Thank you. Before moving to the actual subject of this afternoon, "Means for Accomplishing the Maintenance and Restoration of Peace," I would still like to link up with what has been discussed yesterday and this morning. I find the optimism, which is implied in the title of this colloquium, "The Role of the United Nations and the Maintenance of Peace Before and After the Year 2000," very reassuring. The title means that the organizers assumed that, as a matter of fact, there will be a role for the United Nations in this coming period and even that there will be a United Nations at all.

I am an international civil servant with a permanent appointment at the United Nations, who obviously has a strong interest in the continued existence of the organization. Incidentally, I have to mention here that any views I will express are my own and not necessarily those of the United Nations. It occurred to me recently that the United Nations' continued existence is not so self-evident anymore. Human institutions should not be taken for granted. Less than ten years ago, people were still talking about the future of the Soviet Union. The reasons for these emerging doubts, of course, are to a large extent to be found in what was the subject of yesterday's meeting, mainly the attitude of one of the major member states of the organization, the United States.

For any organization, even at the private level, the success and continued existence is very much determined by the enthusiasm of a few of its most important members. These most active members usually include those who were instrumental in establishing the organization, who still believe in the idealism that is the basis of the organization, and who continue to propagate the purposes of the organization. Very often, those few members have to make a disproportionately large contribution to the life of the organization. That is a fact of life. In any organization, the majority of the members will normally be very passive and allow themselves to be led by the leading members.

When I talk about the need for leadership by the major members of the United Nations, particularly by the United States, I do not mean domination of the organization, trying to impose the will of one Member State in the organization. Rather, I am concerned with providing inspiration and the necessary means for the work of the organization—in other words, insuring that the organization functions.

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This current lack of United States leadership has an effect on many other members and the world community as a whole. I would just like to mention for instance that, in this year of the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, there is even in the context of this celebration a conference going on in Geneva which is dealing with the subject of replacing the United Nations with another organization. This other organization would have no international secretariat and thus be no more than a gathering of Member States. That is what is most worrisome to me.

Now I can turn to a more positive side of my talk on the subject: the means. I must say that when reading the questions that were submitted to me for consideration of this subject, I was a little bit surprised and disappointed. These questions seemed to limit the scope of the means for restoration and maintenance of peace to those which involve the use of military and force. I think that is a very narrow view. The capacity of the U.N. goes, of course, very far beyond that. Therefore, I would like to depart from these questions and talk about something that I think might be a means which may be a better investment for the future of the United Nations, namely peacemaking and preventive diplomacy.

As Professor Sohn pointed out yesterday, the Secretary-General in his Agenda for Peace has identified several areas in which the United Nations can be active with regard to the maintenance and restoration of peace, namely, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building, disarmament, sanctions, peace enforcement, and then, of course, linked to that is the whole subject of development. I submit that among this vast array of activities that can constitute means to restoration and maintenance of peace, it is not upon peacekeeping and peace enforcement that we should primarily concentrate in the future and which would be the best investment for the United Nations in the future. Rather, we should try to develop preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.

Peacekeeping, of course, has been a very remarkable creation of the United Nations and it should continue. Member States should continue to support this activity and continue to provide the means for this activity. There is even room for developing more creativity although there has already been a lot of creativity in the field of peacekeeping. However, it is absolutely essential that in these developments, we stick to the tested basic principles of peacekeeping and that peacekeeping is not allowed to develop into something more, as it has been threatening to do lately.

Maybe I have differed a little bit here from what General MacInnis mentioned; but only by respecting the basic principles of peacekeeping
(impartiality and nonuse of force, except in self-defense) can we safely proceed with this activity in the future. Any other attempts to develop peacekeeping into something else would be easily seen as a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The only way we can consider real military operations as a means for maintenance and restoration of peace is by sticking to the provisions relating to that in the Charter of the United Nations and by starting the implementation of Article 43 and others in the Charter. Unfortunately, even in this post-Cold War period, it does not prove possible to begin this process. Instead, we have been experimenting with peacekeeping and we have had a few disasters which have caught the attention of the world press. In a way, it is astonishing that the world has been concentrating on these “disasters” while at a time like this, in a post-Cold War period, it should be obvious that we should concentrate on other peaceful means of settlement of disputes. Those should get renewed attention in a period where there is no major political ideological conflict anymore. Now there should be a better climate for the consensual type of conflict resolution. With the latter, I mean, of course, in the first place what is provided for in Article 33 and following in Chapter VI of the Charter.

The membership of the United Nations has recognized the need to concentrate more on these peaceful means. It has been expressed in the mandate that was given to the Secretary-General before he launched his Agenda for Peace. It is reflected in the Agenda for Peace and in the addendum thereto, and again in the consideration that was given to the addendum. The membership of the United Nations has again stressed the primary role of peacemaking and preventive diplomacy in the settlement of disputes.

It is, of course, very difficult for the media to concentrate on the results of preventive diplomacy. Indeed, it is very difficult to point out and to talk about examples of results of preventive diplomacy.

Before talking further now on peacemaking and preventive diplomacy, let me just read the definitions of those two concepts in order to make this clear for all of us, as they appear in the Agenda for Peace: “Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.”

I will concentrate here on those means that are in the category of peacemaking and preventive diplomacy which are political or diplomatic
means, and not upon legal or judicial procedures. I must point out, first of all, that the techniques that are involved in the two concepts, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, are basically the same. The difference is that preventive diplomacy takes place before the actual existence of a conflict. In peacemaking, the same techniques are applied while trying to solve existing conflict.

Now, what are these techniques, or what are the different elements involved in peacemaking and preventive diplomacy as executed by the United Nations, or in the first place by the Secretary-General of the United Nations? Preventive diplomacy relies primarily upon early warning. Early warning is a function which seems to have been considered extremely suitable to the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article 99 of the Charter gives the Secretary-General a mandate for bringing early warning matters to the attention of the Security Council.

In order to provide early warning, it is necessary to have information in the first place. The question is whether the United Nations is equipped to gather the necessary information. I would say, generally yes. There is a huge amount of information available. There is the information from the media and from Member States themselves, who seem to be all too willing to share that information, for instance, with the Secretariat. There is information from non-governmental organizations, information collected within the United Nations system itself through offices all over the world, and there is the information from the academic community, which is a very important aspect as it is important to maintain a very close link between the academic community and the United Nations Secretariat.

There is some room for improvement, of course. The Secretary-General has made an attempt to establish a certain political presence of the United Nations Secretariat in certain countries where that would be important in order for the Secretary-General to better understand developments in those regions. The attempt was made mainly because the initiative came from certain Member States themselves, in particular the newly independent states of the Former Soviet Union, of the C.I.S. These states wanted the advantage of having a United Nations presence, even a political presence, in their respective capitals. Therefore, the Secretary-General took the initiative of trying to establish so-called integrated offices in these capitals. This action meant that in these offices, not only development assistance people or public information people would be present, but also political affairs officers. As I said, this initiative met with the strong consent of those countries in which they were intended to be established in the first place. Unfortunately, there
was a lot of negative reaction in the General Assembly, especially from the nonaligned countries who saw a threat to national sovereignty in this kind of planned activity of the Secretary-General. The concept therefore never materialized.

Once you have collected the information, you have to analyze it. Again, that is not too difficult. What one needs is good staff: good political affairs officers, good observers of international politics and developments, and good analysts. That can be rather easily arranged.

The third step, then, is the more difficult step. On the basis of analysis, one must make recommendations for action. The recommendations must be made through the Secretary-General and then by the Secretary-General to Member States or to political organs of the organization. This is more an art than a science. It requires good judgment, a lot of courage, imagination, and the need to be realistic—"realistic" meaning that the recommended action must be performable, implementable, and acceptable to Member States and to the legislative organs like the Security Council or the General Assembly. That touches on the question of what can the United Nations do, what should the United Nations do, or what should it not do? It is very possible that in several cases, the analysis leads to the conclusion that there is or may be a problem, but that there may be no role for the United Nations. To repeat the words of President Clinton, "The United Nations has to know when to say no." The same problem that we have with regard to peacemaking and preventive diplomacy recurs in the context of peacekeeping. There one has to say no as well.

Member States or other protagonists in a conflict have to be willing to solve their problems peacefully, and to negotiate and accept the role of the United Nations. We must do everything possible to test the parties' willingness to participate in mediation or third party involvement and encourage them to do so. But sometimes we must conclude that it is not possible.

Recently, in the discussion that took place on the addendum to the Agenda for Peace, proposals were made to create an obligation in international affairs for Member States of the United Nations to accept United Nations offers of good offices. The Netherlands, for example, has been talking about the need to establish a code of conduct in the field of preventive diplomacy. We are only at the stage of identifying problems in this area; we are still far from solving them, but it is a promising area, and while it requires a major intellectual and political effort, it does not require a major financial investment.

Of course, when offering these services to parties in conflict, one has to
be able to make the United Nations' involvement an attractive means of dispute resolution. What is helpful in accomplishing this is if the United Nations, or the mediators on behalf of the United Nations, can offer other machinery, such as the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the provision of humanitarian assistance, assistance in elections, assistance in disarmament, and so forth. In order to ensure the availability of this machinery, it is necessary for the U.N. mediators to work closely with the legislative organs of the United Nations. Close contact with these organs, such as the General Assembly and the Security Council, can ensure that their approval will be forthcoming when we request a mandate for the initiation of peacekeeping efforts, for instance.

The next step in all these cases of peacemaking is to obtain intergovernmental approval, or an intergovernmental mandate, for the continuation of the efforts. Now the question arises, which organ will provide this approval? Normally the Secretary-General periodically informs the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, of what he is doing in the field of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. As a result of this communication, when the Security Council needs to make a decision regarding a mandate, it is not too difficult for them to decide.

It must be noted that some Member States do not want the Security Council or the General Assembly to be informed of the activities of the Secretary-General. They prefer, especially regarding internal matters, that the Secretary-General deal directly with the Member State rather than involving the legislative bodies such as the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The General Assembly or Security Council can also issue a mandate without the Secretary-General’s request. For instance, a recent example is Afghanistan. There, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a special mission to seek resolution of the political crisis.

After having obtained the mandate we get to the phase of execution of the mandate. There are numerous modalities involved in the execution of a mandate, too complicated and too varied to explain in full. However, one example is the use of special representatives that may be based in the region or special envoys who are sent on a temporary basis. These special envoys are used for such purposes as fact-finding or promoting good will. There is also the establishment of political offices in various areas, with the consent of the parties concerned, in order to execute the peacemaking mandate. These temporary or initial means of executing a peacemaking mandate are far less expensive than a full-fledged peacekeeping operation.

Execution of a peacemaking mandate, however, is not necessarily the
exclusive domain of the Secretary-General or the Secretariat. There are many different ways of involving the Member States. For example, one way of achieving this is through an informal institution known as the Friends of the Secretary-General. For specific conflicts, the Secretary-General invites member groups who have a special interest in the resolution of the conflict to consult with him and advise him. This method has been useful.

One example of such a group is the Friends of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, made up of five members: the United States, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The meetings of this group have facilitated agreement among Member States on various issues. Such agreements can then be put to the Secretary-General and the membership of the United Nations as recommendations. Such groups, although useful, must not attempt to replace the Security Council itself.

Another way of involving Member States is as observers. For example, in the case of Tajikistan, we have established under the auspices of the United Nations through a special envoy for the Secretary-General for Tajikistan a series of inter-Tajik talks. These talks between the government and the opposition involve the participation of observers. In this case the observers were from Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as from the regional organizations known as the OSCE and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. These observers sometimes play a very active role in the mediation process, and have been found to be a constructive force.

The idea of involving Member States in the execution of peacemaking mandates has been discussed most recently in the discussions on the Agenda for Peace. For instance, a proposal by New Zealand introduced the idea of the Security Council appointing a Member State to serve as a reporter/monitor/coordinator/godfather of the problem. This appointed state would consider options for settlement of the problem and then work very closely with the United Nations Department for Political Affairs.

I mentioned the participation of two regional organizations as observers in the negotiations on Tajikistan. That method of cooperating with regional organizations is, of course, another modality of involving Member States and other organizations in the peacemaking activities of the United Nations. This is something that has been stressed very heavily by the Secretary-General in his Agenda for Peace as a means of sharing and alleviating some of the heavy workload of the United Nations. In our experience, this cooperation has been of limited value. Cooperation which was based on joint efforts has been less useful than cooperation based on division of labor. For instance,
in Haiti, where we had a true joint operation with the Organization of American States, it was a much more complicated situation for the United Nations than is the case in Nagorno-Karabakh or Georgia or Tajikistan. In the latter, either the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has played a primary role, with subsidiary roles for other organizations.

In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the main role is played by the OSCE; in the case of Tajikistan or Georgia, the main role is played by the United Nations. The United Nations operation in Tajikistan, for instance, is responsible for the Inter-Tajik talks—the process of national reconciliation. The OSCE concentrates on institution building, democracy building, human rights, and so on.

I mentioned the word "democracy building" and that is how I would like to end. We have talked here about the procedural aspects of peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. There is also another aspect of peacemaking that is generally more difficult: the substantive aspect. This involves answering the questions of what means should be employed to accomplish the restoration and maintenance of peace as well as what legal or political bases should be used to achieve peace.

One aspect is that there has been a lot of talk about democracy and the role of the United Nations in the establishment or promotion of democracy in various Member States. The Secretary-General himself has been a great advocate of this role of the United Nations in the establishment of democracy in national and international relations.

We have to say that the process of establishing democracy is not necessarily synonymous with insuring stability. The promotion of democracy in many countries amounts to creating a revolution in those countries, the reverse of stability. The involvement of the United Nations in such a process is bound to lead the United Nations down a much rockier and shakier path than if the emphasis were simply on establishing stability, peace, or absence of war or simply establishing peace on the basis of traditional principles of international law.

We have seen some examples of this in recent activities. A choice has to be made at this stage whether to engage the United Nations fully and immediately in the establishment of democracy. If we make that choice, the danger to the United Nations is much greater. We would thus create an additional problem for the future of the organization.

Summarizing, the main purpose of this brief, somewhat generic review of peacemaking activities has been to point out these activities and stress that
they are important means of implementing the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter. They should be easier to accomplish in the new world climate, easier than in the past. They will certainly be more economically efficient than the alternatives, the use of military force and troop deployment. They deserve more attention from the academic community, the general public, and the international practitioners alike. Thank you.