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Final Brief on the Criminal Responsibility of Weizsaecker, Steengracht, Woermann (Part 4)

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MURDER OF THE JEWS OF EUROPE

COUNT V

MEIZS ZEPER, STEGRACHT, JOERMAN

PART IV

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**PART IV**

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The non-aggression pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. of August 1939 was still in force, yet the German authorities in Poland had included Jews of Soviet citizenship in general measures against the Jews. This provoked the intervention of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin in February 1941, with the result that WOERMANN told the Soviet diplomatic representative that the going of the Jews to the Warsaw Ghetto would be allowed and that the Jews of Russian nationality would have four weeks to straighten out their affairs, and that the confiscation of property belonging to Soviet citizens was prohibited. In cases where a confiscation had already taken place, an investigation would be carried out.

The Foreign Office and especially the defendants WOERMANN, WEIZSÄCKER, and Ehrmannsdorff obtained a copy of the report on that matter. (NG-1528, Exhibit No. 1728, Document Book No. 61, page 59). The initialed copy of WOERMANN is the one which was produced in evidence.

Even at that time the Foreign Office was not sincere in vouchsafing their promise. The promise to investigate the unlawful confiscation of property belonging to Russian Jews was not intended seriously, since the report indicated that "confidentially".

"... the re-examination of all confiscations of Jewish property, which took place summarily would, of course, be very difficult.

"Principally Soviet citizens shall be permitted to take along their property. It still has to be clarified to what extent this can practically be carried out," (ibid, page 59)

(Also see NG-4511, Exhibit No. 1729, Document Book No. 61)
A few weeks prior to Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories submitted to the Foreign Office a draft concerning the definition of the term "Jew" in the Occupied Eastern Territories. On the 11th of May 1942, Rademacher was in a position to state that the position of the Foreign Office, with regard to the definition of a Jew has been accepted and that only anti-Jewish measures against foreign Jews of Rumanian, Slovak or Croatian nationality would be taken. These limitations, Rademacher, remarked, are to be applied "until further notice." (N-4848, Exhibit No. 1732, Document Book No. 61, page 62).

Rademacher submitted this memorandum to State Secretary WEIZSÄCKER (WEIZSÄCKER's initials are on the document), through Under State Secretary Luther, also to Under State Secretary WOERMANN, with WOERMANN's initials also on the document.

If no answer was given within 9 days, it was assumed "that the Foreign Office approves of the draft." (Ibid, page 62)

In May 1942 the decree concerning the definition of the term "Jew" in the Occupied Eastern Territories was finally drafted with the suggestions of the Foreign Office included. (Ibid, page 76).

Dr. Leibbrandt of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories informed the various government departments of the Third Reich, including the Reich Foreign Office, of the ordinance concerning the definition of the term "Jew". It was discussed in a conference on January 29, 1942 in which it was expressly stated that this definition is necessary.
in order not

"to leave the decision as to whether or not a
person is a member of the Jewish race in the
hands of the Commanders of the Security Police
and the SD ..." (Ibid, page 76)

That, Dr. Leibbrandt pointed out, is a

"predominately political aspect." (Ibid, page 76)

It could not be left to the Security Police and the SD.

The systematic planning of the measures against the Jews
were again confirmed. First, the group of persons to be
qualified as Jews had to be defined. Prior to the actual execution
of the measures the various departments of the German Govern-
ment, including the Foreign Office, discussed from many angles
in detail the elements of a definition which led to a clear
determination of what was a Jew and what was not a Jew. The
Foreign Office participated actively in this delineation.
The measures against the Jews were recognized to be of greatest
political importance and especially of great importance in
matters of foreign policy.

With regard to certain countries where the Foreign Office
representatives had already succeeded in obtaining the consent
of these foreign governments, the Foreign Office had no
objection to including Jewish citizens of the respective
countries in the measures against the Jews.

Thus when the German troops marched into the territory
of the U.S.S.R. every step of the plan to exterminate the
Jews had been meticulously planned.

The reports of the Einsatzgruppen, which were discussed
in an earlier part of this brief, reveal the ferocity and
brutality with which the Nazi extermination machine was set
On the controlling end of that machine sat the defendant WEIZSÄCKER, his staff in the Foreign Office, including the defendants WOERNANN, Erhansederf, and later STEERING, and Richter, and Vossenmayer, who, together with the leading officials of the Reich Main Security Office, fed into that extermination machine the human material to be extinguished and liquidated under the project heading "Final Solution of the Jewish Question." With full knowledge of the monstrosity of the crime as revealed by the reports submitted to the Foreign Office in regular sequence, the defendants mentioned above and especially the defendant WEIZSÄCKER, continued to attach the seal of approval to measures which they knew meant the murder of millions of innocent people, men, women and children.
The annihilation of the Jews in the Baltic countries was executed by the Einsatzgruppen and local anti-Jewish forces. However, the Foreign Office became connected with these measures, because certain nationals of other countries had been included in the extermination.

On the 5th of April 1943, the Foreign Office representative with the Reich Commissioner for the Eastland informed the main office in Berlin that by some mistake the Supreme Commander of the Security Police and the SD in the Eastland had not followed in all details the instructions as set forth in a circular of March 2nd. However, the local SS commander immediately promised to correct the mistake and to give to the exempted Jews an opportunity to return to their home countries. (NG-2652-(B), Exh. 1618, Doc.Bk. 60-2, page 11). Thereupon the Foreign Office representative informed Berlin that

"Since, as is known many thousands of the local and German Jews have been shot in the course of the action in the area of Riga, it is questionable whether any Jews could be used for the purpose of exchanging them without the executions being used abroad against us. It would hardly be possible to fill the quota with these Jews, who are to be exchanged from the Eastland." (Ibid, page 12)

Minister Hindenck, the representative of the Foreign Office in the Eastland, bluntly wrote to the Foreign Office that the liquidation of the Jews in the Eastland was a matter of common knowledge among the Germans in the Eastland. The Foreign Office representative interpreted correctly the aims of his department when he argued that the few remaining Jews who might be considered for exchange purposes were not suitable for such an exchange, since they were dangerous witnesses to the atrocities, which were cloaked with the terminology "Final Solution of the Jewish Question." The information obtained through Hindenck was no surprise to the Foreign Office, as the treat-
ment of the Jews in the Eastland was "known to the Foreign Office." (NG-2652-(D), Exh. 1619, Doc. Sk. 60-A, page 13).
In September 1941 the defendant WEIZSÄCKER received official information that the new Slovakian anti-Jewish laws, which were about to be signed by the Slovakian Council of Ministers, were

"...in their effect upon the Jews...much more severe than the prevailing German Nuremberg laws." (Pros. Ex. 1633, No.209, Doc. Bk. 60 A, p. 68).

The defendant WOERMANN was also informed of the success of "German foreign policy" abroad.

However, the Foreign Office was skeptical as to whether or not issuing of decrees and laws against the Jews would solve the Jewish problem in Slovakia. First, WEIZSÄCKER's subordinate, the representative of the Foreign Office in Bratislava, attempted to conclude an interstate treaty between Germany and Slovakia, for the deportation of Jews of Slovakian nationality. On the 18th of April 1942 Ludin, the German Minister to Slovakia, reported to the Foreign Office that such a treaty would not be necessary. The defendants WOERMANN, Ernstmannsдорf, and Ritter received copies of the telegram from the German Ambassador in Slovakia.

The property of the evacuated Jews who had been Slovakian citizens up to this time would not be claimed by the Reich. By June 1942 however, the deportation of the Jews from Slovakia had reached a deadlock...

"Because of clerical influence and the corruption of individual officials, 35,000 Jews have received special considerations, on the basis of which they need not be deported." (Pros. Ex. 1635, No.1107 A, Doc. Bk. 60 A, p. 71).

Ludin requested a directive and informed the Foreign Office.
particularly WEIZSAECKER, WOMMANN, Ritter and Erdmannsdorff, that the evacuation of the Jews was very unpopular in wide circles of the Slovakian population and that Minister President Tuka, who wished to continue the deportation, obviously met with opposition in his own cabinet and therefore

"requests strong support by diplomatic pressure on the part of the Reich." (Ibid. p. 71).

It was WEIZSAECKER, who in reply to this telegram by Ludin, sent the confidential instructions to Ambassador Ludin in which he suggested certain means of pressure for the continuation of the evacuation of the remaining 35,000 Jews in Slovakia. This is what WEIZSAECKER, with the consent of WOMMANN, communicated to the German Embassy at Bratislava:

"In reply to your telegram 992 of June 29, you can render the diplomatic assistance requested by Minister President Tuka by stating on occasion that the stopping of the deportation of Jews and particularly the exclusion of 35,000 Jews from deportation reported in your telegram would make a very bad impression in Germany, particularly since the previous cooperation of Slovakia in the Jewish Question has been much appreciated. - WEIZSAECKER." (Ibid, p. 72).

The expression, "made a very bad impression", was crossed out by WEIZSAECKER himself and replaced by the words, "cause surprise". Thus, using an even more refined word for this maneuver of pressing the Slovaks to deport their Jews,

The terminology of the defendant WEIZSAECKER, while so refined in its expression, was most effective. WEIZSAECKER knew that the more mentioning of German dissatisfaction would suffice for the desired effect. There were numerous instances where WEIZSAECKER had to interfere personally in order to get things straightened out in Slovakia.

Dr. Bulik, a former leader of the Slovak ethnic group, had disappeared and the Slovakian Ambassador informed WEIZSAECKER of it in August 1942. (Pros. Ex. 1636, RG-1403, Doc. Bk. 60 A, p. 73). An inquiry was made through the defendant WOMMANN, initiated by WEIZSAECKER, and the Slovak Ambassador in Berlin was advised that Dr. Bulik had died of pneumonia in concentration camp Mauthausen on the 3rd of January. Erdmannsdorff and Ritter were likewise informed of the fate of
Dr. Bulik.

The deportation of the Jews from Slovakia is an example of the directing role which the Foreign Office and particularly the defendant WEIZSAECKER played in the initiating, planning, and execution of this criminal undertaking.

"The deportation of Jews in the year 1942 was carried out on order of the Foreign Office."


Ludin personally received this order in the year 1942.

"I remember that it stated in this order that the Slovakian government be requested to deport Jews living in their national territory. At the beginning of 1942 about 60,000 were deported from Slovakia to Poland. After the Putsch in the year 1944, another vast number of Jews was also deported. As I know from statistics there were still about 30,000 Jews here."

(Ibid., p. 77)

Before WEIZSAECKER left for Rome in the year 1943, he had the satisfaction of the fact that the deportation of the Slovakian Jews was underway so that he could even discuss the money arrangements to be made with Slovakia (Pros. Ex. C-280, Doc. Ns-5108, Doc. Bk. 204 ;).

In the summer of 1943, under the State Secretaryship of STEENGRACHT, the defendant Veessenmayer was dispatched to Slovakia by his superior for the purpose of promoting the final solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia. The Foreign Office not satisfied with the speed with which the Slovaks were deporting the remainder of the Jews in Slovakia; therefore Veessenmayer repeatedly had to call Tiso, the Slovakian State President.

"In order to influence him unofficially to bring about a speedier solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia."

(Iros. Ex, 1639, No-4749, Doc. Bk. 60 A, p. 82).

For one reason or another, the Reich Foreign Minister had decided that he did not officially want to press the matter on Tiso and therefore Veessenmayer acted in a so-called "unofficial capacity". The defendant STEENGRACHT was not only informed of the pressure tactics used with regard to Slovakian Jews during that period of time, but communication given to the Reich Foreign Minister was duly approved by STEENGRACHT,
Veesenmayer was successful in his "unofficial" attempts to obtain the consent of the Slovak State President regarding the speedier deportation of the Slovak Jews.

"In December 1943 Mr. Veesenmayer called on me in the embassy and informed me that by special order of the Reich Foreign Minister he was to visit the Slovak State President with the object of deliberating with him upon the further deportation of the Slovak Jews. Thereupon I (Ludin) secured for him an audience with the Slovak State President. After his visit to Dr. Tiso, Dr. Veesenmayer reported to me the result to the effect that the Slovak State President had agreed to the proposed date, the 1st of April. Until then the remaining Jews not having the exceptional status granted by the State President were to be deported...

"In summer 1944 I can recall, upon being reminded, that Dr. Veesenmayer asked me in writing to present a petition to the Slovak government to prevent the entering of Hungarian Jews into Slovak territory. I passed this request of Dr. Veesenmayer on to the Slovak government by means of a verbal message." (Pros. Ex. 1640, NG-1821, Doc. Ex. 60 A, p. 86, Affidavit of Hans Eldor Ludin).

The affiant Dieter Visliceny confirms the activity of Ribevertrop's and STEENGRACHT's representative, the defendant Veesenmayer, regarding the deportation of the Slovakian Jews as follows:

"As far as the solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia is concerned, I know that the Foreign Office was dealing with this question and was involved in it. While I was working in Slovakia various decrees came to my notice, some of which were signed by Secretary of Legation Rademacher, and some by Secretary of Legation Thadden. I know that the connection went from Obersturmbannführer Eichmann to Rademacher and Thadden. When the Tuka government decided in the year 1942 to deport Jews from Slovakia, Eichmann worked out the conditions for deportation for official channelling to the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office then informed the Tuka government of these stipulations in the form of a note, which stipulations it accepted without reservation. The deportation was then carried out on this basis, and some Jews were deported to Lublin and some to Auschwitz... In December 1943 Veesenmayer came to Bratislava. On this occasion he had no time to him, at the time I was official advisor on the Jewish question with the Slovakian government, and demanded from me specific statistical data about the Jews still living in Slovakia. There were still about 30,000 Jews in Slovakia, and..."
Veesenmayer demanded information from me as to the progress of the deportation. At this, Veesenmayer went to Tiso and reproached him about the matter, saying that the deportation of Jews was not proceeding in a satisfactory manner, and demanded that this be remedied and stricter measures adopted. Tiso promised to comply with Veesenmayer's demand. Veesenmayer came at that time by order of the Foreign Office. 

Veesenmayer himself stated in his pre-trial examination, that he undertook these missions on order of the State Secretary. 

When in 1944 Veesenmayer organized the man-hunt against the Jews in Hungary, a number of Jews of Slovak origin tried to save their lives by escaping to Slovakia. The local Slovak Legation as well as the Slovak Minister of the Interior requested from the Hungarian government "the release and repatriation of Jews of Slovak nationality", which gave the Hungarian government the impression "that the Slovak government and especially the Minister of the Interior have adopted an attitude which is fundamentally opposed to the solution of the Jewish problem".

Veesenmayer on the 30th of June 1944 reported this situation to Berlin. STEENGR/CHT, Ritter, and Erdmannsdorff were among those who were informed of the new development. Veesenmayer suggested "that pressure be brought to bear on the Slovak government demanding that they indicate their fundamental disinterestedness in Slovak Jews in Hungary. This would much facilitate operations here and would also clarify matters vis-à-vis the Hungarian government. - signed, Veesenmayer."

Reich Plenipotentiary Veesenmayer was informed by a telegram of June 14, 1944 that the Foreign Office had no objection to his meeting the German Envoy Ludin in Bratislava, to work out, together with Ludin, practical proposals for the treatment of the Jewish problem in Slovakia. This was done under the supervision of STEENGR/CHT, and with the knowledge of Erdmannsdorff. The document was found in the personal files of the defendant Veesenmayer.
On the 16th of June 1914, Veesenmayer urged the Foreign Office in a telegram to take further drastic steps against the Jews in Slovakia, "In view of the fact that the Jews there too represent most undesirable elements for political and military reasons." (Pros. Ex. 1644, NC-2261, Doc. Bk. 60 A, p. 96).

A curious situation had developed. While until March 19, 1941, numerous Jews from Slovakia were fleeing into Hungary, three months later the Jews from Hungary were fleeing back into Slovakia. (Ibid, p. 96). The Jews, struggling to save their lives, were running back and forth like trapped animals. While deportation measures were in full swing in Slovakia, they fled into Hungary, and when a new man-hunt started in Hungary, while in Slovakia there was a temporary let-up, the Jews ran back to Slovakia. Veesenmayer, in an effort to guarantee the final solution of the Jewish question, proposed that in both countries the measures should be of equal severity so as to discourage the Jews from attempting to escape.

Ludin and Veesenmayer were to work out a common plan of action through a meeting in Bratislava. Ambassador Ritter and numerous other officials of the Foreign Office were kept informed of intensifying moves against the Jews in Slovakia and Hungary.

State Secretary STEENGRACHT, who had discussed the matter with von Thadden, agreed in principle with the measures to be taken and requested that the proper coordination with the Personnel Division of the Foreign Office should be insured, so that, if necessary, an appropriate decree could be prepared (Ibid, p. 97).

At the beginning of the action in Slovakia the defendant FEZEE-SCHERZER was the key figure in the final decisions to be made. After May 1, 1943, the defendant STEENGRACHT took his place. All the leading officials of the Foreign Office, including the defendants NORDMANN, Ritter and Erichmannsdorff, were kept informed of the criminal actions prepared and carried out against the Jews in Slovakia. The defendant Veesenmayer played a decisive role in the last phase of the actions against the Jews in Slovakia as German Plenipotentiary in Budapest. The measures against the Jews in Hungary had direct repercussions for Slovakia.
The defendant Veesenmayer initiated drastic actions against the Jews in Slovakia in an effort to coordinate his own criminal actions in Hungary with those effectuated by his colleague in Slovakia.
The extermination of the Jews in Croatia was controlled and supervised by WEIZS. ECKE R and VOLR I NH. WEIZS. ECKE R, with the assistance of VOLR I NH, made the decisions on what means of pressure should be employed against the Croatian government. These men also, in close cooperation with their staff members Luther and Radomacher, and with the RSH., fixed the time-tables for the dealing of death to the Croatian Jews.

WEIZS. ECKE R and VOLR I NH also took care that the obstructions placed in the way of the deportations by the Italian administrators were overcome.

The decisive role which the defendant WEIZS. ECKE R played in decisions regarding deportations can be seen from a note signed by Radomacher and Luther, submitted to WEIZS. ECKE R, and dated October 28, 1941. (NG-162, Exh. 1627, Doc. EK. 61, page 25). At the same time this note is a clear example that the decisions on the Jewish deportations were made by WEIZS. ECKE R and VOLR I NH in closest cooperation with Luther in the Foreign Office.

In this note Radomacher inquired whether WEIZS. ECKE R would be willing to have the Slovakian and Croatian Jews included in the deportation of the German Jews to Poland. He mentioned to WEIZS. ECKE R that the Croatian/Slovakian governments would most certainly not object to these deportations since

"they themselves have taken actions of an extraordinarily severe nature against the Jews..."

"To both governments the strong suggestion should be made that they recall their Jewish nationals from Germany or that they deport them to ghettos in the East."

"Herewith submitted to State Secretary WEIZS. ECKE R via Under State Secretary Luther with a request to make a decision," Signed: Radomacher

(Ibid, page 25)

This document, as indicated, was submitted to WEIZS. ECKE R, who added in his own handwriting next to the words "for decision", the
note "agreed", followed by UELI.ZECHE's initials, and on the left hand side in UELI.ZECHE's handwriting is another note which reads: "Also to Under State Secretary Pol., to the Dirigent (illegible), to the Dirigent Law."

The initials of UELI.ZECHE are also on the document and then the words in UELI.ZECHE's handwriting - "Again to be submitted to me."

The procedure therefore was the following: The Legation Counselor Radomacher made drafts submitted these suggestions immediately to his superior, Luther. Luther passed the proposals up to UELI.ZECHE, who asked other departments, such as KOERLIN's Department and Albrecht's Legal Department, to take note and agree by initialing. If no objections were raised, then UELI.ZECHE himself made the final decision "agreed". Those "agreed", approvals or signatures under these documents were the signatures under death warrants when Luther and Radomacher were informed of UELI.ZECHE's only the operational angle remained for their own action.

Few days later Radomacher reported in a secret memorandum to Stummannfachrur Diekmann of the SS of the decision to which UELI.ZECHE had agreed, with other members of the Foreign Office, including UELI.ZECHE. Radomacher added:

"We shall give you further information on this matter as soon as we have received word from the above governments." (Ibid, page 26)

At the same time the German Embassies in Agram and Bucharest were informed of UELI.ZECHE's decision, as to which Jews should be included in the deportations, and instructed to discuss the matter with the foreign government. (Ibid, page 27).

Trouble with Italy.

The deportation of the Jews from Croatia encountered certain difficulties in the Italian sphere of influence in occupied Croatia. Croatia had in principle consented to the evacuation of Jews by allowing the deportation of 4-5,000 Jews from the second zone.
occupied by the Italians. .. deportation, in the opinion of Luther, which could only be carried out with German help,

"as complications are to be expected from the Italians. We are in possession of real facts which prove that Italian authorities opposed Croatian measures in the interest of wealthy Jews." (NG-3560, Exh. 1715, Doc. Bk. 51, page 29)

The Italian Chief of Staff of the Isonzo region in Slovenia told the Germans

"that it is incompatible with the honor of the Italian Army to take measures against the Jews as it had been requested by the O.T. (German road construction organisation)" (Ibid, page 29)

The Foreign Office, however, was willing to take a chance and to start even without the Italian consent, the deportation of all the Jews in Croatia.

This memorandum, dated July 25, 1942, was transmitted to Ribbentrop, via ELIZA.SCHER and bears ELIZA.SCHER's initials.

It was recommended that the German ambassador in Rome, ambassador von Hackensen be heard in addition. Before the measures set forth in this memorandum were put through, Hackensen's viewpoint was to be heard. (Ibid, page 31). ELIZA.SCHER again initialed the document which gave Hackensen the authority to act.

The German ambassador in Rome, Hackensen, answered in a telegram, dated October 26, 1942, distributed to the defendants ELIZA.SCHER, RITTER and ELIAS.INDORFF indicating the success he had with the Italian government "which is now willing, in accordance with Germany's plan to arrest all Croatian Jews and put them in concentration camps" (NG-5747, Exh. 2777, Doc. Bk. 204-...).

The German ambassador in a telegram, dated January 16, 1943 (found in the files of the State Secretary with the initials of the defendant ELIZA.SCHER) furthermore proves that the defendant ELIZA.SCHER was continuously kept informed of the activity of Hackensen, his ambassador and friend in Rome, in pressing the Italian government to follow Germany's anti-Jewish policy (NG-5459, Exh. C-233, Doc. Bk. 204-...).
On the 20th of August 1942 Minister Kascho, the representative in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia had sent a secret telegram in which he reiterated that an agreement with the Croatian government had been reached regarding the evacuation of the Jews, and that

"we ask that the Italians issue directives to their troops there, to assist in the execution of that measure...".

(Wo-2368, Exh. 1716, Doc.B. 61, page 32)

On the distribution list of this secret telegram were MIZ-C, HITLER, and KORIBN.

Four weeks went by before a clarification of the situation could be reached. The defendant HITLER was in touch with Hitler himself and the Fuehrer requested a memorandum on the matter by the German Minister Kascho in Zagreb, so that he could discuss the matter with the Duco directly. (No-33.5, Exh. 1717, Doc.B. 61, page 34).

"Thus the correct diplomatic language is to be adopted so as not to offend Italy, and the Duco, Kascho himself, is to bring the memorandum to Berlin and to hand it over to the Fuehrer personally." (Ibid., page 34)

He enumerates the reasons why Germany and Italy should work out together a policy to their mutual interest. The new Crm. legislation against the Jews had already been introduced in the northern part of Croatia, but not yet in the southern part. The Duco had already expressed once his approval of the plan regarding the southern part and the local Croatian authorities are willing to cooperate.

The secret telegram was initialed by HITLER and dated September 24, 1942.

On the 14th of October 1942 the German envoy in Zagreb reported to the Foreign Office that the German Reich will receive from the Croatian government 30 marks for each evacuated Jew.

"Preparatory measures for the evacuation of the Jews from the zones occupied by the Italians and confidential registrations of all Jews will be carried out by police attaches."

(Wo-2367, Exh. 1719, Doc.B. 61, page 39)

"Indly inform the Reich Main Security Office." (Ibid., page 39)
WEIZSÄCKER, RITTER UHRABIN and ERDINANDSBERFF received copies of this information.

On the 20th of October 1942 Kasche reported to the Foreign Office in a secret telegram, initialed by WEIZSÄCKER, and also distributed to RITTER, UHRABIN and ERDINANDSBERFF, that

"orkovic (the Croatian Foreign Minister) told me that the Croatian government would point out to the Italian government that it had agreements with the Reich concerning the deportation of Jews, according to which all Jews were to be deported from Croatia. Without the consent of the Reich, Croatia could therefore not simply proceed to let the Jews emigrate to Italy. If deportations to Italy should become possible, however the Croats would have to demand the same conditions as they had agreed upon with the Reich." (NG-28/L, Exh. 1720, Doc.Bk. 61, page 40)

The German Foreign Office enlisted the help of the Croatian "puppet" government. The Croats, even though willing to play the German game, insisted however on obtaining the property of the Jews in Croatia, and in return in paying a certain amount of money "per head" for Jews evacuated.

The German Envoy reproached the Italians to speed up delaying tactics.

"Apparently our Embassy was incorrectly informed concerning the decision of the Duce, or else the decision of the Duce was disregarded by subordinate authorities." (Ibid, page 40)

Kasche then concluded by emphasizing that to hand over the Jews to Italy "runs counter to the all European Jewish policy for which we stand." (Ibid, page 40)

The agreement between the German government and the Croatian government contained the stipulation that the entire assets of the Jews became the property of Croatia. The Duce had decided that the Jews in the coastal zones were to be treated in the same manner as all Jews in Croatia and therefore permission for the deportation of the Jews from the coastal area should be requested from the Italians.
"If however the Italians are absolutely determined to participate in the Solution of the Jewish Question in Croatia, the Croatian government agrees to allow the Jews to be deported from the coastal zone to prove Italian territory, but on the same conditions under which they were being evacuated by the Germans, namely, that the Croatian states becomes owner of their property and that the Jews lose Croatian citizenship..." (Ibid, page 42)

The Foreign Office, after receiving this information from Kasche, a secret teletype note, submitted to, among others, WEIZSÄCKER, RITTER, WERMANN, and ERDLINNSDORFF, that the Italians refused to transfer the Jews to Germany. The opinion had spread in Croatia that the Jews were put in concentration camps through German pressure. (NG-2345, Exh. 1722, Doc. Bk. 61, page 46).

However, this did not end the difficulties which the Germans encountered in Croatia with the Italians. Kasche reported to the Foreign Office by a secret teletype note, submitted to, among others, WEIZSÄCKER, RITTER, WERMANN, and ERDLINNSDORFF, that the Italians refused to transfer the Jews to Germany. The opinion had spread in Croatia that the Jews were put in concentration camps through German pressure. (NG-2345, Exh. 1722, Doc. Bk. 61, page 46).

The local Italian authorities declined interference of the Croats or their participation in the execution of the measures as well as the seizure of the Jewish property by the Italians. (Ibid, page 46).

Confronted with this Italian attitude the German Foreign Office representatives continued their efforts and in the end were in a position to report a "complete success".

The Foreign Office kept close contact with the Reich Main Security Office in all phases of the development of the situation in Croatia. The defendants WEIZSÄCKER, WERMANN, ERDLINNSDORFF, and RITTER followed each step of the development. The subordinates of WEIZSÄCKER in Berlin and in Croatia carried out the policy cleared in Berlin. Kasche on the 4th of March 1943 was in a position to write to his
superiors in a secret teletype (NG-2348, Exh. 1723, Doc.Bk. 61, page 47) which was distributed by 'LEIZ. ECKER,' that by the end of the week the Jewish action would be completed. Deportation would take place by districts in small groups of 20 to 150 persons. Special cars would be made available by the German Railroad in ... 2,000 Jews were involved and police escort was insured. (Ibid, page 47).

"The deportation will be independent of the delivery of per capita payment and foodstuffs. Please inform RSHA IV B 33-Sturmbannführer Riehmann." (Ibid, page 47)

A month later, on April 10, 1943, the Foreign Office inquired as to a report of the deportation measures and the status of negotiations with the Italian offices in regard to the Jews living in the Italian occupied zones of Croatia. (NG-2347, Exh. 1724, Doc.Bk. 61, page 48).

On the 22nd of April 1943 the Foreign Office in Berlin was informed by Kascho that the Jewish question has been solved in Croatia and that only individual cases were to be cleaned up in the coastal regions.

"The Croatian authorities have shown full understanding for the anti-Jewish measures...

"Difficulties are presented by individual cases of those Jews who came from the outside to Croatia...

"I have given instructions that in such cases the Jews should be arrested by us and deported to the Reich." (NG-2349, Exh. 1726, Doc.Bk. 61, page 53)

Attached to this report of Kascho's is a police report, dated April 18, 1944, signed by Riehlin, an 33 Obersturmbann Leader. It confirmed that the 33 participated in the measures against the Jews in Croatia and stated:
"...that the German Legation, by way of the Foreign Office, had been notified of the plan at hand." (Ibid, page 54.)

The responsibility of the Foreign Office in the deportation of the Jews from Croatia is clearly shown by this evidence.

By July 15, 1943 only 800 Jews remained in concentration camps in Croatia, "mostly women and children." (NG-2413, Exh. 1725, Doc. Bk. 61, page 49). The Foreign Office through Thadden requested that measures be taken immediately for the evacuation of those remaining 800 Jews to the East. (NG-2413, Exh. 1725, Doc. Bk. 61, page 49)
In the late summer of 1941, the German Foreign Office started the "liberation" of German-occupied Serbia from Jews, gypsies, and other undesirable elements by concentration camps, deportation, and liquidation. The defendants VEIZSLECKER, VEESEMAYER, Veesenmayer, Ritter, and Erdmannsdorff participated in the various phases of this policy.

On the 8th of December 1941, a secret telegram signed by Veesenmayer, who was on a special mission in the Balkans, was sent to the Foreign Office, and distributed to VEIZSLECKER, VEESEMANN, Ritter, and Erdmannsdorff, informing the Foreign Office of the necessity that "at least all male Jews be placed into custody." (Pros. Ex. 1714, RG-33514, Doc. Bk. 61, p. 3)

The number in question, for whom a concentration camp was being built, was estimated at 8,000. The defendant Veesenmayer suggested to his superiors that these Jews be placed outside the country as quickly as possible and deposited on Romanian territory.

"I request your creating the necessary prerequisites with regard to getting the Romanian consent." (Ibid, p. 3)

The document carries the note "Is being taken care of through VEESEMANN." (Ibid, p. 3)

Five days later the Foreign Office answered the defendant Veesenmayer in a note which was submitted to VEESEMANN, via State Secretary VEIZSLECKER, informing Veesenmayer that the Reich Foreign Minister held the transportation of the 3,000 Jews from Serbia into Romania unworkable.

"Some other way would have to be found." (Ibid, p. 4)

On September 11, 1941, Luther after having secured the consent of VEESEMANN’s and Erdmannsdorff’s Section Pol. IV, who signed the document before dispatch, instructed the German Legation in Belgrade that the deportation of the Jews to foreign territories "is no solution for the Jewish question." (Ibid, p. 5). It was suggested that the Jews be placed in work camps and used for necessary public works. It was further announced that this decision had been made in agreement with VEESEMANN’s Department and the matter would be handled in the future through Depart-
ment Deutschland. WORMLANN himself initialed the document.

A few days earlier the Political Division IV of WORMLANN had received a secret teletype from Veesenmayer and Benzler in which it was urged that

"a quick and draconic solution of the Jewish question in Serbia is a most urgent and practical necessity." (Ibid, p. 6)

Since this was a second cable, it was WEIZSAECKER's duty to take cognizance.

Veesenmayer requested directives from the Reich Foreign Office in order to be able to put "utmost pressure" on the German Military Commander of Serbia, who disagreed with Veesenmayer.

Veesenmayer indicated that he did not expect any resistance on the part of the Serbian government or the Serbian population. He suggested that the Foreign Office enlist the aid of the Reich Fuehrer-SS by inducing him to

"issue an identical order to the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe of the Security Police and to the Standartenfuehrer of the Security Service, Fuchs." (Ibid, p. 6)

The close cooperation which existed between the Reich Foreign Office and the Reich Fuehrer-SS cannot be shown more clearly. The German Military authorities in occupied Serbia resisted a "quick and draconic solution" of the Jewish question in Serbia. However, the Foreign Office representatives and the SD and the SS made common cause against the Army representatives during certain phases of the anti-Jewish policy in Serbia.

On the 13th of September 1941 Rademacher, a liaison man between the Foreign Office and the RSHA, reported the answer of that agency. The urgent request to deport 8,000 male Jews from Serbia to either the General Government of Poland or to occupied Russia met with considerable transportation and other difficulties. He was desperate about a possible postponement of the action against the Jews, which would have been against the office directives. However, Eichmann of the RSHA declared such a deportation impossible for the time being and proposed to the Foreign Office to initiate shootings of the Jews. (Ibid, p. 8).
On September 28, 1941 the German Legation in Belgrade again cabled to the Foreign Office regarding the immediate deportation from Serbia of the male Jews, reminding the Foreign Office of its promise of assistance in having the Jews and also the Free Masons shipped somewhere down the Danube, or to concentration camps in Germany or Poland.

"An immediate solution of the Jewish question is from the political viewpoint at present the most important task here, and is a prerequisite for beginning to eliminate the Free Masons and the anti-German intelligentsia....

We will have to cope with the rest of the Jews, about 20,000, and their family members. As far as transportation problems are concerned the simplest solution seems to be to put them on an island in the delta of the Danube. I have been informed that this procedure has been successfully adopted for the deportation of the Jews from Czechoslovakia."

Together with Vessemayer I ask you urgently for your assistance in this matter which is the first prerequisite for a lasting appeasement for which we are all striving." (Ibid, p. 11)

Luther and the Department Deutschland carried on some of the correspondence regarding the Jewish question in Serbia, and it should be noted how step by step he referred to directives he had obtained from above and, on the other hand, informed his superiors, including the defendant WEIZSAECKER, of the developments in Serbia regarding the Jews. Thus he submitted to WEIZSAECKER on 2 October 1941 a secret note, which the latter initialed, summarizing all the important details of the Serbian situation. He complained that the Military Commander of Serbia did not seem to develop the necessary energy for his task.

"It is my opinion (Luther reports to WEIZSAECKER) that the Military Commander is responsible for the immediate elimination of these 8,000 Jews. In other territories other military commanders have taken care of considerably greater numbers of Jews without even mentioning it."

Luther then informed WEIZSAECKER that since the Military Commander of Serbia is such a failure, he requested from WEIZSAECKER authorization for discussing this question with Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich,

"who will be coming to Berlin from Prague for a few days. I am convinced that in agreement with him we will very soon arrive at a clear solution for this question." (Ibid, p. 13)
Luther received the answer from his superiors that the Reich Fuehrer-SS

"he contacted immediately and the question be cleared whether he cannot also take over those 8,000 Jews, in order to deport them to Eastern Poland or some other place." (Ibid, p. 14)

The Foreign Office considered the matter of the Serbian Jews of immediate urgency and Rademacher was sent to Belgrade in October 1941 on a temporary duty assignment. The purpose of the trip was to find out on the spot whether the problem of the 8,000

"Jewish instigators, whose deportation has been requested by the Legation could not be taken care of on the spot." (Ibid, p. 15)

Rademacher reported that upon his arrival Minister Bonzlur and other German Legation officials told him that indeed part of the problem had already been liquidated on the spot by shooting 2,000 of those 8,000 Jews -

"as a reprisal for attacks on German soldiers." (Ibid, p. 15)

The German Military Commander had furthermore ordered that 100 Serbs should be shot for each German killed. First, 50 Communist leaders were shot and when they did not have enough Communists "they replenished the quota by Jews", which were then called Communist instigators. (Ibid, p. 15)

Rademacher continued in his report that

"During the discussion it was stated that to begin with, there were not 8,000 Jews, but only about 4,000 and only 3,500 can be shot. The remaining 500 are needed by the State Police in order to keep up the health service and discipline in the ghetto which is to be established." (Ibid, p. 15)

Rademacher negotiated with an "export" of the RSHA on the Jewish question, Sturmbannfuehrer Wolmann, who was attached to the German Legation, and was informed

1. The male Jews will have been shot by the end of this week, which will solve the problem mentioned in the report of the Legation.

2. The rest of about 20,000 Jews, women, children, and old people as well as about 1,500 gypsies - the male ones will also be shot - are to be concentrated in a ghetto in the so-called gypsy quarters of the city of Belgrade. A minimum of food could be..."
guaranteed for the winter." (Ibid, p. 16)

The Foreign Office official Turner, reported in addition that the concentration of the remaining Jews in the ghetto was only a temporary measure because the ghetto was a center of disease and should be burned down. Therefore, the Jews and gypsies who are not shot for reprisals will sooner or later be deported during the night to the Serbian island of Mitrovica. (Ibid, p. 16).

A Standartenführer Fuchs believed

"Local solution of the entire Jewish question is possible." (Ibid, p. 26)

Fuchs and Veimann, the operational experts of the RSHA in Belgrade, were according to Rademacher, in favor of a "local solution" and Rademacher concluded that it would be more practical to deal with the "Specialist Veimann" on the solution of the Jewish question in Serbia.

On the 15th of November 1941, Rademacher submitted a supplementary note, initialed by Luther, to State Secretary VEIZSBECKER, who initialed the report. To this note VEIZSBECKER remarks on the 22nd of November, with his own signature, that the Foreign Office is the competent agency for these deportations.

"The Foreign Office will have to occupy itself with the deportation of the Jews from Serbia to other countries." (Ibid, p. 20)

VEIZSBECKER adds that the Foreign Office officials should not work on the operational side of the measures. This was to be done by the competent military and police authorities in Serbia. In the opinion of VEIZSBECKER, the Foreign Office is only responsible for the deportation of Jews to other countries." (Ibid, p. 20)

By December Bensler called Rademacher, indicating that the remaining Jews of Serbia were to be taken to a concentration camp, Solun, in Croatia. Bensler insisted that the Jews should be deported to the East as soon as possible, but Rademacher replied to Bensler

"That this was out of the question before the spring, since at this moment the deportation of Jews from Germany is underway." (Ibid, p. 21)

The sad story of the fate of the Serbian Jews proves that VEIZSBECKER himself regarded the deportation of Jews from satellite countries to other
places as the rightful jurisdiction of the Foreign Office. Already in
May 1942 an interim report of the Foreign Office (Pros. Exh. C-278,
doc. NG 4440, Doc. Bk. 204 A) stated in respect to Serbia:

"There is no longer a Jewish problem
in Serbia."


On the occasion of a reception by the Reich Foreign Minister on November 26, 1941, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popoff touched on the program of according like treatment to the Jews of all European nationalities, and pointed out the difficulties that the Bulgarians had in the application of their Jewish laws to Jews of foreign nationalities. (Ex. 1455, RG-2566 J, IB 59, p. 136)

In the course of discussions about this problem in the German Foreign Office, the German Legation in Sofia was instructed by a note of June 19, 1942 which was signed by WEIZSÄCKER, WORRIAN, Presser and, by the latter's Section IV, by the Director of the Economic Division and by his Section IV, and by Luther and Ribbentrop.

This note instructed the German Minister in Sofia:

"If the question is put from the Bulgarian side as to whether Germany is ready to deport Jews from Bulgaria to the East, the question should be answered in the affirmative, but in respect to the time of the deporting should be answered evasively." (Ibid, p. 137)

On April 3, 1943 a Foreign Office memorandum was prepared by Wagner on the situation in Bulgaria (NO-4189, Exhibit No. 1790, Document Book No. 62-B, page 40), according to which the Jews of Bulgarian nationality who were living in Germany were subject to all measures concerning the Jews, including deportation to the Eastern Territories, (Ibid, page 40)

Upon German instigation Bulgaria itself had decided to deport the Jews to the Eastern Territories and accepted German help in this endeavor.
"A German expert, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Damek, has been detailed for this purpose and assigned to the German police attaché in Sofia since the end of January 1943. The decision for the deportation to the Eastern territories was made only after diverse resistance. The Bulgarian Minister for the Interior, for instance, was more in favor of concentrating the Jews in camps within the country ..." (Ibid, page 40)

There were large groups of persons in Bulgaria who were in favor of resettlement and advocated emigration to Palestine.

"Here the arguments are principally based on humanitarian considerations. Only recently a proposal was made in Sobranje to cease the deportation of Jews, since the fate awaiting them in the German Eastern territories would be in complete contradiction to the most fundamental commandments of humanity."

The character of these deportations was obvious for all readers of this memorandum. Wagner himself stated that these deportation measures were considered to be "in complete contradiction to the most fundamental commandments of humanity"; yet he went on to report that, in spite of this opposition, deportation of at first 20,000 Jews was ordered and carried out involving above all Jews from the New Bulgarian area of Macedonia (about 8,000), and Thrace (about 6,000), most of whom were not Bulgarian citizens, whereas the Jews in old Bulgaria in the main were kept and allocated for labor.

"According to the latest reports from our agencies in Bulgaria 7,740 Jews from Macedonia and 4,219 from Thrace have already been deported ..." (Ibid, page 41)

By the end of May 1943 Wagner expected the completion of the action. By that time all Jews will have lost their Bulgarian nationality on leaving the country.
"Subsequent complete disinterestedness on the part of Bulgaria towards the deportees, limitation of personal luggage to the minimum, excluding all valuables, and official seizure of property left behind, exception of persons living in mixed carriages. On the whole, the deportation is progressing smoothly."

(Ibid, page 41)

For this specialized service of the Third Reich, the Bulgarian government was called upon for some remuneration to Germany.

"Originally we had envisaged a sum of 250 Reich marks per Jew, which, however, the Bulgarians considered too high. Eventually we did not pursue the matter further and showed it until further arrangements are made." (Ibid, page 41)

On another page of this document, also signed by Wagner, the transit of Jewish children from Roumania to Palestine is mentioned.

"Then these plans became known to the German Embassy in Sofia was ordered to try to prevent these transports." (Ibid, page 42)

In spite of the promises made to the Germans that the transports would be stopped, Wagner learned that from Bulgaria as well as Roumania, emigrations of Jews to Palestine were in progress or preparation. A person stationed in Turkey was denounced by Wagner as dealing with this Jewish emigration for his own personal gain.

Wagner also identified a steamer which was being loaded with approximately 1,000 passengers, suspected of being Jews. The name of the steamer was given as "Continental" and information was given as to the route the steamer would take.

The Foreign Office seemed to have met with some setbacks in the execution of the program in Bulgaria. A report from Sofia on the subject: "Handling of the Jewish Problem".
signed by the Foreign Office representative Beckerlo and dated June 7, 1943, assured headquarters in Berlin

"that we here are doing everything within our power to arrive in a suitable manner at a final liquidation of the Jewish question."

(MSS-2357, Exhibit No. 1791, Document Book No. 62-B, page 54)

The Beckerlo report continued mentioning difficulties arising from the

"mentality of the Bulgarian people who are lacking in the ideological enlightenment which our own people enjoy. Having lived all their lives with Armenians, Greeks and gypsies, the Bulgarians see no harm in the Jew to justify special measures against him. Since the Bulgarian Jews are mainly craftsmen and are frequently much more industrious than other workers, I believe the Bulgarian government to be right in approaching the problem from different aspects ..." (ibid, page 46)

"I shall keep an eye on the Jewish problem and endeavor to expedite the solution as far as possible since the matter is bound up with an increased strengthening of our position and is closely linked with our war aims ..." (Ibid, page 47)

Attached to this communication the Foreign Office received a secret report, signed by Beckerlo, addressed to the Reich Security Main Office, dated June 7, 1943, recapitulating the work on the deportation of Jews from Bulgaria.

On the 5th of April 1943 the deportation of the Jews from Bulgaria had been in process, but the Bulgarian government pressed for labor assignment of the Jews in Bulgaria itself.

In May 1943 certain political developments in Bulgaria gave the pretext to resume the deportations and provided the possibilities:

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"(a) Deportation of all Jews in Bulgaria to the German Eastern territories, for reasons of internal security.

(b) Evacuation into the provinces of the 25,000 Jews living in Sofia, in case plan (a) cannot be carried out." (Ibid, page 49)

Beckerle reported that the available police forces were inadequate to carry out an effective raid on short notice; finally it was decided to adopt plan "(b)" for the time being. (Ibid, pages 49-50). Immediately after the evacuation of the Jews

"the furniture and housing equipment of the evacuated Jews from Sofia will be auctioned immediately after removal from the premises." (Ibid, page 50)

The report found encouragement in the thought that the Jews arriving in the provinces would cause the food prices to increase which in turn would increase anti-Jewish feeling. (Ibid, page 51). For the evacuation of the Jews into the Bulgarian provinces

"can only be regarded as a temporary measure which must lead to the deportation of the Jews to the Eastern territories."
(Ibid, page 51)

The Bulgarian population in Sofia had reacted strongly against the German plans for the Jews.

"News of the measure of the evacuation of Jews into the provinces leaked out in Sofia on 23 May 1943. On 21 May 1943 a considerable number of demonstrators tried to march to the Royal Palace in order to protest ..." (Ibid, page 51)

According to the plan, the Jews were to be removed from Sofia by the 7th of June 1943. In view of the difficulties the Foreign Office representative ...
"has made repeated presentations to Prime Minister Filof ... to deport all Jews to the Eastern territories." (Ibid, page 53)

On the 24th of June Beckerle reported from Sofia to the Foreign Office in Berlin that the deportation of the Jews from Sofia into the provinces could be regarded as concluded, and that approximately 20,000 Jews had been deported. (K5-096, Exhibit No. 1792, Document Book No. 62-B, page 55). The general situation in the provinces which Beckerle had predicted in his report of June 7, 1943 had developed to the disadvantage of the Jews whose presence caused food shortages and rent increases almost everywhere. (Ibid, page 55). Thus he could state that in spite of a temporary delay in the measures leading toward a final solution of the Jewish question in Bulgaria, future events would constitute a springboard for further developments in accordance with German aims.

These telegrams from Sofia to the Foreign Office were all sealed matter so that the new State Secretary SIEGLEIGHT, who received them, had an opportunity to decide whether he should continue to participate in this murder scheme or not. SIEGLEIGHT did.

The representative of the Foreign Office in Bulgaria directed by his headquarter in Berlin under the control of the defendant SIEGLEIGHT, was the moving power in introducing the Bulgarian government to carry out anti-Jewish measures in accordance with Germany's plans.

The resistance of the Bulgarian population was qualified by the German representative of the Foreign Office in Sofia as being based on lack of enlightenment. This lack of enlightenment was not present in the German Foreign Office. On the contrary, the leading officials of the Foreign Office...
were enlightened enough to do all they could to bring the Bulgarian people to see the light and consent to have their Jews deported.
The annihilation of the Rumanian Jews started in 1942 in Germany under the State Secretaryship of the defendant WEIZSÄCKER. He, together with ROMANIN and Luther, made the necessary arrangements with the Rumanian government in order to receive Rumanian consent for those deportations. Gradually Rumanian Jews were deported to the East from Germany and all German-occupied territories. But death for the Rumanian Jews was to pursue them into even their homeland. Now the Foreign Office, first under WEIZSÄCKER and later under SEEMERT, pressed the Rumanian government to comply with their terms for the Jews of Europe as set forth in the exhibits of this chapter.

On November 13, 1941 the defendant WEIZSÄCKER was informed by the German Minister in Bucharest, Manfred von Killinger, that the Rumanian government had agreed to have the Jews of Rumanian nationality living in Gorj county deported to ghettos in the East together with the German Jews.

The document in evidence bears the initials of WEIZSÄCKER, and was distributed to ROMANIN and Rohrstrasse, among others.

On February 11, 1942 Luther through WEIZSÄCKER submitted a memorandum to Ribbentrop, regarding deportation of the Rumanian Jews. The Rumanian authorities had carried through "wild-cat" deportations of Jews into the occupied Eastern territories and Alfred Rosenberg, the German Minister for the occupied Eastern territories, had objected to these un系統ic deportations, since the Jews were turned over to the Ukraine-territory which was under his jurisdiction.

"Especially since the danger of the spread of typhus has increased by the sale of the Jews' articles of clothing."

(3-R-317, Exhibit No. 1779, Document Book No. 62-B, page 2)
The Romanians had dumped the Jews into German occupied Eastern territories where they were liquidated and their articles of clothing sold by the murderers. The reference of Alfred Rosenberg to the appearance of the Jews' articles of clothing in German occupied Eastern territories cannot be explained otherwise. Certainly the Romanians did not deport the Jews to the Eastern territories in order to allow the Jews to carry on a clothing business. What appeared on the Ukraine market as Jews' clothing, could only be that which was taken from the dead bodies of the Jews.

Luther proposed to his superiors, including HETZEBOCKER, that influence be exerted so that the Romanians deport Jews only if this has first been agreed upon in advance with Germany through the regular channels via the Foreign Office." (Ibid, page 2)

"The Reich Security Main Office, through Zieckmann, also protested against the premature deportation of the Romanian Jews to the Ukraine since it interfered with the deportation of the Jews from German occupied territory. He stated that should the deportation of the Romanian Jews continue:

"I am reserving myself the right of security police measures." (Ibid, page 4)

"Security police measures" from the mouth of Zieckmann could only have meant that he was threatening to kill the Jews on the spot.

On the 12th of May 1942 the Foreign Office was informed that the German Embassy in Bucharest was acting in accordance with instructions issued by the Foreign Office in Berlin.

In a handwritten note to this document, it is stated:

"About 28,000 Jews were brought to German villages in Transylvania. In the meantime they were liquidated." (Ibid, page 6)
This note was initialed by Redenchor and dated the 18th of May. Section Pol IV of WURZMAN received information copy.

On the 19th of May 1942 the news of the liquidation was confirmed by a secret report to the Foreign Office. The murder of the Jews in reported simply in the following words:

"A considerable portion of the Jews in Transylvania died ..." (Ibid, page 8)

On the 17th of August 1942 Luther submitted to HELLER and WURZMAN a memorandum, initialed by both, giving details of the latest progress made with regard to solving the Jewish problem in Romania. (Exhibit 1790, Ng-3558, Document Book No. 62-B, page 12).

The Romanian government in November 1941 had agreed to the deportation of the Romanian Jews from the Reich, thus permitting Germany to include them in the measures proceeding in the Reich and in the occupied Eastern territories. (Ng-3558, Exhibit No. 1790, Document Book No. 62-B, page 10).

The Romanian Consulaties, however, protested against the measures, asserting that they were in possession of contradictory directives and therefore the Romanian Minister in Berlin insisted that the Romanian Jews be treated no worse than the Jews of other countries, for instance, Italy, Switzerland, and Hungary. Thereupon the German Minister in Bucharest, Killinger, was asked by the Foreign office in Berlin to clarify that question with the Romanian government. The results were as follows: The Romanian government repeated that it was up to the German government to subject the Jews of Romanian nationality to the German measures against the Jews. This permitted, orders were given to the HSS to continue the partially interrupted measures against the Jews.
An official of the Romanian government requested, via the German Legation, to be permitted to come to Berlin in order to discuss with the Foreign Office the practical execution of the deportation in Romania. (Ibid., pages 10/11).

The Romanian government official thus acknowledged the competency of the Foreign Office in dealing with the deportation measures in Romania and in Germany.

Luther informed WEISLOMER and WIERMANN and both acknowledged receipt of the information by their initials.

On the 19th of August 1942 Rintelon of Ribbentrop's office reported that:

"The political and technical preparations with regard to the solution of the Jewish question in Romania have been completed ... so that the evacuation transports may proceed in the near future ..."

"Commencing approximately on 10 September 1942 it is intended to remove the Jews from Romania in current transports to the Lublin sector, where those fit for work will be allocated accordingly, and the remainder will be given special treatment ('Sonderbehandlung')." (MD-3599; Exhibit No. 1081, Document Book No. 62 B, page 13) also 1928, KG 3039, Book 27B, p. 40

According to Rintelon's communication the distinction between Jews fit for work (work Jews) and the remainder, unfit for work, is made clear in its criminal consequences. The remainder, unfit for work, were subjected to "Sonderbehandlung" (Special Treatment), a term which directly implies that they were being physically exterminated.

This document, signed by Rintelon, was classified as "Secret Reich Matter", the distribution of which was handled in the Foreign Office in the following way:

"When a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office it was first sent from the Telegram Control..."
Office to the Decoding Office for decoding. The Decoding Office micrographed the decoded text. All reproduced copies received a rubber stamp 'Secret Reich Matter. To be treated as a sealed matter'. In the office of the State Secretary a distribution list was put on the telegrams with a rubber stamp. The State Secretary checked on the distribution list those officials who were to receive copies of the telegram. The office of the State Secretary collected the copies destined for the various offices and had them delivered to them against receipt once or several times a day. In case an official who was not listed on the distribution list was to receive such a telegram, his name was added in handwriting usually at the bottom of the distribution list. Officials other than those checked by the State Secretary on the distribution list, could be given copies only on orders of the State Secretary.

"The recipient of each distributed copy was marked by a line on the list. Those officials who also received the respective telegram, could be pointed out by a check mark. The recipient, therefore, knew with which officials he could talk about the contents without violating secrecy obligations.

"The State Secretary, who immediately received a carbon copy of all incoming telegrams, could order in individual cases that also telegrams which arrived without being marked 'top secret' were to be treated as sealed matter..."

(The 4534, Exhibit No. 1526)

The Document No. 3539, Exhibit No. 1751, Document Book No. 80-3, was such a 'Secret Reich Matter', which came to the attention of the defendant WEIZSLÄGER, who, according to its contents and importance, decided upon its distribution. The Document in evidence is not the original, but one of the copies which were reproduced by the Decoding Office of the Foreign Office. A rubber stamp bearing the distribution list of the main departments of the Foreign Office was marked on the left hand side of the document and bears a check mark referred to in Albrecht's affidavit.

There can be no doubt that the defendant WEIZSLÄGER had...
knowledge of this telegram. The fact that it is not initialed or signed by him is explained by the fact that it is a copy sent to Ministerial Director Wiel of the Foreign Office's Economic division who marked it with his initials, on the right hand side of the document.

Thus all precautions had been taken that no legal or political claims could arise in the opinion of German agencies from the mass murder of innocent people.

This report indicated that "provisions have been made that these Jews will lose their nationality after crossing the Romanian frontier." (Ibid, page 13).

Obviously, the German agencies did not trust the Romanian government. Possibly a later Romanian government might claim indemnity for the murder of the Romanian Jews. Therefore, the German agencies were careful to have these Jews declared stateless by an act of the Romanian government, in order to forestall all possible claims which any Romanian government could make regarding these Jews.

This proves how carefully all aspects of Germany's policy against the Jews were studied by the various agencies and that all possible precautions were taken in order to avoid the consequences of the crimes perpetrated.

On August 29, 1942 the confusion regarding the Romanian Jews was straightened out, since the Romanian authorities again allowed the government of the Reich to carry out the measures against the Romanian Jews.

"Consequently the Foreign Office has no doubt that the deportations which were interrupted
to some extent will be started anew and that the Romanian Jews in the Reich and in the occupied territories will be included in the anti-Jewish measures."

Luther reported at the same time to the German Legation in Bucharest that

"I have requested the Reich Security Main Office to continue the deportation ..."

"If, on occasion, the argument, which was presented by the Romanian Minister here, should be brought up there, namely that the Romanian Jews must not be treated worse than the Jews of other countries, I ask you to point out that the Hungarian Jews are also included in these measures just as has been the case with the Croatian and Slovenian Jews up to date. It would be wrong to make further comparisons with other countries, since this is part of the gradual accomplishment of a general solution and because further negotiations regarding this topic are pending." (Ibid, page 16)

"I presume that the work will proceed smoothly from now ..." (Ibid, page 17)

Both documents were signed and initialed by Luther. The dispatch to Bucharest and the instruction to Bucharest were only dispatched after having been approved by Section Pol IV of ACHRAH who stated in his direct examination that he assumed the responsibility for acts of his section.

(NA-2196, Exhibit No. 1782, Document Book No. 62-3, page 15)

On the 12th of December 1942 the German ambassador in Bucharest, who had previously insisted that he was doing everything in order to get the Jewish question solved in Romania, under the control of the Foreign Office, (NA-2195, Exhibit No. 1783, Document Book No. 62-4, page 12), now reported that he had objected to Marshall Antonescu's desire to let 75,000 to 80,000 Jews go to Palestine and Syria.

"In my opinion, Marshall Antonescu intends to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, he wants to make the much-needed 16 billion Lek, ..."
and on the other hand, he wants in a comfortable manner to get rid of a large number of Jews, who are causing him difficulties in the field of domestic policy. He declines a radical measure against those Jews who have not been proven to be Bolsheviks ..."

"I therefore would like you to inform me at an early date of the attitude of the Foreign Office. Signed: Killinger."

(NS-3936, Exhibit No. 1784, Document Book No. 62-B, page 23)

This telegram was distributed to WEIZSÄCKER, WOLFF, Rittner, and HEDRINKE. The document is initialed by WEIZSÄCKER.

On the 9th of January 1943 the decision of the Foreign Office was reached and sent by Luther to Killinger. It was dispatched only after having been approved by WOLFF in two sections Pol IV and Pol VII.

"The plan for the emigration of Jews to Palestine and Syria, as proposed by the local Government Commissioner, should be prevented by all means. It represents only a partial solution of the Jewish question, which, in view of the general principles, followed by the German government in the European solution of the Jewish question, cannot be accepted.

(NS-2200, Exhibit No. 1785, Document Book No. 62-B, page 27)

Again on March 11, 1943 the German Embassy in Bucharest was informed that

"emigration from countries allied with Germany cannot be approved by the German government."

(NS-2194, Exhibit No. 1786, Document Book No. 62-B, page 30)

Even Jewish children were excluded from being saved. Then the Foreign Office learned that 72 Jewish children had been shipped via Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, that 270 Jewish children were to follow, and that finally 500 Jewish children were to be shipped in the same way to Palestine, instructions ...
were sent to the German authorities in Bucharest.

"Please do your utmost to prevent emigration and transit shipments of Jews to Palestine and report about results." (Ibid., page 32)

At the same time the German representatives in Sofia were informed by the Foreign Office in Berlin to:

"... oppose these transports of Jewish children in every possible way and report on the results."

(K3-1782, Exhibit No. 1787, Document Book No. 62-B, page 35)

A representative of the International Red Cross had asked Antonescu to permit the emigration of Jews on shipping space made available by the Red Cross. Killinger, who learned about this intervention of the Red Cross, requested the Foreign Office to give instructions, which came back promptly to the effect that Killinger was to prevent the Romanian government from evacuating the Jews from Romania, even if the International Red Cross should furnish the necessary shipping. (K3-3987, Exhibit No. 1788, Document Book No. 62-B, pages 36/37).

The defendant SCHENGELHART was informed of the situation and personally sent a telegram to Killinger on the 25th of June 1943 ordering him to prevent the emigration of one Jew who had succeeded in negotiating with Antonescu on the possibilities of his departure. It was the well known Jewish industrialist Mandel of Bucharest who had succeeded in getting an Italian transit visa but SCHENGELHART considered his departure as dangerous. (Ibid., page 33)
The German Foreign Office officials were right to distrust the
Rumanian government. The measures taken by the Rumanian government
were brutal and harsh, but the murder was not organized with the
thoroughness and attention to detail employed by "EISENACHER, TOERIN,
Luther and Eichmann, which we can study in hundreds of documents.

The marked misgivings of the German Foreign Office appeared when
an intervention of the Red Cross and of Jewish groups from abroad, the
rescue of Jewish children from Rumania to Palestine was proposed. It
was the defendant STEINER-GHIT who in the course of the years 1943 and
1944 frequently favored the including of Jewish children in death
transports to the allowing of their rescue and escape to Palestine.

Such rescue actions were attempted on several occasions. In May
1943, a short time after STEINER-GHIT had become State Secretary the
proposal for the emigration of 70,000 Jews from Rumania to Palestine,
especially children, was discussed. Even the German envoy Killinger
in Bucharest seemed to see nothing objectionable in this.

The action became known as the so-called Feldschuer Action, named
after the Swiss Minister Feldschuer in Berlin. STEINER-GHIT, in agree-
ment with the Reich Foreign Minister, with the defendant Eichsmendoff,
and with Councilor Heimburg of the Political Division, refused however
to grant this rescue (Pros. Ex. 3643, No. 5049, Dec. Bk. 98 B, p. 17).

In February 1944 a new attempt was made to save the lives of 7,000
Jewish children from Rumania by allowing them to emigrate to Palestine.
It was again the defendant STEINER-GHIT who turned down the rescue action.
He instructed in February 1944, through a special cable (Pros. Ex.
3644, No. 5138, Dec. Bk. 93 B, p. 74) Killinger in Bucharest as follows:

"Tell Marshal (Antonescu) that emigration
of Rumanian Jews to Palestine would greatly dis-
please friendly Arabs....

"We therefore considered it expedient for the Rumanian
Government to conform to the attitude of the Reich
Government in the question of the emigration of Jews.
If permission has already been granted for the emi-
gration of Jews, we would ask to rescind permission,
"for report... (signed STEINER-GHIT)."

In line with this decision of STEINER-GHIT, his subordinate van
Tiračić, refused on April 8, 1944, the granting of safe-conduct for the Turkish vessel Tari, which was to bring Jewish children from Constanza, Romania, to Istanbul, Turkey, with the help of the International Red Cross. (Ex. 1789, No. 4963, Doc. Ex. 62 B, p. 39)

In cross-examination SIEBENKLANG first tried to deny that he had given the order to Bucharest to rescind the permission for the emigration of the Jewish children. (Pros. Ex. 306th, No. 5138, Doc. Ex. 89 B, p. 71)

However, after he had examined the document and could no longer deny that he was responsible for the rejection of the child-rescue plan, he gave the following answer (Tr., p. 1062):

"My question is, why was this approval rescinded?"

A. Dr. Kemner, this is the very thing to which I previously referred to under direct examination, saying that emigration to Palestine was prohibited on principle, and this political problem, which had been predeterminded already a long time before had been definitely determined on basis of conversations with Gaddani and the Grand Mufti. These decisions could not be changed anymore, and the only means of bringing about an agreement and thus bringing about an advantage to the Jews, was sought in the possibility of obtaining the Reich government's permission that now instead of emigrating to Palestine, the Jews were to emigrate into those countries that were willing to absorb them, with the exception of Palestine. That was the suggestion which I was able to achieve with great trouble to myself, and we alone were not able to bring it about ourselves -- not even Ribbentrop himself. Himmler was the Commissar for the Jews, and therefore for each single step of ours we had to secure his approval and beyond that even the approval of Hitler. And you will agree with me, Dr. Kemner, that under those matters were turned down, and if ever there was talk of any such thing having been even attempted the foreign governments were reprimanded, and you will agree with me that this only confirms what I have introduced as an exhibit in my case in chief -- that emigration to Palestine was not permissible, but it was permissible for other destinations.

"There is no talk of that at all in the document, but I wanted to ask you, how was it possible for you to come to any agreement with anybody and feel yourself tied down to any such agreement, if the person was not a chief of state, but was your own employee -- a man who was paid by you with thousands of pounds of gold?"
A. To whom are you referring?

Q. I am referring to the Grand Mufti.

A. But I didn't make any such agreement. I found a situation already on hand in which everything was already shaped in a final form and really I couldn't change anything on things already predetermined. Professor, you yourself agree with me.

Q. First of all you pay a man, and then the man, your employee, says to you, "The children may not come to Palestine."

Thus, STEENGLUCHT admitted that he turned down the rescue plan for Jewish children, and became responsible for the fate they inevitably fell victim to under the German annihilation plan. It is no excuse that STEENGLUCHT followed the practice established by WEIZSÄCKER, who had made the original agreements with the Grand Mufti, including the payments to him from Foreign Office funds (Affidavit Rokowski, RG-5462, Pros. Ex. C-361, and 3645, Doc. Ek. 215 B, p. 5).

Even back in 1941 WEIZSÄCKER had promised the Mufti financial support in the struggle against their mutual enemies, the English and the Jews. (Pros. Ex. C-276, RG-5730, Part B, Doc. Ek. 201 A, p. 5, WEIZSÄCKER's letter to the Mufti of April 8, 1941).
March 19, 1944, was the blackest day in the history of Hungarian Jewry. On this day the defendant Edmund Veesenmayer was installed as the Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Budapest. His duties included the annihilation of about nine hundred thousand Jews of Hungary. He performed his duties. Hundreds of thousands were murdered, only the smaller part was liberated by the victorious armies of the Allies and survived.

In its chapter on the persecution of Jews, the I.M.T. stated:

"German missions were sent to such satellite countries as Hungary and Bulgaria, to arrange for the shipment of Jews to extermination camps and it is known that by the end of 1944, 1,300,000 Jews from Hungary had been murdered at Auschwitz."


Veesenmayer received the exact wording concerning his power through the defendant STEGENRIICHT (Pros. Ex. 1806, Doc. Bk. 62, p. 72), who as State Secretary exercised the overall control and direction. It should also be noted that STEGENRIICHT as State Secretary received all secret cables from the German Embassy in Hungary for proper action. In the large number of telegrams which are set forth in this chapter we see that there was no single instance where STEGENRIICHT withheld his approval from acts in line with the Final Solution.

The defendant Ritter informed all Reich authorities, including the army, the navy, and the airforce, about the scope of the new plenipotentiary's power (Pros. Ex. C-436, No. 5521, Doc. Bk. 207 A). The defendant Ritter instructed the defendant Veesenmayer in detail about the program he had to carry out (Pros. Ex. C-439, No. 5520, Doc. Bk. 207 A).

The policy for exerting pressure against the Hungarian government to the end of bringing also that state in line with Final Solution objectives, was initiated by the defendant WEISSBECKER, already in the year 1942. WEISSBECKER also laid the groundwork for Veesenmayer. The German Foreign Office knew that the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Nicholas Horthy and the then Hungarian government were firmly opposed...
to the German murder program against the Jews and resisted its application in Hungary. In this situation, the defendant von NEIZSÄCKER, who controlled the execution of the program for the "Final Solution" in the satellite countries, on October 20, 1942 summoned the Hungarian Minister Sztójay in Berlin, and admonished him strongly that

"the way Hungary treated the Jewish problem has so far not been in accordance with our principles."

(Pros. Ex. 3766, NG-5728, Doc. Ek. 201, p. 165)

In order to bring further pressure on Sztójay and his government, NEIZSÄCKER even requested the Hungarian Minister to

"bring me upon your return from Hungary, a report on what the people in Budapest think of the German proposals concerning the treatment of the Jews."

(Pros. Ex. 3765, NG-5727, Doc. Ek. 201, p. 163)

This situation is also revealed in the Prosecution Exhibits 1804 (NG-1800) and 1805 (NG-1798) in Document Book 62 A, pp. 66 and 70.

At the end of March 1943, when NEIZSÄCKER was still State Secretary Vecslyay received the assignment to investigate why the final solution of the Jewish question had not progressed in Hungary as in the other satellite or occupied areas.

On April 30, 1943 Vecslyay sent a report over his signature, and bearing the initial of Himmler, The defendant criticized Hungary's defeatist attitude and termed the Jews the "number one enemy of Germany and the Axis."

He proposed that the Reich influence and guide Hungarian internal life.

(Pros. Ex. 1813, NG-2192, Doc. Ek. 62 A)

As a result Horthy was summoned by Hitler who in the presence of Ribbentrop warned him on April 17, 1943,

"Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps."

(HIT, Vol. I, p. 297)
In the meantime SIGENGRACHT had taken over the office of State Secretary, in which office, as he himself has admitted, he carried on consistently with the established policy (See his cross-examination). SIGENGRACHT's and Veesenmayer's policies on the Hungarian question were in complete concurrence, as is shown through Exhibit 3700 (NG-5972, Doc. Br. 201). In this memorandum of September 17, 1943, SIGENGRACHT's Under State Secretary Hencke pointed out in a memorandum to Ribbontrop that the Foreign Office was in complete agreement with Veesenmayer's policy. SIGENGRACHT had passed upon this report, and approved its forwarding to Ribbontrop.

Again, on December 15, 1943, SIGENGRACHT informed himself about the course of action in regard to Hungary, and especially about the inclusion of Hungary in the annihilation program which had been "neglected" by the Hungarians. On that December 15, he read and initialed the Secret Report of Veesenmayer of December 14, 1943 that Veesenmayer had submitted to him. SIGENGRACHT, because of the importance of this matter, also had his Under State Secretary Hencke read this report, and Hencke read it on December 30, 1943. This report of Veesenmayer had special significance because it was the Foreign Office which had dispatched Veesenmayer for a special mission to Hungary, namely the investigation of the political and Jewish situation in Hungary.

"The cleaning up (of the Jewish question) is a prerequisite for Hungary's inclusion in the life and death struggle of the Reich." (Pros. Ex. 3718, NG-5560, Doc. Br. 201, p. 51)
Three months later the same Veesenmayer had been appointed Reich Plenipotentiary for Hungary, and it was, as has already been pointed out, the defendant STIEGLICH, who, partly together with Ritter, handed him the instruction on his broad powers.

Already in July 1944 STIEGLICH learned from his appointee Veesenmayer that the Hungarian Minister Sztojay had told the latter that:

"One and one-half million Jews had already been killed and the major part of the rest, now being on transport would suffer the same fate." (Pros. Ex. 6-449, NG-5523, Doc. Bk. 207 a)

STIEGLICH received three copies of this information, one went to Ritter.

The annihilation of the Jews was of course common knowledge in Europe. In this connection, it should be mentioned that the two high Hungarian State government officials, Jonas Schilling and Count Bela Bethlen refused to collaborate in the deportation program and flatly declared that they would:

"Rather resign than to become guilty of murder."

Veesenmayer reported this uncooperative spirit to the Foreign Office, adding later, that:

"Proper action had been taken against the officials." (Pros. Ex. 3707, NG-5611, Doc. Bk. 201)

In the following we will show that Veesenmayer, the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office, STIEGLICH's subordinate, exercised the broad
powers of his appointment in full for the annihilation of the Jews of Hungary and adjacent areas. He did not hesitate or cringe from terrible responsibilities. Three witnesses, who were the most prominent observers testified before this Tribunal: the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, the lawyer Dr. Részó Kastner of the Jewish community, and the higher SS and Police Leader in Hungary, SS General Otto Winkelmann.

Admiral Horthy testified to the power of Veesenmayor as follows:

"A. It was the supreme German post which existed in Hungary ... He was actually the only one with whom I had any contact or communication whatever. If I had anything to discuss or anything to ask in connection with the Third Reich, of course, I had to approach Veesenmayor and ask him to call me.

Q. During the period, Admiral Horthy, that you know the two gentlemen in Hungary, General Winkelmann and Veesenmayor, which one in your opinion at that time did you consider as the superior?

A. Plenipotentiary Veesenmayor absolutely." (Tr. p. 2704)

The SS and Police Leader Winkelmann testified to the power of Veesenmayor (Tr. p. 2615c) as follows:

"Mr. Veesenmayor was Ambassador to Hungary, but not only that, he was Plenipotentiary General."

Then asked which administrative office in Hungary was responsible for deportation of Jews, he answered:

"As I have explained, in the legal field Veesenmayor; in the technical field Eichmann.

Q. "he was the one who really had the power in Hungary?

A. Towards the outside, it was Horthy, who, of course, was influenced in his activities by the German Embassy in question that interested Germany, or at least he was limited in his activities by the Embassy.

Q. "Was the Jewish question one of those questions that interested Germany?

A. Yes." (Tr. p. 2618h - 26185)

The witness Dr. Részó Kastner, in charge of rescue activities, asked about the power of Veesenmayor in Hungary, answered:

"I could assume that Veesenmayor was the de facto ruler of Hungary." (Tr. p. 3619)
'Q. Dr. Kastner, what in your opinion was the full role of the defendant Veessmayer in these anti-Semitic measures?

A. Your Honors, as I said Veessmayer was a de facto ruler of Hungary. His main role was to outline for the Hungarian government the policy which had to be followed and to put into power the persons who provided sufficient guarantee that this policy would be carried out with the utmost energy. It is no longer secret that upon the pressure exerted by Veessmayer, the Minister of the Interior, Jaross, was appointed and his two State Secretaries Laszlo Endry and Laszlo Daky, the last having the command over the Gendarmerie and the police and the first one having the mandate of solving the Jewish question, both of them known from the previous years as fanatic Nazis, completely loyal to the German Reich." (Tr. p. 362a)

Under his broad power shown above, Veessmayer dealt with a program which concerned 900,000 - 1,000,000 Jews. STEENGRICHT received this information (Pros. Ex. 1810, NG-2190, Doc. Bk. 62 A, p. 130, see his initial page 129).

On April 19, 1941, one month to the day after his usurpation of Hungarian sovereignty, Veessmayer could report (Pros. Ex. 1810, NG-1815, Doc. Bk. 62 A, p. 77) that after a discussion with the Hungarian government, he received the promise that

"at least 50,000 Jews fit for work ... will be placed at the disposal of the Reich by Hungary. It should be possible to place another 50,000 Jewish laborers at the disposal of the Reich during the month of May."

On April 23, 1941, four days later, STEENGRICHT was informed through secret cable from Veessmayer (Pros. Ex. 1811, NG-2233, Doc. Bk. 62 A, p. 89)

"The work of putting Jews into ghettos began in the Carpathian area on April 15. Thus far 150,000 Jews have been affected. A total of approximately 300,000 Jews will be dealt with ... the same is already in preparation ... in Transylvania and in other countries bordering on Romania. An additional 250,000 to 300,000 Jews are to be dealt with."

This was only the beginning.

On June 13, 1941, STEENGRICHT received the following information from Veessmayer concerning the deportation of Jews from the Carpathian
more than 200,000 Jews have been deported in ninety-two trains from the area. In addition, Veesenmayer reports that his subordinates, Orell and Hatzinger, together with the SD Security Service of the SS have controlled these measures. (Pros. Ex. C-1446, N2-5619, Doc. Bk. 207 A).

On June 20, 1944, the defendant STEENGRACHT received in three copies the following information: the number of deported Jews amounted now to 326,009 (Pros. Ex. 3713, N2-5567, Doc. Bk. 201, p. 21).

During the daily morning conferences which took place under Veesenmayer's chairmanship in the presence of his deputy Minister Fiano, the progress reports on the Jewish annihilation were openly discussed (Tr. p. 13306 et seq.).

On July 8, 1944, after Hungary's rural counties and the suburbs of Budapest were cleared of Jews, Regent Horthy succeeded in bringing the deportations to a halt (Kastner Testimony, Tr. p. 32645). This was followed by strong protests made by Veesenmayer to the Prime Minister of the Hungarian Government. (Kastner Testimony, Tr. p. 3625).

That such an encroachment on the domain of Veesenmayer's authority was not easy, is evidenced by the fact that Horthy, to put through this simple act of humanity in his own State had to mobilize the Hungarian Gendarmes. (Tr. p. 3625).

The events, following the stop order, were described by the witness Dr. Kastner as follows:

Q. Dr. Kastner, were there any new German demands and actions subsequent to the particular acts?

Dr. Kastner: Well, naturally the Germans never gave up completely. It is perhaps not only because of the Budapest Jews but because it had to be a major test of the possibilities of Veesenmayer to command the political life in Hungary. The resistance put up by Horthy in connection with the fate of the Jews from Budapest could be extended as it was later on to major political issues. So subsequent demands were made just in order to break through this line of veto to get out a part of the Budapest Jews.

Later on Veesenmayer declared that he accepted that they should not be deported to Auschwitz but at least they should take them out from Budapest and be brought somewhere in the Hungarian province.

Q. Dr. Kastner, did Horthy confer with any
Hungarian leaders at this time? That is, Hungarian leaders in opposition to the German demands?

A. We are now in about July, 1944. At that time Horthy dismissed the Sztojay government; that means dismissed Sztojay and the two state secretaries and the Minister of the Interior and started once again with his policy to try to get Hungary out of the war...

Q. Now, after the dismissal of Sztojay, who was appointed as Prime Minister?

A. Gen. Lukács was appointed Prime Minister, if I remember, against strong protests put up by Veesenmayer.

A. Veesenmayer's mission in Hungary was not only the liquidation of the Hungarian Jews, but certainly to assure the continuation of the war by Hungary on the side of Germany and to isolate Horthy from his friends and all democratic elements who would have been able to advise him against the German tendencies. He succeeded in getting the Jews out. He did not succeed in isolating Horthy and in subjugating him because Horthy slowly regained control over the country and regained his will of decision.

At this time, that means starting from the middle of August, Veesenmayer planned a major coup in order to repair the failure of 19 March when he left Horthy in power.

Q. Dr. Kastner, after the arrest of Horthy and Salóczy's appointment as Prime Minister, were the Jewish deportations resumed?

A. Salóczy was appointed on the 16th of October 1944. Some days later the deportations restarted, if it is possible, in an even more inhumane manner. Tons of thousands of Jews, mainly women, were forced to march on the highway leading from Budapest to the German border in rain and in snow with no foot, no sleep, so thousands of them died on the way or were shot because they could not continue to march. Once again they were sent to work and it was certainly in the interest of their efficiency that they were sent to Germany in this way..." (Tr. p. 3627/3628)

The witness Horthy testifies on Veesenmayer's activities in the

period after the stop of the deportations along the same line as

witness Dr. Kastner (Tr. p. 2712/2711):

"Q. How, Admiral Horthy, continuing our examination, you last stated that in reply to your protest against these deportations Veesenmayer told you that these people were required for work in Germany. Now, my question is, when did you first find out that these people were being sent to extermination camps?

A. By the end of June, when I looked this up, I received extensive reports about the extermination camp in Auschwitz."
Q. Admiral Horthy, what did you then do, with respect to those deportations?

A. While those deportations took place in the country I was entirely powerless of course. It was different in the capital because there I had a small number of entirely reliable forces under the command of an excellent general called Baky. It was my impression that although strong German forces were there an open rupture must not occur. Shall we say the force of a sovereign Hungarian State was to be maintained. When I received a report that a large number of gendarmes, under the pretext of a festival, were brought into Budapest and they were to assist in the deportations, when I learned that fact I called the commanding officer of the gendarmes and ordered him to remove all gendarmes from Budapest, which he did. Then I called certain forces from an adjacent town of Esztergom and asked them to come to Budapest in order to strengthen the garrison.

Q. Admiral Horthy, did that, for the time being, stop those evacuations?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any further attempt made to renew them?

A. Yes, quite. Roughly twenty-five kilometers from Budapest there was a camp called Kisztaya and I learned that from there transports had left on a train. I thenceon decreed that wherever the train could be reached it should be stopped and taken back, which happened. The train was stopped at Ratwang and taken back to Kisztaya.

Q. Admiral Horthy, how was it possible that the Germans permitted you to remain in office after those two acts against their measures of deportation?

A. That was connected with something I have mentioned before - namely that no open conflict was to be admitted, the appearance of an independent Hungary was to be maintained.

Q. Admiral Horthy, did the defendant Vassomayor make any attempt to change your adamant attitude?

A. Yes, if I can remember rightly, the Minister and Plenipotentiary, together with General of the SS Himmlmann, came to see me and they told me they had made an arrangement with the government according to which the deportation of Hungarian Jews was exclusively in their hands. It was my impression that I was to be told that I was interfering in things which were none of my business, shall we say. They also told me that the military situation was such as to make the unreliable Jewish elements a very undesirable element in the country. They had therefore to be removed and they asked me not to interfere with the deportations. I again refused to comply.

Q. Admiral Horthy, did those deportations begin under German auspices, and if so, when?
Q. These deportations went on after my arrest, under Szalasy a Prime Minister.

Q. What role, Admiral Horthy, did Veesenmayer play in your arrest?

A. On 15 October 1944, I asked the Minister and Plenipotentiary to come to see me. I informed him that I wanted to have a truce with Russia and that was as Germany's ally was over for Hungary. My son, in the morning of the same day, was lured into a trap, was arrested, beaten up. Blood was streaming from him. A sack was strapped over his head and he was taken in an aircraft to Vienna and from there to Neuhausen.
During the first half of October 1944, when the action of
the Foreign Office, - known as Panzerfaust, and described
above - for the arrest of Horthy and the installment of a new
Hungarian Government under Szalasy was underway, VESELMAYER
suggested in a secret report submitted to Ribbentrop, STEEN-
GRACHT and other Foreign Office officials, that in order to
complete the annihilation program, the pressure against the
Hungarian should be increased.

VESELMAYER reported impatiently that

"Influential Hungarian circles seem to try
to delay taking a definite stand on the
Jewish question while awaiting political and
military developments in order to establish
for themselves an alibi for future eventualities."

In view of these delaying tactics, VESELMAYER suggested:

"we must examine whether and to what extent the
German attitude mentioned above must be funda-
mentally changed and whether one or the other
measure is to be adopted in order to carry out
the evacuation of the remaining Jews from
Hungary or Budapest either through our own
forces or through pressure upon the Hungarian
Ek. 201, p. 30)

The report, received by the Foreign Office through
special courier, was discussed by the proper officials. State
Secretary STEENGRACHT endorsed it on Oct 13, as noted by
Mirbach (on page 29), and forwarded it to Ribbentrop.

On October 24, 1944 (Pros. Ex. 1828, Tr-3457, Doc. Ek. 62-4)
VESELMAYER summarized his activities in Hungary in a memorandum
to Ribbentrop, which, being classified top secret, went through
STEENGRACHT, as follows:

.... for the solution of the Jewish problem
in Hungary, agreements were made after 19 March
(1944) between the Hungarian and the Reich
governments, in accordance with which until
July of this year by order of the Hungarian
government through the Hungarian gendarmerie and the police and by the supervisory cooperation of German Security Police organs, all Jews from the area of the Hungarian provinces were being transported in whole family groups to Germany for labor assignment. Apparently under the influence of foreign press attacks sponsored by the enemy powers, as well as also by intervention of divers foreign and enemy powers, the former Regent informed the Reich Government in August of a decision, not to allow any more deportations of Hungarian Jews to the Reich territory.

"... It was only after 16 October, that under the supervisory cooperation of German agencies, new negotiations were started with the aim to find a final solution of the Jewish question in Hungary."

As the witnesses Horthy and Kastner testified (see above) the "deportations started again" (after October 16, 1944)

"if it is possible, in an even more inhumane manner ... thousands of them died on the way or were shot ..." (Tr. p. 3628 - 3629)

However, with the progress of the Allied forces and the lack of transportation facilities at the end of November 1944, the deportation process slowed down on November 21, 1944, STENGMARCK was informed by VEEREN-MAYER through a secret cable about new difficulties. (Pros. Ex. 3717, No-4937, Doc. Ex. 201, p. 44). Two days later (ibid, p. 50) he confirmed the further instructions he had received from the Foreign Office and reported that he had

"... informed Szalaszy today in accordance with your instructions. In spite of technical difficulties he is willing to speed up the evacuation of Budapest Jews energetically."

But it was too late. On December 8, 1944 VEEREN-MAYER was compelled to leave Budapest. After having caused the annihilation of about 500,000 Hungarian and Slovakian Jews, he did not succeed in the murder of the remainder, who were
liberated by the Allied armies.

That Veesemayer performed his activities under the constant control of the State Secretary is not only proven by the documents and the relationship of the two offices they held.

Veesemayer himself when asked in a pre-trial interrogation (Pros. Ex 174, N-2605 Doc. Bk. 4 R, p. 42) whether he had acted on his own initiative, expressed clearly, that all his activities were done according to the instruction he had received and as a faithful official of Ribbentrop and Stengelacht.

The instructions Veesemayer received from his Foreign Office superiors, were instructions for death actions to be carried out devoid of all human feeling or compassion. When asking for instructions from his superior officials in Berlin, through a cable of June 29, 1944 (Ex. 1823, NG-236, EB 62-A, p. 151), as to whether he should agree to a proposal of the Swiss government for the emigration of 10,000 Jewish children, the Foreign Office turned down this emigration proposal. Stengelacht had passed upon it, agreed to the negative proposal of his subordinate Wagner, and submitted the negative instruction to Ribbentrop.

When further rescue actions were proposed concerning the rescue of 2,000 Jews from Hungary, the Foreign Office decided, according to a proposal of Wagner, to which Stengelacht consented and which he then passed on to Ribbentrop, to "delay the answer to these two interventions until the question of the treatment of the Jews remaining in Hungary has definitely been solved." (Ex. 1827, NG-238, EB 62-A, p. 176 and 177).

There is not one single piece of evidence to support Stengelacht's defense claim that his practice was to recommend or to issue orders for mercy or the milder course.
STENGRAPH knew that Veesenmayer regarded the Jews as a public enemy number one, Veesenmayer had reported it to him, as we see in the following excerpt from Veesenmayer's cross-examination. (the already mentioned exhibit 37184, Doc. Book 201, p. 52)

In his cross-examination of July 23, 1948, the defendant revealed his own attitude towards his activities in Hungary as follows:

(Tr. p. 13 455 to 13 460):

"Q. Dr. Veesenmayer, is it correct that in November or December, 1943 you were in Budapest?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time, before you became minister, were you of the view that the Hungarian Jews were public enemy number 1 of the German Reich in Hungary, and that therefore, they should be deported? Was that your political conviction?
A. That it was the most important and most dangerous enemy, yes. I do not believe that I mentioned anything about deportation in this context, however, because at that time I was by no means clear in my mind just what the best method was to destroy the danger to our war efforts that resided in the Jews in Hungary. However, I was of the fundamental opinion that these men should work and even, if possible, should work in a way that contributed to our war effort.
Q. Before you went to Hungary as Minister were you of the opinion that Horthy and the Hungarians as such were friendly to the Jews and that Hungary constituted a refuge for these Jews?
A. I believe that I have already answered this question in general terms in my direct examination in drawing a distinction according to my views at that time between how Horthy was oriented toward the large majority of the Jews and how he was oriented toward a very few Jews at the top who were affluent. In the one sense he was a vigorous anti-Semite and in the other sense he was a friend of the Jews. That was my opinion at any rate at that time. The relatively small number was the one that counted because it was the one that made politics and it was the one with influence, and that was for us an absolute danger.
Q. Yesterday you said that you wrote a long report in December with your suggestions and proposals of how German policy in Hungary should be conducted and that a basic change would have to be made. Do you recall whether in your report at that time the sentences were contained 'The Hungarian is not an anti-Semite, a fact which Jewry is well aware of.' Do you recall that sentence?
A. That is quite possible, but I must say regarding that the following. These are extracts. They state on the one side, and then on the other what one happens to have in one's mind at the time. As such, they are incomplete. They are unsatisfactory to me and everyone who reads them.
Q: Was it not a long report?
A: Yes.
Q: It was some 27 pages?
A: Yes, and before that it had been nearly 50 pages.
Q: Do you recall also the statement, "The Jew is public enemy number 2"?
A: That is certainly the case, and that was my conviction at that time.
Q: Do you recall that in this report it also said that Horthy would in no circumstances appoint Imredy as minister, the man whom you approved, because he was so inimical to the Jews?
A: It may be that I got that impression at that time from conversations that took place during that period. I certainly committed errors also in my reports because all this is piece work.
Q: You wrote that long report at that time before you were minister. You sent it to whom?
A: To Ribbentrop.
Q: To anyone else?
A: I have already said I think that I sent it to Kaltenbrunner or gave it to him.
Q: To STEINERGARTH in particular?
A: Quite possible. If I may add though, the report you seem to have before you is the final version. It would be with the excerpts made in it. It is very painful when one attempts to report and then half of it is thrown away or is condensed. This is not merely an extract of what I said, but in many respects it says matters different from what I said.
Q: Well, now I shall show you this report. Did you sign it as it now stands? Is this the version you signed when you sent it over to the others?

MR. KEMPNER:
Your Honor, 5560 is Mr. Veesenmayer's report of December 10, 1943, as sent to the State Secretary STEINERGARTH and initialed by him on December 17, 1943. May I ask the Court for identification number 3718.

THE PRESIDENT:
The document described will be given identification number 3718.

BY MR. KEMPNER:
Q: Is that your signature on the first page?
A: Yes, no doubt of it.
Q: Now, Dr. Veesenmayer, you left Budapest when?
A: 8th December 1944 from Budapest and on 29 March 1945 I left Hungary.
Q: And when were you captured in Germany?
A: 14 May 1945.
Q: By American troops?
A: I surrendered to the American troops.
Q: Were you alone at the time, or did someone else surrender with you? Anybody else from your staff in Budapest?
A: A colleague of mine, a Herr Rakowsky.
Q: What was the date again?
A: The 14th of May 1945.
Q: When you and Rakowsky surrendered to the American army, did you discuss how you were to behave after this catastrophe?
A: Yes, certainly we thought about that a great deal.
Q: Did you speak with Rakowsky at that time and say, "There is only one thing left. We must tell the Americans the whole truth about all the dreadful things that have happened." Did you say that to Rakowsky and did he agree?
Rakowsky knew more at that time than I did because only later did I find out how dreadful the things were that had happened. It is correct that we were in agreement that we wanted to use fairplay. Rakowsky had been in America a long time, he knew or at least, he thought he knew the Americans, and I had also had contact with American businessmen previously; therefore, our plan was primarily to turn ourselves over to the Americans because we felt regarding the Americans that these men, at least, from the point of view that I was conscious of it in myself at least, had conducted a fair, decent, and honorable battle. That they did fight, I do not doubt, but on the contrary --

Q. Very well. A last question, Dr. Veesenmayer, and don't interrupt. My last question to you is: you are one of the few who readily confesses his conviction. You were not, however, in a resistance movement?

A. No.

Q. Just as you thought. As a National-Socialist you served Hitler, is that correct?

A. Yes, I even said more. My attitude was, even when I was questioning myself whether I wanted to believe and still should believe, the same.

Q. Now, this is my question. You are connected with some of these dreadful things. I want to know whether you stand behind them as a person and whether you regret them? May I ask you to say yes or no, first and then make your comments. You stand behind them as a honest man?

A. For what I did, I stand behind them as an honest person.

Q. Very well.

A. But let me end my answer with one further statement which is not a statement of my own. In preparing for my cross-examination I read a book very basically. It is the "Seven Pillars of Wisdom", by D.H. Lawrence. I do not wish to measure myself against this man. He was a model for me, but I found in this book a sentence which I believe has a small degree of validity for me, and the sentence is, from his, namely Lawrence's point of view: "As time went on our urge to fight for the idea became a blind obsession which stormed over our doubts with reins loose. We had to whether we wanted to or not, and what now looks like excess and brutality appeared in the inevitable, or perhaps even an unimportant formality." I do not say this in extenuation of myself, but I believe that in those sentences I can find a certain echo for myself.

MR. REMERER: 
No further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: 
Dr. Doetzer, have you any redirect?

DR. DOETZER: 
No redirect.

THE PRESIDENT: 
Very well, the witness may be excused from the witness stand.

(The witness was excused)"
DIARY OF MURDER ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN HUNGARY (1944)

The day by day account of the annihilation program in Hungary, carried out under the direction and supervision of the State Secretary SIEKENCRACHT, and also under the special control of the defendant Ritter, and with the participation of the defendant Erdmannsdorff in his capacity as acting head of the Political Division, is set forth in the following exhibits:

Ex. C-138 NG 5522 Doc. Bk. 207-A 20 March 1944

Telegram from VEENSEMAYER to the Foreign Minister via Ambassador Ritter. VEENSEMAYER reports on a lengthy discussion with Horthy on the formation of a new Hungarian Government. The telegram gives ample evidence of the extreme pressure used on the aged Hungarian leader. The telegram, classified "Sealed Letter" was distributed to RITTER and ERDMANNSDORFF among others showing that both were concerned with and accessory to Nazi foreign policy in the making.

Ex. C-139 NG 5520 Doc. Bk. 207-A 20 March 1944

Telegram from RITTER to VEENSEMAYER in Budapest. RITTER instructs VEENSEMAYER to take up the affair Kallay with Kaltenbrunner and to see to it that the former Hungarian Prime Minister Kallay be watched by German Gestapo men and arrested should he attempt to leave his castle. The telegram is classified "Sealed Letter" and ERDMANNSDORFF is checked on the distribution list. The document shows that RITTER was instrumental in utilizing the Gestapo to implement the German foreign policy.

Ex. C-140 NG 5526 Doc. Bk. 207-A 22 March 1944

Telegram from VEENSEMAYER to ambassador RITTER complaining that an effective surprise siege of the Burg, the castle seating the Hungarian Government, is not possible with the German troops available at present. The document is classified "Sealed Letter" and is distributed to RITTER and ERDMANNSDORFF among others. It shows that details on the implementation of German actions in Hungary were reported to ambassador RITTER, only without being referred to Ribbentrop in contrast to RITTER'S defense claim to have acted as "mailman" only. It further shows that the policy-makers in the Foreign Office were also involved in and concerned with the military aspects of their policy.

Ex. 3715 NG 5603 Doc. Bk. 201 23 March 1944

Telegram from VEENSEMAYER to German Foreign Office, classified as "Sealed Letter", via Ambassador Ritter, in which he reports that he has made the necessary arrangements with the SD to have the former Hungarian Minister Kallay arrested. The telegram bears VEENSEMAYER's typewritten signature.

Ex. 3737 NG 5658 Doc. Bk. 201 25 March 1944

Telegram from VEENSEMAYER to Reich Foreign Minister via Ambassador RITTER, classified "Sealed Letter." VEENSEMAYER reports on a luncheon party given in his honor by Prime Minister Sztojay. In the course of the luncheon VEENSEMAYER

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points out that the Reich expected quick, energetic and thorough reforms from the Hungarian government. The document bears VISSONYIYER's 'typewritten signature.

IX. 3743 NG 5661 Doc.Bk. 201 28 March 1944

Telegram from German Foreign Office to VISSONYIYER, classified as "Secret Matter". The document reveals that the Reich Foreign Minister directed the reshuffle of the Hungarian diplomatic corps. The telegram bears JEMNISDORFF's typewritten signature.

IX. C-241 NG 5528 Doc.Bk. 207a 31 March 1944

VISSONYIYER reports to the Foreign Minister via Ambassador RITTER that Jewish journalists and lawyers were excluded from practicing their profession by new Hungarian anti-Semitic laws. Minden's initial on the "St.S." of the distribution list indicated that STIHLGUT saw this document. It shows that defendants VISSONYIYER, RITTER, and STIHLGUT observed in detail the implementation of the anti-Semitic policy which they inspired in Hungary.

IX. 3760 NG 5563 Doc.Bk. 201 2 April 1944

Telegram from VISSONYIYER to Reich Foreign Minister via Ambassador RITTER, classified as "Secret Matter", in which he states that SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Winko Krom is subordinated to him and is very cooperative. The document bears VISSONYIYER's typewritten signature.

IX. 3701 NG 5574 Doc.Bk. 201 2 April 1944

In a secret telegram from the German Foreign Office, classified "Secret Matter", VISSONYIYER is instructed to eliminate Reinhardsear Horthy from political business and to continue the political work with the new Hungarian government alone. The telegram bears VISSONYIYER's typewritten signature of Altenburg.

IX. 1607 NG 4234 Doc.Bk. 02 A 3 April 1944

VISSONYIYER reports that recent air-raids on Budapest have intensified anti-Semitic feeling and that demands have been made for one hundred Jewish lives in retaliation for each Hungarian killed. VISSONYIYER thinks that this figure is too high "since in that case we would have to shoot at least 30,000 to 40,000 Jews." However, "At the next attack I would have no scruples against having 10 suitable Jews shot for every Hungarian killed. In view of the conferences which I had last night with the Ministers Ratz and Kunder, I have the impression that the Government would be willing to carry out such a measure on its own. On the other hand such an action once begun, should be carried out consistently. In view of the suggestion made to the Führer by the Reich Foreign Minister, offering all Jews as a present to Roosevelt and Churchill, I would like to be informed whether after the next attack, I may start with retaliatory measures described above."

This telegram was distributed to STIHLGUT, and others.
Telegram from VÍLAJNAYAR to Reich Foreign Ministry via Ambassador RITTER, classified as "Sealed Matter". The document reveals that VÍLAJNAYAR used pressure on the Hungarian government. The document bears VÍLAJNAYAR's typewritten signature.

Secret telegram from VÍLAJNAYAR to German Foreign Office, classified "Sealed Matter", in which he reports that he exercised strong pressure on the Hungarian Premier Sztojay to have uncooperative Hungarian officials and high ranking officers removed. In the case of the officers, he will have them arrested by the SD if their dismissal does not take place immediately. The document bears VÍLAJNAYAR's typewritten signature.

In a secret telegram to the German Foreign Office via Ambassador RITTER, classified "Sealed Matter", VÍLAJNAYAR reports that agreement had been reached between the German and Hungarian governments on the question of recruitment of ethnic Germans in Hungary for the Waffen-SS. The telegram bears VÍLAJNAYAR's typewritten signature.

Telegram from VÍLAJNAYAR to the Foreign Office, addressed to RITTER and distributed to KEPPLER and many others. This telegram contains essentially the same information as is contained in the teletype of the previous day (NG 1815) but adds that the 50,000 Jews will be transferred to Germany on VÍLAJNAYAR's demand. The details of transportation will be worked out between VÍLAJNAYAR and Oberscharführer Winklmann of his staff. The Foreign Office is requested to furnish information to what place in the Reich the Jews are to be delivered.

Teltype communication from VÍLAJNAYAR via RITTER to Ribbentrop. VÍLAJNAYAR reports that he has received definite promises from the Hungarians that "up to the end of April at least 50,000 Jews fit for work will be placed at the disposal of the Reich... another 50,000 Jewish laborers (should be) at the disposal of the Reich during the month of May." On 20 April 1944 this information is passed on to SS-Obersturmbannführer Schumann of the Reich Main Security Office by von Thadden of the Foreign Office.

Two samples of a series of SS reports from Budapest sent by VÍLAJNAYAR to Ribbentrop via RITTER on measures taken...
by the Germans in Hungary against all opponents of Nazism. These reports were found in the files of Department Inland II of the Foreign Office, labeled "Jews/Hungary Special action".

(A) 19 April 1944. Telegram Nr. 111 "For Reich Foreign Minister via Ambassador RITTER", signed by VILSINAYIR.

The second paragraph of this telegram reads:

"Jews: Total arrests: 7,184.
In Szégedin it was possible to arrest the sister of Jews David Frankfurter, Mrs. Ruth Loewi. The father of the Frankfurters is allegedly missing. Although it could not be proved that Mrs. Loewi participated in the murder of Landsgruppenleiter Gustloff she is being transferred to the Reich. She has repeatedly visited her brother in Switzerland.
In the course of establishing ghettos in Budapest and vicinity Jews will probably be housed in the following places:

About 850 Jews will remain distributed over the entire town of Gsepel.
About 750 Jews will be housed in the factory Kauthun.
About 6-000 prominent Jews from Budapest will be housed in the eastern parts of the Manfred Weiss factory.
About 600 Jews will be housed in the factory Mauthner.
About 250 Jews will be brought into a labor camp located North of the factory.
About 300 Jews will live in Scroleser Street near the munitions store.
About 600 will be transferred to the factory halls of the fur-goods factory.

(B) 20 April 1944. Telegram Nr. 127 "For Reich Foreign Minister via Ambassador RITTER", from VILSINAYIR.

Paragraph 3 of this telegram reads:

"Jews: On 20 April total arrests in single actions 7,493. Total arrests in special actions 38,000...
On 21 April total arrests in single actions 7,580.
Total arrests in special actions 100,038..."

VILSINAYIR reports to the German Foreign Office that 10,000 Jews are ready for deportation. He requests procurement of freight cars for their transportation. VILSINAYIR's typewritten signature.

Telegram from VILSINAYIR to German Foreign Office, classified as "Sealed Matter", which reveals that VILSINAYIR closely cooperated with the SD and that he placed an SD agent as a consultant on anti-Jewish decrees in the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior. The document bears VILSINAYIR's typewritten signature.
Telegram from VIßENWYR in Budapest to RITTJR in the Foreign Office reporting on the progress of the rounding up of Jews in the Carpathians.

"Thus far 150,000 Jews have been affected. The action will probably be completed by the end of next week. Approximately 300,000 Jews. The same is already in preparation and is planned immediately in Sibiu in Transylvania and in a number of countries bordering on Romania. An additional 250,000 to 300,000 Jews are to be dealt with. Subsequently it will be the turn of the counties bordering on Serbia and Croatia, with the final ghetto-work to be done in the interior of the country and its conclusion in Budapest."

Transportation plans for these Jews, according to VIßENWYR's telegram, call for "a daily shipment of 3,000 Jews... Auschwitz is designated as receiving station."

This telegram has been distributed to Deputy Chief Political Division (REICHSDAKOFF). Again the same information is forwarded by Thadden to Siekmann of the NSIA on 24 April 1944.

Secret telegram from VIßENWYR to German Foreign Office, classified "Sealed Matter", reporting that two shipments of 2000 Jews were on their way to Auschwitz. VIßENWYR's typewritten signature.

Telegram from RITTJR presumably to VIßENWYR, dated Salzburg, 27 April 1944, in reply to a communication from VIßENWYR (NG 2191 supra). RITTJR reports that, according to the Chief of the Security and SD it is impossible for the Reich to accept 50,000 Jews "for labor assignment"

"because it would make illusory the completed evacuation of Jews from the Reich territory and the affected exclusion of Jews from plants in the Reich. On the other hand there is no objection to placing the Hungarian Jews into Reich labor camps which are under the control of the Reich Führer SS (Himmler)."

Transportation problems are subject to separate directives from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. This telegram is initialed by von Thadden and bears the notation "Return to Ambassador RITTJR."

Telegram from VIßENWYR via RITTJR to Reich Foreign Minister, classified "Sealed Matter", in which he informs the former of the dismissal of 19 district presidents in Hungary. The document bears VIßENWYR's typewritten signature.
Telegram from VISSINSKY to Reich Foreign Minister via Ambassador RITTEN. VISSINSKY reports on a discussion with the Reichswarmler which had a rather lively character.

Telegram from VISSINSKY via ambassador RITTEN to German Foreign Office, classified as "Sealed Matter". VISSINSKY reports on political developments in Hungary, the document shows how VISSINSKY used pressure on the Hungarian government. The telegram bears VISSINSKY's typewritten signature.

Two further telegrams from VISSINSKY to RITTEN distributed to STING, KUNDE, and JANSEN in forwarding periodic SD activity reports. The telegrams, dated 2 May 1944 and 20 May 1944 reveal a reign of terror on the part of the SS directed not only against the Jews but also against the Churches and all opponents of Germany who are usually conveniently labeled "Communists".

Telegram by VISSINSKY to the Foreign Office for the attention of Ambassador RITTEN. VISSINSKY reports that 200,000 Jews have been concentrated in ghettos in the Carpathian region while the concentration of approximately 110,000 Jews in Siebenbuergen (Transylvania) is about to start. The deportation of these Jews will be in groups of four transports of 3,000 Jews daily. A conference to work out the train schedules will start on 4 May in Vienna. Inasmuch as probably also foreign Jews have been apprehended a liaison officer from the embassy will visit the Special Commando Tischmann in the course of the next week in order to segregate the Jews from neutral and enemy countries. This telegram was distributed to JANSEN in addition to many others.

Telegram from VISSINSKY to German Foreign Office, classified as "Sealed Matter", in which he submits the names of two candidates for the post of Hungarian Minister in Berlin and asks for a decision.
Telegram signed by VESENMAYR, distributed to STEINGRACHT, RITTER and others.

VESENMAYR reports on a conference on Hungarian labor, attended by representatives of Organization Todt, the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, Security Police, and the Wehrmacht. In order to fill labor needs the strength of Jewish labor battalions is to be increased with the result that some 150,000 Jews would be exempt from evacuation.

Telegram from German Legation Budapest to Ribbentrop via RITTER, classified as "Sealed Matter," in which it is reported that the purge of the Hungarian provincial administration is making good progress; all district commissioners have already been removed. The document bears the signature of Senior Councillor of Legation Feins.

Secret telegram from VESENMAYR to German Foreign Office, classified "Sealed Matter." VESENMAYR reports that former Hungarian Minister Count Bela Bethlen has been relieved of his post and that disciplinary action against Vice District Commissioner Schilling had been initiated. VESENMAYR's typewritten signature.

Correspondence on Thadden's visit to Budapest to speed the solution of the Jewish question there.

(A) 22 May 1944. Telegram from Wagner of the Foreign Office to VESENMAYR asking him to discuss with Hezinger (Jewish specialist at the embassy) "how the embassy could ensure that in the future the Jews of neutral and enemy nationality will be dealt with in accordance with the directives given by the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs."

Wagner further announces Thadden's visit for preliminary discussions on "settling the property accounts of German and Hungarian Jews."

(B) Letter from Thadden to "Horst" Wagner, undated, submitting his report on his activities in Budapest. Thadden also adds that he regrets the departure of Hezinger before the concentration (of Jews) in Budapest has been accomplished.

(C) 25 May 1944. Thadden's report. The first part of this report deals primarily with German Foreign Office and SS personnel active in what VESENMAYR called "the big catch." When Thadden called on Eichmann (paragraph 4 of the report) he learned some of the statistics of "the big catch:"

"...up to noon of 2h May 116,000 Jews had been deported to the Reich. Approximately 200,000 more are assembled and await their deportation. They were mostly Jews from the North-Western parts of Hungary. In addition, a concentration has been effected in..."
tho South, South-West and South-East of the country in a border zone 30 kilometers wide. On 7th June concentration in the provinces north and northwest of Budapest will start. It is estimated that there will be about 350,000 Jews. At the same time the concentration in ghettos will be completed in the parts of the country South of Budapest. By the end of June they hope to be able to begin the concentration of the Jews living in Budapest. They expect to round up about 1 million Jews (possibly even more), one-third of whom should be able to work and will be taken over by Schalit, the Organization Todt, etc., in Upper Silesia. Only about 30,000 Jews able to work will remain in Hungary under Honvad guard in order to be employed in the Hungarian armament industry. The entire operation is to be concluded by the end of July (including deportation)."

Ax. 3708 NG 5538 Doc.Bk. 401 24 May 1944

The Reich Foreign Minister in a telegram addressed to VELSSINAYER, classified "Sealed Letter", expresses the opinion that three Jews should be given permission to leave the country in order to get rid of the Portuguese Minister. The telegram bears the typewritten signature of Altenburg.

Ax. 1816 NG 2150 Doc.Bk. 62 A 26 May 1944

This is another, more formal version of the report on Thadden's visit to Budapest dated 26 May 1944 (NG 2960 C supra).

(i) Cover-letter signed by Thadden submitting his report to the State Secretary STADNINICH (initialled), to Ribbentrop and others. A handwritten note on this letter reads:

"The State Secretary requests that these notes also be submitted to the Reich Foreign Ministers."

(ii) The report by Thadden gives details of the anti-Jewish measures in progress in Hungary including mention of a "racial solution" which is about to take place and a one day operation to clear Budapest of Jews. On the subject of defining the term "Jew" in the sense of the German Nuremberg Laws, German officials in Budapest advise against this in Hungary for the time being, as too many of Horthy's circle of friends and of the Hungarian nobility would be affected.

Deposited Jews, if fit for work, are to be assigned to the Todt organization and that of Schaub upon arrival at Auschwitz.

(iii) 3 June 1944. Cover note by Wagner submitting summary of the Thadden report to Ribbentrop and RITTER.

(iv) Summary of the Thadden report.

Ax. 3730 NG 5651 Doc.Bk. 261 1 June 1944

VELSSINAYER reports in the telegram to Ribbentrop via RITTER, classified "Sealed Letter", the wording of the agreement concerning recruitment for the SS-Women's Auxiliary Corps of the Waffen-SS. The telegram bears VELSSINAYER's typewritten signature.
VASSIHYAK informs the German Foreign Office by secret telegram, classified "Sealed Matter", that he has signed an agreement for recruitment of female auxiliaries for the Waffen-SS with the Hungarian minister Csatay. The document bears VASSIHYAK's typewritten signature.

Telegram from VASSIHYAK to Foreign Office for Ambassador RITTER on political actions, especially anti-Jewish measures, in Hungary. Document is classified "Secret Reich Matter", bears VASSIHYAK's typewritten signature and was distributed among others to STINGLACH and RADMINSKORFF.

Secret telegram from VASSIHYAK to German Foreign Office, classified "Sealed Matter", in which he points out that, in order to avoid the disquieting of Jewish elements and attempts to emigrate, the greatest secrecy should be observed on anti-Jewish measures. The telegram bears VASSIHYAK's typewritten signature and von Thadden's initials.

Telegram from VASSIHYAK forwarding reports on SD activity to the Foreign Office. This telegram is distributed to STINGLACH, Kanye, and others. On page 3 of the translation of this telegram it is stated: "The death verdict against those members of the German Wehrmacht who were sentenced for smuggling Jews to Romania was carried out on May 29."

Telegram from VASSIHYAK to Foreign Office on anti-Jewish measures, particularly deportations, in Hungary. Document is classified "Sealed Matter", and bears VASSIHYAK's typewritten signature. Checked on the distribution list are among others the names of RITTER and RADMINSKORFF.

Telegraphic from VASSIHYAK to German Foreign Office, dated 14 June 1944, and classified "Sealed Matter", in which he suggests the introduction of anti-Jewish measures in Slovakia. The telegram bears VASSIHYAK's typewritten signature. Three copies were sent to State Secretary STINGLACH.

Secret telegram from German Foreign Office to German Legation in Bratislava (Slovakia), classified "Sealed Matter", following complaints received from VASSIHYAK that Hungarian Jews are emigrating to Slovakia, the Foreign Office suggests anti-Jewish measures to be introduced in Slovakia too. The document bears the typewritten signature of Allentau, RITTER, among others, checked on distribution list.
To telegram from Vissinent to Foreign Office for Ambassador Ritter on political actions, especially anti-Jewish measures, particularly deportations in Hungary. Document is classified as "Sealed Matter", bears Vissinent's typewritten signature and was distributed among others to Steiniglacht and Erich Kandt.

To telegram from Vissinent to Foreign Office for Ambassador Ritter, classified "Sealed Matter", in which he reports that the total number of Jews deported to Germany to date amounted to 326,006. The telegram bears Vissinent's typewritten signature. Three copies were sent to State Secretary Steiniglacht.

To telegram from Vissinent to the German Foreign Office, classified "Sealed Matter". Vissinent reports that in the course of a conversation with Hungarian Supply Minister Jurcsik he had pointed out to the latter that by taking over the Jews from Hungary Germany had also relieved Hungary of a corresponding number of food consumers. In recognition of the service rendered, Hungary should make a generous gesture by sending additional foodstuffs to Germany. The document bears the typewritten signature of Vissinent. Three copies were sent to State Secretary Steiniglacht.

Telegram signed by Vissinent to the Foreign Office and distributed to Steiniglacht, Ritter, and others. Vissinent reports that the SD will no longer extend separate treatment to Hungarian Jews in Greece but will deport them to Germany and seize their property at the same time. Vissinent assures that the Hungarian Government will not take any interest in their Jewish nationals but suggests not to inform it until a settlement on the property of Hungarian Jews in the German sphere of power has been made.

Vissinent informs the German Foreign Office in telegram, classified "Sealed Matter", that anti-Jewish measures had to be postponed because the Reichsverweser had raised objections. The telegram bears Vissinent's typewritten signature. Three copies were sent to State Secretary Steiniglacht.

Note by State Secretary Steiniglacht in which he informs Vissinent that he has requested SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Berger to abstain from immediate contact with Hungarian agencies and to discuss all matters in advance with Minister Vissinent. The document bears Steiniglacht's typewritten signature.

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Telegram by VISENMAYR to the Foreign Office, distributed to Hincke, HITLER, and ROTHMINSBERG, among others. VISENMAYR reports that the deportation of 721,823 Jews has been concluded and that further deportations are pending. "Simultaneously small special actions in suburbs of Budapest as preparatory measures have started. Furthermore, a few small special transports with political Jews, intellectual Jews, Jews with many children and especially skilled Jewish workers are still on the way."

Telegram from Ribbentrop to VISENMAYR classified "Sealed Matter" and distributed to STINGLACH, HITLER, and ROTHMINSBERG, among others. The Hungarian Government is to be told that all foreign offers on behalf of Hungarian Jews are to be rejected. 6 July 1944

Tolegy.om from VISENMAYR to the Reich Foreign Minister via Ambassador HITLER reporting that Ribbentrop's order (supra) was carried out. This telegram enumerated the various steps taken by foreign governments and the Vatican to rescue the Hungarian Jews from certain death. The most significant item in this revealing report is the fact that the Hungarian intelligence service had deciphered telegrams sent by the American and British ambassadors in form to their governments. These telegrams "contain a detailed description about what happens to the Jews who are being deported from Hungary. It is mentioned there, that already 1 1/2 million Jews had been exterminated, and that at present currently the majority of the deported Jews are suffering the same fate ..."

The telegram bears the notation "St.S." proving that, contrary to their allegations, at least STINGLACH, HITLER and VISENMAYR were fully informed as to the true fate of the Jews and knew about the large-scale extermination.

VISENMAYR further reports that "in a further teletype 70 Hungarian and German personalities are mentioned who constitute the main culprits ..."

Hence this telegram alone establishes beyond doubt that the full extent of the extermination policy of the Foreign Office and other Nazi agencies was known and that, in fact, the defendants continued their dire and sordid course despite this widespread knowledge.

Memorandum, signed by Wagner, submitted to Hincke, STINGLACH and Ribbentrop and initialed by STINGLACH. Wagner states that the Swiss requested exit permits from Hungary for 10,000 Jewish children and a number of adults and families and that the American War Refugee Board requested emigration of Jewish children under 10 years of age to Palestine.
STEEENGRACHT is reminded that Reich policy is aimed at preventing emigration or, at least, make it dependent on valuable compensation. Therefore, VESENHÄUSER is to be instructed to tell the Hungarian Government to refuse the Swiss and American request so as not to alienate the Arabs. Wagner concluded that "a reply to this attitude can only be expected in about two to three weeks, and since the Jewish action will, on the whole, be finished at the end of this month, any intervention will thus become useless."

Ex. 3746 NG 5684 Doc.Bk. 201 6 July 1944

Telegram from VESENHÄUSER to Reich Foreign Minister via Ambassador RITTER. VESENHÄUSER reports on a discussion he had with the Reichsverweser on important Hungarian political problems. The document reveals that the Reichsverweser requested to have the Gestapo removed from Hungary and that VESENHÄUSER used pressure on the Reichsverweser. The document bears VESENHÄUSER’s typewritten signature.

This telegram was initialled by State Secretary STEENGRACHT.

Ex. 1822 NG 1802 Doc.Bk. 62 A 7 July 1944

VESENHÄUSER in this telegram reports that the Hungarian Ministerial Council has reached the following conclusions regarding Polish refugees:

"Polish Jews are to be treated according to regulations issued for Hungarian Jews."

The bulk of Polish civilian and military refugees will be put in concentration camps and made to work. VESENHÄUSER views this development as satisfactory although "it does not comply with the original intention of the SD to re-transfer all Polish refugees to the Government General."

This telegram was distributed to STEENGRACHT and RITTER among others.

Ex. 3715 NG 5586 Doc.Bk. 201 11 July 1944

Telegram from VESENHÄUSER to German Foreign Office, classified "Sealed Matter", in which he suggests to straighten out the discrepancies in the treatment of Jews in the various Balkan countries. The document bears VESENHÄUSER’s typewritten signature.

As a secret telegram it came to the attention of State Secretary STEENGRACHT.

Ex. 3702 NG 5577 Doc.Bk. 201 13 July 1944

In a secret telegram to the German Foreign Office, classified "Sealed Matter", VESENHÄUSER reports that the Reichsverweser is dejected about the political situation in Hungary and against the continuation of the present course against the
Jews. The telegram bears WEGEMMAYER's typewritten signature, as a secret telegram it came to the attention of State Secretary STEENGIACHT.

Ex. 3747 NG 5722 Doc.Bk. 201 15 July 1944

Telegram from WEGEMMAYER to Reich Foreign Minister, classified as "sealed matter". WEGEMMAYER reports that in the course of a discussion with the Reichsverweser he had pointed out that important political changes in Hungary had to be first approved by the Fuehrer. The top-secret telegram bears WEGEMMAYER's typewritten signature. As a secret telegram it came to the attention of State Secretary STEENGIACHT.

Ex. 1824 NG 2739 Doc.Bk. 62 A 16 July 1944

Telegram from Ribbentrop to WEGEMMAYER instructing him to call on Horthy at once in order to prevent the dismissal of the German-sponsored Sztojay Government. A dismissal of Sztojay and the proposed arrest of members of his government who carried out the anti-Jewish measures is considered "treason" of the "future of Europe fighting for its existence". WEGEMMAYER is further instructed to inform Horthy that the Fuehrer demands that the measures against the Jews of Budapest be carried out by the Hungarian Government without further delay. If the treasonable activities in Hungary continue the Fuehrer, so WEGEMMAYER is told, would be forced to act without scruples and this would include the personal safety of Horthy himself. Horthy should not be "intimidated by some ridiculous Jewish-American threats".

A subsequent note by Altenburg, dated 21 July 1944, indicates that WEGEMMAYER carried out this instruction on 17 July at 1700 hours.

Ex. 3748 NG 5755 Doc.Bk. 201 17 July 1944

Telegram from German Foreign Office to Reich Plenipotentiary (WEGEMMAYER) classified as "sealed matter". Ribbentrop instructs WEGEMMAYER to inform the Reichsverweser that the Fuehrer strongly disapproves of the changes in the composition of the Hungarian government, as suggested by the Reichsverweser. WEGEMMAYER is also ordered to insist on completion of anti-Jewish actions in Hungary. The document is signed by Ribbentrop. As a secret telegram it came to the attention of State Secretary STEENGIACHT.

Ex. 1825 NG 2994 Doc.Bk. 62 20 July 1944

Correspondence, found in the files of Department Inland II of the Foreign Office, involving STEENGIACHT, WEGEMMAYER, ERDMANNSOFER and other members of the Foreign Office in a plan to barter Jewish lives for supplies and armament for the Waffen-SS.

(1) 20 July 1944. Telegram from Altenburg of the Foreign Office to WEGEMMAYER, enclosing the text of a broadcast over London radio which reports the arrival of one Jewish and one German delegate in Turkey in order to approach
the allies with the following proposition: All Jews in Hungary are to be given exit permits in exchange for the supply of trucks, medical supplies, etc. for the SS.

(B) 22 July 1944. VESENLAYER replies via RITTER that the statements made over the London radio were correct. He is informed that the negotiations in Turkey are going well and that the British report was apparently only published in order to camouflage the affair towards the Russians.

(C) 16 September 1944. Memorandum submitted by Wagner via STEENGRACHT to Ribbentrop stating that the Foreign Office has received a complaint from the Swiss embassy to the effect that 318 Hungarian Jews have arrived in Basel without papers and asking that the Swiss Government be informed in the future of any such action on the part of the German Government.

(D) 29 September 1944. A further memorandum by Wagner submitted to Ribbentrop via STEENGRACHT and Heincke stating that Thadden was informed by the RSHA that the 318 Hungarian Jews were to be sent to Switzerland in exchange for vital supplies for the SS. The matter was arranged verbally between Eichmann and Himmler and there was nothing in writing about it.

(E) 11 November 1944. Memorandum by Wagner to Ribbentrop stating that he had been informed by the RSHA that another transport of 1,000 would shortly be dispatched to Switzerland in exchange for the procurement of war material for the Waffen-SS. It was up to the Foreign Office whether it wished to inform the Swiss. Wagner asks for instructions.

(F) Note by Wagner to Brenner, attached to the Document E (above) asking that this memorandum be treated as a personal communication to Ribbentrop and be handed back to him for destruction as soon as it was read, since nothing on the matter is to be put in writing. Ribbentrop is also to be informed that STEENGRACHT has been informed.

Ex. 3751 NG 5726 Doc.Bk. 201 23 July 1944

Telegram from the German Foreign Office to VESENLAYER, classified as "Sealed Matter", in which it received instructions not to publish any communiques on the Jewish question. The document is signed by Wagner. It is a secret telegram it came to the attention of State Secretary STEENGRACHT.

Ex. 1826 NG 1806 Doc.Bk. 62 A 25 July 1944

Telegram from VESENLAYER distributed to STEENGRACHT and RITTER.

VESENLAYER reports that the Swiss embassy announced that it had ready certificates for the immigration to Palestine for about 40,000 Jews and an additional 1,000 Jewish children in response to repeated assurances on the part of Germany and Hungary that emigration of Jews from Budapest would be favored. However, "inasmuch as the Jews in question are without exception biologically valuable material... it
was agreed with Eichmann that if further evacuations of Jews from Budapest are authorized these are to be carried out as suddenly as possible and so rapidly that the Jews considered for emigration will already have been shipped before the formalities are attended to. The missions in question have already been informed that the planned action can, of course, refer only to such Jews as are still in the country."

Memorandum by Wagner submitted to Ribbentrop via STEENGRACH (a stamp states "seen by the State Secretary").

Wagner relates that requests have been received both from the Swiss and the Swedes to let specified numbers of Hungarian Jews immigrate. The Swiss legation even indicated that the enemy powers would be willing, if necessary, to permit 2,000 detained Reich Germans return to Germany. However, he suggests to "delay the answer to these two interventions until the question of the treatment of the Jews remaining in Hungary has definitely been solved."

A number of memoranda on anti-Jewish measures carried out in Hungary, submitted by VERSENDLAYER to the German Foreign Office. According to Lirbach's remark on the document it has been submitted to State Secretary STEENGRACH.

Telegram from Ribbentrop to VERSENDLAYER on the enforcement of anti-Jewish measures in Hungary. The telegram is classified "Sealed copy". Since it is a secret telegram State Secretary STEENGRACH received copy for information.

Telegram by VERSENDLAYER to Ribbentrop, distributed to RITTER and EIDELMANNSCORPF, giving the full text of a note handed to the Hungarian Foreign Minister on German Jewish policy in Hungary.

The note contains a detailed statement on the Reich's position with regard to the solution of the Jewish problems in Hungary and admonishes the Hungarians for having been too lax in the fulfillment of their agreements in this respect.
(A) Telegram from Wagner to VESENNiER, informing him that the Swiss request transit visas for 8,000 while arrangements have been made only for 7,000.

(B) To this VESENNiER replies a day later that the total of 8,000 Jews comprises probably the 7,000 adults whose departure was permitted by the Führer and 1,000 children the decision about whom is still pending.

(C) However, on 25 November, STEENORIUGHT and Wagner are informed that Ribbentrop wishes

"to delay the matter for the time being and not to reply at present to the note of the Swiss embassy."

Ex. 1830 NG 3301 Doc.Bk. 62 A 14 November 1944

Wagner telegraphs the following to VESENNiER:

"On the instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister I ask you to inform the Hungarians verbally that we wish to advise them against recognizing further protective passports issued to Hungarian Jews beyond the previously approved quota, as this would only cause great problems and it can hardly be expected that this will make the neutral states more willing to recognize the Hungarian Government."

Ex. 1831 NG 3623 Doc.Bk. 62 A 16 November 1944

A series of telegrams from VESENNiER to German Foreign Office on anti-Jewish measures (deportations, establishment of ghettos, etc.) in Hungary. The telegrams bear VESENNiER's typewritten signature.

Ex. 3717 NG 4987 Doc.Bk. 201 21 November 1944

As a secret telegram State Secretary STEENORIUGHT was informed.