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[The following essay has been submitted by the author in lieu of a transcript of his remarks from the Colloquium presentation.]

U.N. Peace and Security Powers and Related Presidential Powers

The competencies and responsibilities of the United Nations concerning peace are varied and complex. Clearly the Security Council has a primary competence under Article 39 with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression; however, efforts to assure the full meaning of peace can implicate each entity within or connected with the United Nations and a whole panoply of general purposes, principles, competencies, rights, and obligations found in the United Nations Charter and authoritative practice.

While the reach of Security Council peacekeeping and peacemaking powers is quite extensive, it is limited by the U.N. Charter.1 Each limitation must be kept in mind not merely as a constitutional limitation on Security Council power, but also as a limitation relevant to U.S. involvement in peace and security operations and to the retained competence of the United States to act alone or with others. Some limitations also provide, as Professor Gabriel Wilner might state, "legal . . . criteria for involvement."2 The first such limitation can be found in paragraph 2 of Article 24, which assures a constitutional limit on power when directing that the Council, in discharging its duties with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, "shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." As noted in Article 1 of the Charter, such Purposes and Principles include human rights and self-determination. Thus, the constituted authority of the Security Council is conditioned by the need to serve, among other

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2 Gabriel Wilner, letter to colloquium participants, Feb. 27, 1995.
goals, human rights and self-determination of peoples.\(^3\)

Second, these limitations are implicit in Article 25, since Members agree merely to carry out "decisions of the Security Council [made] in accordance with the . . . Charter," and, thus, decisions made in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as well as other Charter-based limits and duties.\(^4\) Third, Article 55(c) provides a general duty of the United Nations (and, thus also, the Security Council) to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . . ."\(^5\) Fourth, customary *jus cogens* prohibitions, such as the prohibitions of aggressive force and genocide, should condition and limit U.N. peace and security powers.\(^6\) In particular, Security Council actions under Chapter VII of the Charter generally must not serve to encourage aggression and genocide, as some actions apparently have with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the extent that they do, Members should not be bound to participate. Fifth, as most writers recognize, Article 51 of the Charter affirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs," at least "until the Security Council has taken the measures *necessary to maintain* international peace and security" (emphasis in original) and those measures prove to be generally effective.\(^7\)

An interesting question involves the relationship between Security Council competence and the right of the United States to engage in defensive uses of force when its military, embassy personnel, or other nationals are under armed attack. While Security Council measures are taking place but not yet effective, even if U.S. troops are participating in a U.N. operation, the United States should not be precluded from using armed force where reasonably needed to respond to an attack on U.S. military or other U.S. nationals abroad. Article 51 of the Charter should still allow an Entebbe-type rescue

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\(^4\) See id. at 141-42.

\(^5\) See id. at 140-42.

\(^6\) See id. at 138-40.

or protective mission, as well as other defensive uses of force reasonably
needed under the circumstances. It might be useful to coordinate U.S. actions with U.N. operations. Article 49 of the Charter requires "mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council," but defensive measures under Article 51 of the Charter need only be "reported" to the Security Council.

Peace and security powers are also enhanced by the many purposes and principles contained in the U.N. Charter. For example, paragraph 1 of Article 1 addresses the related purpose of the U.N. "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." As in the past, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations might involve various peace-enhancing components. The prevention of threats to the peace can involve authorized self-determination assistance and the promotion of human rights, thus implicating other purposes outlined in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. The recent U.N. efforts concerning Haiti provide an example of the conjoining of these purposes. Similarly, efforts to stop Iraqi aggression also promoted self-determination and human rights.

Future efforts authorized by the Security Council might more openly involve human rights enforcement, including enforcement of relevant international criminal laws beyond merely the establishment of international criminal tribunals (perhaps even authorizing operations to capture alleged international criminals and to end related threats to peace and security). Future operations might also involve the recovery of stolen nuclear or
biological weapons, efforts to counter international terrorism, and hostage rescue or protective missions as well as more general forms of humanitarian intervention.

DOMESTIC PEACE AND SECURITY POWERS AND THE CHARTER

What power does the President of the United States possess to assure adequate U.S. participation in U.N. operations such as those mentioned above? First, in view of the President’s duty under Article II, section 3 of the U.S. Constitution faithfully to execute the laws and the fact that the United Nations Charter is treaty law of the United States, it is evident that the Charter can enhance presidential powers. In this respect, there is a conjoining of the faithful execution of the laws power and the treaty power. Also relevant are the Executive power, the President’s foreign affairs power and, in time of hostilities at least, the commander in chief power. Importantly, only the commander in chief power is addressed in Section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution. Counterposed to these are the various powers of Congress under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, including its share of the war power and the far-reaching, but not all-encompassing, “necessary and proper” clause. Additionally, Congress clearly has the potentially inhibiting power of the

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12 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 142 & n.34, 144, 146-50. See also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 14-15, 155-56 nn.19-20 (1993); infra note 30 and text accompanying note 34.

13 Paust, supra note 1, at 144, 148; Harper, supra note 8 (In addition to statutory authority in the U.N. Participation Act, the Foreign Assistance Act and various authorization and appropriations acts, “the President has independent constitutional authority, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive with responsibility for the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. . . .”).

14 See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Harper, supra note 8; infra note 34.

15 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 144, 148; Harper, supra note 8; infra note 34.

16 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 144. Thus, the WPR does not seem to regulate other presidential powers under the Constitution. See also Section 8(d)(1) of the Resolution. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); cf id. § 2(a). Moreover, the fact that only the commander in chief powers are addressed is relevant to interpretation of war-related phrases contained in the WPR such as “hostilities” and “combat”. See also infra note 50. Indeed, the name of the resolution also points to the fact that these terms are related to war.

17 Paust, supra note 1, at 147-48 & n.56.

18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also Paust, supra note 1, at 148.
purse string. With respect to restraints on the treaty power, Congress has the power to pass legislation that can bind the President domestically to act inconsistently with a treaty if: (1) the legislation is last-in-time;\textsuperscript{19} (2) the legislation is unavoidably inconsistent with the treaty; (3) there is a clear and unequivocal evidence of congressional intent to supersede the treaty;\textsuperscript{20} (4) none of the various exceptions to the last-in-time rule apply;\textsuperscript{21} and (5) the legislation is not unconstitutional (for example, as an impermissible infringement on the constitutional separation of powers).

With respect to new efforts in Congress and the so-called National Security Revitalization Act,\textsuperscript{22} it is evident that the effect of such a legislative scheme might involve the weakening of U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking by significantly limiting or jeopardizing U.S. participation. U.N. peace and security operations should be responsive to various crises as they arise, and so should U.S. participation. In my opinion, the legislative scheme would impermissibly interfere with presidential powers and needed flexibility in the area of foreign affairs and national and international security, especially with respect to (1) congressional waivers or approval for joint or foreign commands, and (2) ad hoc congressional waivers or approval for monies for special operations beyond those previously authorized or within a normal budget.\textsuperscript{23} Congress should tolerate greater Executive control of the details of command and the power of the United States to respond to threats to peace and national and international security. When


\textsuperscript{23} See also supra note 22. On related presidential commander in chief powers, see, e.g., United States v. Sweeney, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall. 2), (1866); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615, 618 (1850); Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), aff’d, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
war is at stake Congress admittedly has a greater need to participate, but even then the sharing of the war power involves several complexities and separations of power and responsibility.

New legislation might require reports to Congress that contain too many details, such as the size, composition and objectives of U.S. forces, and information concerning reliance on foreign troops for security and support as well as the ability of such forces to perform.\textsuperscript{24} Such detailed reports could seriously jeopardize both U.S. force and U.S. national security as well as the security of others. In terms of separation of powers, such details are best left with the commander in chief.

With respect to the legislation, if it is finally enacted and can pass constitutional muster, it might have only a limited effect. A 1996 act may be last-in-time with respect to the U.N. Charter as such, but there is no guarantee that it would prevail over a subsequent Security Council resolution\textsuperscript{25} or a new Executive agreement made pursuant to the Charter and/or a new resolution of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{26} As the \textit{Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States} affirms, "binding resolutions such as those of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, . . . have the effect of law."\textsuperscript{27} Judicial opinions confirm that Security Council resolutions have such an effect\textsuperscript{28} and are even relevant to application of the last-in-time rule.\textsuperscript{29} Accordingly, a 1996 act might be trumped by a latter-in-time Security Council resolution, and the President will have the power as well as the duty to follow the prevailing law.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{24} See supra note 22.
\textsuperscript{25} See, e.g., Paust, \textit{supra} note 1, at 144-45, 148-50.
\textsuperscript{26} See, e.g., \textit{id.} at 146-50; \textit{Restatement, supra} note 8, § 115 cmt. c, § 303 cmt. f.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Restatement, supra} note 8, § 102, cmt. g and reporters' note 3.
\textsuperscript{28} See Paust, \textit{supra} note 1, at 144 n.47.
Indeed, more generally the President has the power and duty to execute a Security Council resolution, as any law, unless an exclusive congressional power is directly at stake or per terms of a particular resolution it requires prior legislative implementation. In fact, one of the express presidential powers, the “Executive” power, is close in name and meaning to the word “execute.” The Constitution confirms that the President has the power (Article II, § 1) and the duty (Article II § 3) to execute law.\(^3\) Thus, unless self-executing and relevant; Leigh, supra note 8 (Executive has power “to carry out the terms of security commitments contained in treaties”); Dellinger, supra note 8, at 125 n.7 (“Moreover, the deployment accorded with United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 940 (1994)’’); John W. Davis, W. W. Grant, Philip Jessup, George Rublee, James T. Shotwell, Quincy Wright, “Our Enforcement of Peace Devolves Upon the President,” letter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1944 (President has “powers to carry out a commitment for participation in international policing such as that” under U.N. S.C.); cf. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 190-92 (1972) (U.N. Charter duties and undertakings with respect to war and peace are “consistent with the Constitution” and the place of treaties “in the constitutional pattern,” especially since “Security Council orders” are subject to the President’s concurrence or veto and the President acts also “pursuant to a treaty . . . implemented by Congress.”); but see ELY, supra note 12, at 11, 151-52 n.60; Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military Engagements, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 58, 67 (1995); letter by Professors Bruce Ackerman, Abram Chayes, Lori Damrosch, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B. Kurland, Lawrence Tribe, William Van Alstyne, to Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, Aug. 31, 1994, reprinted in 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 127 (“In Dellums, as here, the United Nations Security Council had issued a resolution authorizing member nations to ‘use all necessary means’ to drive Iraq from Kuwait. In our judgment, that resolution does not absolve Congress of its constitutional obligation to approve military action or the President of his constitutional obligation to seek and obtain that approval. To the contrary, the wording of Security Council Resolution 940 respecting Haiti ‘authorizes,’ but does not require, member nations to take military action, and expressly leaves each member nation, according to its own constitutional processes, to decide whether warmaking is ‘a necessary means’ to carry out its international obligations.’”); Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 74, 81, 88 (1991).

\(^3\) The RESTATEMENT also recognizes that even a non-self-executing agreement can be executed by “appropriate executive or administrative action.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 111 cmt. h; see also id. § 303 cmt. g. Moreover, treaties have been implemented by executive agreements. See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 526-29 (1957); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15 (1957); Coplin v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 115 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff’d, 479 U.S. 27 (1986); RESTATEMENT, supra § 115 cmt. c, § 303(3) cmt. f and Reporters’ Note 6; LOUIS HENKIN, supra, note 30, at 176. On the President’s duty to execute, see generally Paust, supra note 19, at 423-25 & ns.59-61; Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 377 (1987); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 (1988); A. HAMILTON
a matter lies directly within the exclusive prerogative of Congress, it is otherwise constitutionally precluded, or legislation is required by the international instrument, the President must faithfully execute even an otherwise non-self-executing law. Further, whether a resolution is "self-executing" domestically should not inhibit any effect it may have abroad. Thus, even a "non-self-executing" resolution should be binding on the United States in its actions abroad or at the international level if such an effect is consistent with the terms of the resolution considered in context, and the President's powers and responsibilities would thereby be enhanced.

An interesting question arises when the Security Council resolution is not strictly "mandatory" but "authorizes" states to participate in a military action, especially in the context of a "decision" of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such was the case with respect to Iraq and Haiti. Further, this is what the Executive utilized in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the President stating in 1994 that military actions were taken pursuant to his "constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief" and as measures taken as part of a "NATO enforce-

\[\text{\textit{Pacificus No. 1, in 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33, 35, 38, 40, 43 (H. Syrett ed. 1969) (President "is charged with the execution of all laws," ["duty to enforce the laws"]) including treaties and the law of nations ["the laws of Nations, as well ... [i]t is consequently bound. ..."], and since ["o]ur Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part of the law of the land," the President has both "a right and ... duty, as Executor of the laws. ..."); J. Madison, Helvidius, 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 107 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) ("That the executive is bound faithfully to execute the laws of neutrality ... is true. ... It is bound to the faithful execution of these as of all other laws, internal and external, by the nature of its trust and the sanction of its oath. ...")); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800) (Representative Marshall in 1800: "He is charged to execute the laws. A treaty is declared to be a law. He must then execute a treaty, where he, ... possesses the means of executing it ... [and he] is accountable to the nation for the violation of its engagements with foreign nations, and for the consequences resulting from such violation. ...")); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (J. Jay) ("the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner ..." (emphasis added)); P. DUPONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1824) quoted at 11 F. Cas. at 1120 n.6 (law of nations "acts everywhere proprio rigore" and "is binding on every people and on every government. It is to be carried into effect at all times ... [e]very branch of the national administration ... is bound to administer it ... [i]t can never cease to be the rule of executive and judicial proceedings. ...")].


33 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 145 n.51.
ment effort . . . under the authority of U.N. Security Council Resolutions."

An Executive claim might be that even an authorizing resolution, as part of a treaty process, is still an authorizing law which the Executive has discretion to execute or comply with on behalf of the United States—that even if the Executive is not bound to implement the resolution, executive power is enhanced because treaties which have the effect of authorizing action (or treaties plus resolutions thereunder which do the same) are laws of the land. The President’s duty faithfully to execute legal “mandates” also reaches, and is enhanced by, treaty law and the President’s duty is one involving the good faith exercise of discretion conferred by a Security Council resolution. Moreover, such authorizing resolutions are evidently “decisions” of the Security Council (and, in context, not mere “recommendations”) within the meaning of Articles 25 and 48 of the U.N. Charter.

The President might also have the power to circumvent such legislation by an Executive agreement made pursuant to the U.N. Charter. For example, an Executive agreement pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter to supply U.S. military forces for U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, as a treaty-executive agreement, might well prevail over previous and inconsistent federal legislation, including the War Powers Resolution and the United Nations Participation Act.

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34 See id. at 144 n.45.
35 See supra notes 30, 34; PAUST, supra note 21, at 444, 464-65. As in the case of any treaty, a conferred discretion must be exercised in good faith and not in a manner thwarting of the overall object and purpose of the treaty. Such is an obligation relevant to the President’s duty faithfully to execute the law.
36 But see Houck, supra note 7, at 6.
37 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 146-50. An executive agreement that attempts to implement a treaty is considered to be one made “pursuant to a treaty” and to have the status of a treaty. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 115 cmt. c, 303 cmt. f. The RESTATEMENT recognizes that the last-in-time rule does not apply in the case of a clash between certain “sole” executive agreements and an act of Congress and that inconsistent legislation prevails. See § 115 cmt. c and Reporters’ Note 5; see also American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) (statute and executive agreement interpreted consistently); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. 204 F.2d 655, 659-60, passim (4th Cir. 1953), aff’d on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Col. 1983), aff’d, 479 U.S. 27 (1986); JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.9 at 220 (4th ed. 1991) (“If the President’s authority to promulgate an executive agreement does not derive from his exclusive presidential powers . . . then the executive agreement should
not be able to override an earlier enacted federal statute.”); COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1078 (4th ed. 1995) (“The basic rationale of Youngstown is that a president has no inherent power to repeal or suspend an act of Congress.”); DANIEL G. PARTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCESS 644 (quoting former Judge Bork: “it is certain . . . that the President could not make substantive law in direct opposition to legislation by Congress. This is the lesson of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. . . .”), 647 (“it seems equally clear that executive agreement law must be subordinate to both statutes and self-executing treaties.”) (1992); PETER M. SHANE, HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 543-44 (1988) (“Unless an executive agreement may be connected to at least implicit statutory authorization, it is probable that, unlike a treaty, it may not override prior statutes.”); BURNS H. WESTON, RICHARD A. FALK, ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 195 (2d ed. 1990) (last-in-time rule not applicable to executive agreements); cf. Coplin v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 115 (1984) (treaty-executive agreement), rev’d on other grounds, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff’d, 479 U.S. 27 (1986). Only a sole executive agreement within an exclusive Executive power (such as recognition of foreign states or governments and armistice agreements) should prevail over legislation, but it would be the separation of powers and not the last-in-time rule that compels such a result. See HENKIN, supra note 30, at 177-78, 186; Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 317 (1945). Of course, a treaty-executive agreement or a congressional-executive agreement at least has the status of its coordinate legal base (i.e., a treaty or a statute). See RESTATEMENT, supra § 115 cmt. c.

The same result follows even more logically with respect to a clash between a mere executive regulation (not within an exclusive Executive power) and an act of Congress. See The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92, 112-13 (1874) (“No power was ever vested in the President to repeal an act of Congress” and presidential proclamations of amnesty did not have such an effect); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 330-33 (1818) (statute controls presidential instructions regarding: seizure of vessels); The Flying Fish, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-79 (1804) (statute prevails over presidential orders); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (Paterson J., on circuit) (“The president of the United States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids. If he could, it would render the execution of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure, which is a doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet with any supporters in our government.”). Moreover, the last-in-time rule does not apply to a clash between a constitutionally valid treaty and a mere executive regulation, since only federal statutes (and possibly some executive agreements) are generally coequal with treaties as domestic law and the Executive is bound by treaty law while it remains extant. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (Curtis, J., on circuit) (“treaties must continue to operate as part of our municipal law, and be . . . executed by the President, while they continue unpealed, . . . no body other than Congress possesses [the power to] refuse to execute a treaty.”), aff’d, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862); Paust, supra, note 19, at 423-25 & ns.59-61; supra note 31; but see Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 930, 936-37 & ns.19-20 (1986) (addressed in Paust, The President Is Bound, supra note 31, at 384). This should especially
The U.S. deployment of troops in Haiti has raised related issues. When one reads recent communications on the constitutionality of the planned U.S. military operation in Haiti, one is struck by the seeming manipulation of several terms. Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger's letter prefers "operations," "measures," and "deployment" in justifying presidential prerogatives short of "war," whereas Professor Lori Damrosch favors "hostilities," "invasion," "a shooting war," and "combat" while arguing for congressional primacy (although she nearly acknowledges a presidential power to initiate "certain . . . low-level engagements").

What would the planned use of our military against a resisting force of the illegal regime in Haiti actually have involved? Certainly, this would not entail a "war" or international "armed conflict" in the traditional sense (i.e., a use of armed force between states or nations under the authority of their respective governments or leaders) if the U.S. use of force had been authorized by the legitimate governmental leader of Haiti and the illegal regime had failed even to acquire the status of a "belligerent." As Professor Michael Reisman suggests, it would not have been armed force against Haiti, the de jure government, or the Haitian people, but force with the consent of Haiti's elected President clearly consistent with self-determination of the Haitian people and their human right to participate in a process of "authority" involving "legitimate" government, a point supported by legal
principles that seem to have escaped Professor Michael Glennon.\textsuperscript{43} It is also evident that in such a circumstance use of the word “invasion” would not be appropriate.

If the resisting military of the illegal regime had not even achieved the status of an “insurgent” under international law (which would implicate common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and words such as ‘armed conflict,’ ‘hostilities,’ and possibly ‘noncombatants’), then use of words such as “hostilities” and “combat” would have been improper. Appropriate determinations of the status of belligerency or insurgency involve contextual inquiry and, thus, implicate general matters such as the “nature” and “scope” of deployments. One critical element concerning each status involves the requirement of adequate control of significant territory,\textsuperscript{44} a matter that must be tested contextually. Thus, when the U.S. declared that it would “apply all of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions . . . [i]f it becomes necessary to use force and engage in hostilities,”\textsuperscript{45} the U.S. conditioned application on the existence of actual “hostilities” and did not even admit that all provisions, even then, would be technically applicable.\textsuperscript{46} Clearly, not every use or projection of military power is entwined in a belligerency or an insurgency, and the existence of an insurgency seems to pose the minimum threshold for “hostilities” or “combat.” Nonetheless, if an insurgency had occurred, Security Council authorization of military force and direct U.S. participation would have internationalized the armed conflict, at least in terms of Geneva law.\textsuperscript{47}

Moreover, if an insurgency was not likely but a quick, overwhelming use


\textsuperscript{45} See U.S. Permanent Mission in Geneva, Diplomatic Note to the International Committee of the Red Cross (Sept. 19, 1994), reprinted in part in Meron, supra note 32, at 78.


\textsuperscript{47} See Paust, supra note 44, at 507-10.
of military power with only sporadic and ineffective resistance, one could not logically conclude that U.S. troops would have been "equipped for combat" unless the words "for" and "combat" lose any common meaning. Certainly troops are not equipped "for" combat if no "combat" is contemplated or likely to take place.\footnote{See also U.S. Dep't State Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution and Antiterrorist Operations, U.S. Dep't State, Current Policy No. 832, at 2, \textit{reprinted in part in} 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 636 (1986) (doubts whether WPR applies to use of antiterrorist units "where no confrontation is expected between our units and forces of another state," since likely that such action is outside language referring to "hostilities" or "forces equipped for combat").} Therefore, I disagree with Professor Damrosch on proper classification of the "Somalian experience"\footnote{See Damrosch, \textit{supra} note 30, at 64-65.} and affirm Professor Glennon's recognition that in Somalia there were no "hostilities" (nor an 'armed attack'), but some uses of force by "brigands."\footnote{See Glennon, \textit{supra} note 43, at 70-71.} The question shifts to whether international law addressing some of these very terms is relevant to interpretation of the WPR and constitutional powers. Presumably it is.\footnote{See also \textit{The Prize Cases}, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125 (1814); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 41 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800) (and \textit{supra} note 41). \textit{See also supra} note 16; 1973 Senate Committee Report, \textit{supra} note 8, \textit{reprinted in} FRANCK & GLENNON, \textit{supra} note 8, at 570, 577 (" 'acts of war' in the sense of large-scale military operations against sovereign states \ldots involving full-scale warfare against a foreign power. \ldots" [and] "hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia"); \textit{BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY}, "hostility," 872 (4th ed. 1968) (addressing "war" and the law of nations); \textit{see generally} Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 159 (1933); \textit{The Charming Betsy}, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792).} In conclusion, it is evident that Congress seeks involvement in overall decisionmaking concerning U.S. participation in peace and security operations. If legislation goes too far it may lawfully be bypassed even if it is not unconstitutional. The difficulty, it seems, will involve selection of agreed criteria and procedures that provide sufficient flexibility and restraints.