Georgia Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1970), pp. 696-723


Collective bargaining became the keystone of our national labor policy with the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. The central role of this procedure was preserved in the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts. By choosing collective bargaining as the principal instrument of labor market control, Congress sought to remove sources of industrial strife by a method which preserved private determination free from either unchecked employer power or smothering governmental control. Landrum-Griffin was supplementary legislation designed to eliminate or prevent practices which distorted and defeated the collective bargaining policy of the Labor-Management Relations Act. This statutory scheme has now been in effect for more than a decade, and the time is certainly ripe for an evaluation of the usefulness of reporting and disclosure as a control device. However, that is not the purpose of this article. All that is attempted here is a first step in that process in the form of a review of how these provisions have fared in the courts since 1959. Nevertheless, some preliminary judgments may be ventured.