

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRACIES†

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Thank you for the kind and warm welcome. It is great to be here. Let me pay my respects to these great youngsters in uniform here: Captain John Porambo, Acting P.M.S., and his contingent from the Bulldog Battalion. Forty years ago or so, I sat in formations like this one. It has been a wonderful thirty-eight years for me serving in a great army, the best army in the world.

Let me congratulate the University of Georgia and Professor Loch Johnson. Thank you very much for bringing together so many views and for this opportunity to think about these difficult tasks. You have already recognized Clete Johnson, but let me add my thanks to him and all the organizers for their foresight and timeliness in choosing this topic.

Transitioning to democracy is hard work; we should know it in this country. We have nearly 229 years invested in this process—the experiment continues today. Looking at our democratic experiment today, going back to the original principles and to our Founding Fathers, there is a lot that has endured, but there have been significant changes as well. Democracy is inherently risky and it is full of challenge. The autocrats out there who control power today are not going to give it up willingly. How do you transition to democracy? How do you democratize? Under these circumstances, legitimacy is a powerful tool.

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It is at least as powerful as military force. But you have to make your case for it; then you must reinforce that argument very quickly by creating a safe, secure environment within which you can begin to control and protect the population. If you do not, there are many others who always seem to linger around the fringes of crisis, who are looking for the opportunity to backfill those vacuums and those voids. For those of us who have spent a little bit of time wrestling with these responsibilities, we are always in a footrace to control and protect the population. Two key words here: *control* and *protect* the population before others step in to fill those voids.

It is a huge step, going from autocracy to democracy—I think all of us would accept that. But I am also suggesting that it is another long step going from a fledgling democracy to the sort of experiment that we enjoy today here in America. Those of us who have spent some time in those troubled places in the world: we believe in democratization; we believe it can work. We are not frustrated or put off by it. It is important work. It is possible to get this done and get it done in a way that all of us think is successful.

Let me try to add to the discussion this morning by talking about my personal experiences in Bosnia. As I mentioned earlier today, in discussions before coming to this stage, all of us are very good at describing problems. We can tell you what is not working well; we can suggest to you that it is wrong-headed. It is a lot harder to come up with suggestions for how to solve the problem or to make things better. The reason I picked the Bosnia experience to share with you is that it is a part of the world that has seen very little freedom and a lot of suffering over the last 600 years. Yet, the models that were put together there seem to have made some inroads against fear, against domination, against oppression, and they certainly brought an end to bloodshed.

I arrived in Sarajevo in July 1997 to assume command of SFOR, the peace stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was a UN-mandated, NATO-led, multi-national coalition.¹ At the same time I was doing this, I was asked to handle two other commands, so I was really wearing three hats. The other two commands were U.S. Army Europe, which is responsible for watching a geographical area stretching from South Africa to the Baltics, and NATO Land Forces Central Europe. Both of these headquarters were located in Heidelberg, Germany. The third command, SFOR, was clearly the more challenging of the three and I decided to base in Sarajevo. SFOR is a large multi-national effort.

¹ See SFOR mission description, at <http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm> (last updated Jan. 14, 2004).

There are roughly forty troop-contributing nations: the nations of NATO Russia (maybe the only time an American division commander has commanded a brigade of Russian soldiers); former East European nations; Baltic nations; Turkey (a member of NATO); Malaysia; Egypt; and others. Thus, I located myself in Bosnia to give the SFOR mission the priority of time, energy, and focus that it deserved.

I arrived in Sarajevo July 10, 1997, a day when NATO attempted its first PIFWC (Person Indicted For War Crimes) detention. This was the first attempted PIFWC detention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it did not turn out well. It resulted in the death of the PIFWC, a Serb named Simo Drljaca, who had been the police chief for the city of Prijedor, Republika Srpska. He resisted detention, pulled out a weapon, and shot an SFOR soldier. In return, he was killed in self-defense. His death generated charges by Serb hard-liners that he had actually been captured, was laying on the ground, and was executed by SFOR.² As you might expect, we conducted an immediate autopsy using Serb physicians to assure that the quality and the credibility of the autopsy would be acceptable. The physicians agreed with SFOR's account, disproving the charges. But the charge, nonetheless, started a sixty-day crisis of riots, civil disturbances, and confrontations with SFOR, in large measure because we were not as quick nor as effective at getting the truth out as the Serb propaganda machine was at spreading disinformation. This was a year and a half into the SFOR experience and we still had no control over the state-controlled organs of propaganda, something that we would go to work on over the next six months. We were in a violent crisis. The Drljaca episode was telling; the resulting civil unrest and future PIFWC detentions would all be influenced by this confrontation. It gave rise to significant concerns on the part of some in NATO about the need for force protection of our soldiers. It led to a tightening of the rules governing, not just PIFWC detentions, but all operations generally, and the result was an awkward statement of intent. It went something like this: SFOR will not hunt down PIFWCs, but if in the course of its normal duties SFOR encounters a PIFWC, and the tactical situation permits, SFOR may detain the PIFWC for transfer to The Hague.

Describing rules of engagement for situations that never present themselves is illogical and even our young soldiers see through them pretty quickly. Detentions are inherently policing actions. In the absence of an effective police force, it fell to SFOR to use its military capabilities to meet some

² See, e.g., Law Projects Center Yugoslavia, at http://www.srpska-mreza.com/guest/LPC/Simo_Drljaca.html (providing an account of "The Murder of Simo Drljaca").

widely-held expectations: expectations by The Hague that handed down these indictments; expectations by Bosnians who had lost loved ones or who had, themselves, suffered at the hands of the accused; and, certainly, expectations by the international press, who sometimes encountered these indictees in public, at eating places downtown.

Everyone expected action and bridging the gap between expectation and the curious statement of intent was the commander's business. Commanders are paid to figure out what has to be done and how. NATO always expected SFOR to detain PIFWCs, but without repetitions of the Drljaca experience. We put plans in place to conduct detentions with very high probabilities for success and very low probabilities of injury, not only to innocents, but also to officials in the performance of their duties. The last thing we needed to happen in a detention operation was for a policeman to show up, have to decide whether a detention or a kidnapping was in progress, and then decide whether and how to get involved. That scenario is never helpful to anyone. Thus, our planning included how to minimize those opportunities from occurring: actionable intelligence, detailed and consistent rehearsals, patience, and very clear and very simple rules governing the use of lethal force, so that even our youngest soldiers could understand what was expected of them. These items were key to our successes. Over time, we succeeded in becoming pretty good at detentions, good enough so that some PIFWCs decided to turn themselves in rather than wait for us to show up. Ideally, that is what is supposed to happen. Someone being sought by the police should walk into the police station saying, "Here I am."

In addition to the Drljaca incident, my first meeting with the Tri-Presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina gave me an indication of what the next fifteen months were going to be like. The Tri-Presidents I am referring to here are President Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim; President Momcilo Krajisnik, a Serb; and President Kresimir Zubak, a Croat. After the customary initial introductions, during which I outlined our objectives, they were very appreciative and I was thanked profusely: "It's good to have SFOR here. Security is better, and we are, in fact, better off. Our citizens can go about their own daily routines in their own ethnic communities with great security." Then regrettably, the meeting turned into a lecture: "When SFOR leaves, as it will someday, we will go back to our old ways. We cannot help ourselves. It is our history; it is our culture. We are three different peoples." I looked at these three gentlemen, three European white males, who insisted that their cultures were so different they could not possibly change the course of their history. You could barely tell them apart, and without knowing their names, you could not be certain

which was Croat, which was Muslim, and which was Serb—at least I could not. They even spoke the same language! I thanked them for the history lesson and then told them that I was probably the one wrong person in all of SFOR to deliver that lecture to. I come from a country where nobody looks alike, and most of us—not all, but most of us—arrive in this country with our cultures, our languages, our foods, our dress, and our music. Somehow, in the process of joining this great democratic experiment, we are able to find our diversity positive and not threatening. So I chose not to buy their excuses for slow-rolling SFOR's efforts to achieve the objectives of the Dayton Peace Accords.

This encounter implied that I could not expect much help from them unless whatever SFOR proposed would benefit them individually as well as benefit their factions. We decided to press the initiative—and initiative is the key word—in the sense of being proactive and not waiting for things to happen. We decided to press the initiative because nothing changes in this part of the world unless pressure is applied, subtle pressure, but pressure nonetheless. The challenge was in being patient, not overreaching and creating a spike in violence in response.

Everyone espoused cooperation as we sat around those long conference tables talking about what was possible. There was, however, always an undercurrent of backsliding and minimalism percolating just beneath the surface. SFOR's responsibility was to aggressively pursue the safe and secure environment within which the people—not the military, but those who really do nation-building, reconstruction, and democratization, the great international governmental and non-governmental organizations that bring their important skills—can go to work. They could only do so if SFOR established and sustained a secure environment that permitted them to get out of the cities and in the countryside where the work was most needed. In the process, we hoped to “isolate the battlefield,” military terminology for separating bad actors from the rest of the population, so we could then control and protect that population. This would enable the other organizations, which can bring about real change in democratization, to go about their duties. Although SFOR provided a level of physical daily presence, its first choice was to apply force judiciously, indirectly, and preferably as a last resort. Otherwise, the lesson to be gained from SFOR's role in the mission would be that democratization requires a large and powerful military with which to pressure the civil population to do what was wanted: an unthinkable and unwise situation, and not the reason for SFOR's involvement in this peacekeeping mission.

While SFOR was conscious and deliberate in its application of force, its successes in PIFWC detentions demonstrated that it was capable of bringing to justice those who had been indicted. We were able to signal SFOR's readiness and willingness to act decisively if reconstruction efforts were stymied by obstructionism. In the town of Bijelina, a mother watched as SFOR detained her son, a PIFWC, as he was departing their apartment building for work. She was up on the third or fourth floor looking down as he exited the building and stood next to his car. He was detained in a matter of seconds. Her comment later to the press was that, "It was just like the movies, one instant he was there and then he was gone. This SFOR, you have to watch them." Comments like these added to SFOR's reputation.

SFOR worked at maintaining a strong partnership with the UN High Representative, who reported to the NATO Secretary General and to the Secretary General of the United Nations. As a result, he had the overall lead for civil implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Our support for him was essential. Others in the partnership included the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; the UN Mission, Bosnia-Herzegovina; the International Police Task Force; the UN High Commission for Refugees; and others. These were the Principals who sat in conference daily. We were all challenged by ponderous organizations that had come together very quickly. Organizers had put together as much capability as they could get, and none of us, not even SFOR, had very clean structures. There were significant internal challenges in each organization, and to coordinate amongst the international participants, it took the leadership of the Principals to bring things together in successful ways.

I lived with threats, both personal and those projected against American soldiers. The occasional veiled message reminded that just eighteen dead American soldiers would be enough to send SFOR home, a reference to our Mogadishu experience. I was personally protected twenty-four hours a day by the very best special operators in the world, but I went to bed every night wondering whether tomorrow might be the day, not for an attempt on me, but for a mass attack against our American contingent. We had no good intelligence on the threats or how to preempt them, so we had to find ways of generating our own intelligence. This is where the term "actionable intelligence" applies. Intelligence was not forthcoming from our traditional combat intelligence systems or processes, so we had to go on the offensive, seizing the initiative on a broad range of activities from pure military tasks, including intelligence collection, to infrastructure repair, to humanitarian assistance, to focused engagements with the leadership of all three former warring

factions—Muslim, Serb, Croat—at all levels, from national to municipal. This is called “presence.” These activities were designed to put our unknown and unseen adversaries on their back foot, denying them the freedom to act. In these situations, intelligence, legal, public affairs, psychological operations, and civil affairs soldiers become tier one players; their contributions are immense. Generating this kind of offensive action takes people, both in numbers and with a wide range of skills and capabilities, to enable us to have at least one more option than our adversaries. We were not always sure what was working well or what worked best, but as we forced our adversary to react to us, he began to show himself in very subtle ways, occasionally making mistakes that we were prepared to exploit. Seizing the initiative developed the opportunities that might not have otherwise presented themselves. Even with the capability to exercise initiative, there are no guarantees of risk-free operations, and commanders must accept and visualize what those risks might mean. Personally accepting the risks that go with your decisions makes things personal, and it becomes *very* personal. On a day when we ran one of our riskier PIFWC detentions, a senior member of our Congress arrived just after the detention operation had been successfully concluded. As I briefed him on the operation, he reminded me that if the operation goes well, everyone will take credit for it; if it goes badly, it would be quite lonely testifying before his committee with the cameras of the nation rolling. I always thought things might go that way, but having it explained so matter-of-factly made it just a little bit colder than I expected.

I was not the first to command SFOR and in preparing for my duties, I reviewed in detail the key lessons from each of my predecessors’ tenures in command. We noted that many of the commanders, both my predecessors and the commanders below them, were tested soon after assuming command of their organizations; within days in some cases, but certainly within months. They were tested with what appeared to be manufactured crises that were laid out as if to see how they would deal with them, to see if they had the right stuff. On those occasions where a commander was able to deal with his crisis effectively, that was the end of it. Where a commander did not bring together all of the assets quite as effectively, there usually was a retest. I was convinced that I was going to be tested early and I was determined to pass it.

My test occurred at the height of the Serb disobedience between July and September 1997. As I indicated earlier, it was triggered by the death of former Serb police chief Drljaca on July 10 and lasted until the municipal elections in September 1997. Drljaca’s death triggered an outbreak of civil disobedience that spiked on August 20 when Serb hard-liners infiltrated special police loyal

to them into Banja Luka, capital of the Serb Republic. We later concluded that they intended to pressure the downfall of elected President Biljana Plavsic. About five o'clock that afternoon, President Plavsic called, pleading for SFOR's assistance.

We informed the Office of the High Representative, then assembled and transported representatives of the international community to Banja Luka for a crisis action meeting with Madame Plavsic. She explained that she feared for the safety of her supporters and demanded an immediate attack by SFOR to recapture Banja Luka's police stations for return to her control. I explained to her that nothing was ever that simple or that easy. We had her wishes and would go to work on them.

We also had the responsibility of ensuring that SFOR did not appear to have taken sides politically in what might have been internal Serb matters. So we reconnoitered the city, confirmed the presence of large numbers of Serb special police, and spent that night preparing orders and briefing and rehearsing our forces. At dawn the next day, before most people were up, when very few were on the streets, and with the infiltrators at varying stages of alert, we conducted a very powerful, coordinated attack against the five Serb police stations and took them down simultaneously. The action was over in about twenty minutes. In the process of consolidating our gains, we confiscated over twelve tons of weapons, ammunition, and explosives and detained special police officers from elsewhere in the Serb Republic who had infiltrated those police stations.

During this action, we relearned lessons about physical courage from a young Czech army captain. He was the first man into his assigned station with his contingent in tow. As he entered the station, he encountered a phalanx of armed special police, whose leader said, "I've lost members of my family in the war. Today, one of us dies here, you or me." This young captain placed his forearm across the chest of this special police commander, moved him aside, and declared, "It is over." All resistance collapsed. The quality of the leadership at company command level is important. Had this young captain not acted decisively, we might still be there negotiating for that police station. But in a few seconds, he solved the issue for us. There is no substitute for courageous, decisive leadership at the company level, where it is most important.

About a week later, on August 28, Serb hard-liners, frustrated at their defeat in Banja Luka, sought to regain momentum and chose to make a stand in the strategically important town of Brcko. For those who may not be familiar with the geography of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska is shaped like an

inverted L that has been tipped over. It runs south to north on the eastern portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina and then east to west across the top. The politically sensitive town of Brcko is in the northeast corner, where the L hinges together, strategically important because it unites the two regions of the Serb Republic. At 4:30 a.m. on August 28, 1997 a siren sounded, calling Serbs out of their homes. As they had rehearsed during the war, they assembled near the town center and were directed to confront the sixteen-man U.S. infantry platoon securing the Brcko Bridge near the center of town, our only crossing over the Sava River and our land route to Europe. Its operational importance led us to assign that platoon a mission to retain that bridge at all costs. By 5:00 a.m., the platoon and the south side of the bridge were completely surrounded, and the crowd of rioting Serbs grew throughout the course of the day to several thousand. The platoon was essentially cut off. The demonstration, which began at 5:00 a.m., lasted until 9:00 p.m., when, on the instructions of a man in a suit who had pulled up in a dark Mercedes, the crowd began to melt away.

In fifteen months in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I never encountered a spontaneous demonstration, although that term was used by the press to describe acts of civil disobedience. Every event I am familiar with was orchestrated. For sixteen hours, that infantry platoon was confronted by demonstrators who had placed children and old women up against our concertina wire barricades with the general populace to their rear. Directing the crowd's actions and instigating confrontations with our soldiers were military-aged young men who roved to the crowd's rear carrying cell phones and long wooden staves. On occasion throughout the day, several young men would work their way forward through the crowd and reach over the women and children to strike our soldiers with the wooden staves. They had driven nails through the ends of the staves and were using them to punish our soldiers with blows to their arms and shoulders. The intent, we assumed, was to provoke a lethal incident.

Our soldiers stood their ground. The mission was to hold that bridge and they did so. They did not overreact although they absorbed a lot of punishment that day. When I visited them a day later, most could not raise their arms to salute and could barely shake my hand. I thanked them for their courage and their discipline. It was a great reminder—to me and to them—that there are days when the best equipment in the world will not make a difference but discipline, toughness, and character will.

A day later, on August 29, another U.S. infantry platoon on patrol encountered and disarmed twenty-seven men moving up a trail in some woods. They were questioned and released; very little was forthcoming about their activities. Although the arms had been confiscated, the patrol leader, an

inquisitive young lieutenant, wondered where the men had been headed. The lieutenant followed that trail to the top of a mountain called Udrigovo, where he discovered a nondescript, unimportant-looking tower sitting out in the middle of nowhere. The tower turned out to be the key strategic communications site between Serb hard-liners in Republika Srpska and Milosevic in Belgrade. The patrol deployed around that tower, took control over it, and reported their actions. They were not quite sure what they had, they only knew that twenty-seven armed men were headed towards it.

The judgment of this young officer, in seizing the initiative and following his instincts, provided me with tremendous leverage in negotiating later with Serb hard-liners—tremendous leverage. To get that tower back, the Serbs were willing to grant the international community access to their state-controlled radio and television networks so we could communicate directly with the people. We leveraged for more, such as access to the networks for moderate and minority candidates who were seeking public office in the upcoming municipal elections on September 13 and 14. The importance of this communications site to the Serb leadership was revealed through their own strident demands for its return and their subsequent willingness to negotiate its return in exchange for significant concessions towards democratization. Here, we really began to learn how to negotiate and leverage. Apply pressure, stay active, and when mistakes occur, be prepared to exploit.

Early morning about a week later, on September 8, a French reconnaissance patrol in eastern Republika Srpska reported that passenger buses were being loaded in one of the Serb hard-line strongholds. A quick check with other patrols revealed that about fifty of these buses were being loaded in other hard-line Serb communities with military-aged young men carrying long staves and boxes of rocks—rocks which could be used as missiles in a violent confrontation. The buses were headed west towards Banja Luka and a quick check revealed that President Plavsic was holding her final campaign rally at a soccer stadium in Banja Luka that night. We concluded that the hard-liners were seeking a collision to challenge President Plavsic's leadership. Too strong a move by SFOR to protect President Plavsic and her supporters might influence the way Serbs in general saw her in the upcoming elections. SFOR had to appear neutral in this confrontation, even as we administered the preservation of a safe and secure environment.

From about 7:30 a.m., September 8, until the early morning hours of September 9, the very capable multi-national U.S. division and the equally capable multi-national British division proceeded to conduct, without the use of lethal force, a classic military delay to slow this convoy of roughly fifty

buses—slowing, diverting, and frustrating this Serb hard-liner effort. A dropped tree across the road here, a pile of sand in the roadway there, a flat tire or two; our object was to keep the convoy out of Banja Luka. Not a single bus entered the city. They got close, but not a single bus entered Banja Luka. The signs of our victory early the following morning were weary, hungry, exhausted Serb demonstrators lined up at the bathrooms of the gas stations in northeastern Srpska, waiting for the buses to be refueled because they had run out of fuel.

Ironically, some Serb hard-line leaders, who had quietly pre-positioned themselves in Banja Luka in anticipation of this collision, and the likelihood that Plavsic might capitulate, were discovered by Serb moderates who threatened harsh retribution. They had pre-positioned themselves, we think, to take control if President Plavsic stepped down. It fell to SFOR to escort them safely out of Banja Luka because the moderate Serb population was threatening their lives.

The value of physical strength and stamina, courage, and creativity on the part of young leaders gave SFOR options it would not have otherwise had. Young commanders executed so well that they provided me options that were not forthcoming anywhere else. In the process, clear messages were sent to the factions, to the Serbs as well as to the other two factions: SFOR is capable; it is determined; it is a force to be reckoned with. I was never tested again. This occurred early in my tenure as Commander of SFOR, but I was never tested in this way again.

Peacekeeping is not an activity unto itself. It is one phase in a campaign of activities to establish security and stability in troubled lands. It can occur early in a crisis to try to avert a war; it can come after the fact, post-hostilities, after attempts to avoid war have failed. Peacekeeping is merely one phase of a broader campaign. The SFOR mission was a post-hostilities peacekeeping mission following the three-year war from which the former warring factions—Serb, Croat, and Muslim—all emerged exhausted but with some ability to govern intact. No one faction was capable of overthrowing the other two, and no two factions could bring themselves to work to overpower the third. So there was equilibrium in place and this provided SFOR and the international community significant leverage, enabling us to stay above the fray, be even-handed, not take sides, and yet press for reforms. Although the war had ended, make no mistake about it, there was still a battle of ideas under way. SFOR's mission was difficult enough, but behind the veils of legitimacy that confronted us in our formal public discussions lurked hard-line political parties, corrupt politicians, police on the take, criminal gangs, black marke-

teers, and extremist organizations, including paramilitaries and even Muslim extremists who had infiltrated Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war. Sorting our way through this potential maze of deceit, we had to generate intelligence that would help us retain the initiative.

We counseled our civilian counterparts in the international community that SFOR's intention was not to use our military capabilities as a first choice, but to use it sparingly and hopefully as a last option. That advice was, for the most part, generally well received. We encouraged the IPTF (International Police Task Force) to aggressively create a legitimate police force to which we could turn over those policing actions. It is never good to have your military component looking like the police force. Those functions needed to be turned over, but despite its best efforts, IPTF found the going slow and arduous. In the interim, SFOR had to balance being the option of last resort with preserving its authority to go anywhere, do what it thought was important, inspect anything it wanted, and take appropriate follow-up action through the judicious use of force. There is a balance between both poles that must be found. When force was used, we employed a cycle that had action, reaction, and counteraction as its logical sequence. When you act, expect there will be a reaction and be prepared to counteract that reaction. In other words, load the third step, the counteraction, even as you are taking the first step because you expect there will be a reaction. We always sought to have one more option than our adversaries. To do so, we had to think through this process and have sufficient force levels along with flexibility, agility, and responsiveness.

Strategic communications and information operations were also key. We hosted anywhere from forty-five to sixty visits a month. These included heads of state, ministers, and chiefs of defense from most of the forty-plus troop-contributing nations and numerous congressional delegations. Foreign visitors generally saw me as a NATO commander. Americans, on the other hand, almost exclusively saw me as a U.S. commander. The responsibility of coalition commanders is to make sure that those two perspectives remain linked. Being consistent and treating other troop-contributing nations as you do your own was essential to keeping this large, NATO-led coalition tightly cohesive.

In 1999, as I assumed the duties of Army Chief of Staff, we crafted a vision that described the global environment in this way:

The world remains a dangerous place, full of authoritarian regimes and criminal interests whose combined influence extends the envelope of human suffering by creating haves and have-nots.

These negative elements foster an environment for extremism and the drive to acquire asymmetric capabilities and weapons of mass destruction.

They also fuel an irrepressible human demand for freedom and a greater sharing of the better life. The threats to peace and stability are numerous, complex, oftentimes linked, and sometimes aggravated by natural disaster.³

Written on the eve of the twenty-first century, the world's best army was trying to describe an environment it had been watching and wrestling with for most of the decade. It was a global environment in which four bothersome factors were evident to us: international crime, narco-trafficking, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technologies, maybe not the weapons but certainly the technologies. The four complicators, when you talk about them individually, are policing functions. How would you deal with them individually? With good intelligence and good police work. But throughout the 1990s, we asked whether these four complicators could ever merge into one problem. Our question was that if this kind of merger occurs, who deals with the problem, because the resulting capability of that combination exceeds the capabilities of most police forces. It may exceed the military capabilities of some of our allies. We were trying to describe our concerns.

Those who had spent time overseas sensed the danger in the environment. Others who lacked that perspective may not have necessarily seen the great envy and great anger at Americans for who we are, what we have, and how we live. The Army's sense then, in 1999, was that we needed visionary leadership, not hectoring, not lecturing, but visionary leadership. Winning this war against the international terrorists would succeed, we thought, not because we hunted down every extremist warrior but because we were able to better that global environment we described in some measurable way. And to have any hope of creating that kind of change, it would take strong, visionary, credible leadership.

³ Louis Caldera & Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, *The Army Vision*, SOLDIERS, Mar. 2000, at 4,5, available at <http://www.army.mil/soldiers/mar2000/pdfs/ArmyVision1.pdf>.

