somalia to the United States government, owed to the United States army. It is an oddity of U.S. law that says when funds of this sort are committed or resources are expended, they must be paid back in the first six months of the following fiscal year. If not, when they are paid back, they do not go to the agency that provided the services, but rather into the general pot. The Army was not amused with this concept. This fellow was good enough to tell me that he had about 19 days and he'd be deeply appreciative if I could find $61 million for him. So I spent the next three weeks not meeting the people in peacekeeping, but meeting all the budget people at the Comptroller's office. On the last day, I got a call saying that if I could come over around 7 o'clock tonight, they would have the check for me. I walked over at 7 p.m. and was handed a Citibank check with more zeroes than I thought one could fit on a check. As the Comptroller's deputy handed it to me, he said, and I thought this was the Comptroller's humor, please ensure that this is not cashed until Tuesday (and this was Thursday).

This is how the U.N. has to live with the shortage of money. It has to move the debt around. We stiff each other until someone says we have to be paid. We don't pay our contractors overseas until they cut off the peacekeeping missions. We pay them and not the rent and utility bills in New York and in Geneva until the buildings go dark. So the cycle starts around. So, as Pogo said, we see the enemy and he is us.