I have chosen civil disobedience in defense of international law because it should in a sense be one of the easiest cases to prove the point that international law can and should be part and parcel of processes of challenge of particular regimes. Indeed if international law has a position on any form of civil disobedience, then it should be disobedience in favor of international law. Moreover civil disobedience more generally does not raise some of the much more complex and sui generis difficulties which a legitimization of armed or violent resistance raises, difficulties which are better left for other reflections. My principal argument will be that the lack of a clear position on civil disobedience in international law has been problematic for international law, but that civil disobedience has also suffered from insufficient explicit recourse to international law, leaving ample room for convergence (I). I will then look in very broad terms at what a contemporary “right to civil disobedience under international law” might look like. The challenge, obviously, is not for international law to legitimize any civil disobedience, but (in legitimizing some) to help define the conditions when it might be internationally legitimate (II).