Georgia Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter 1975), pp. 383-415


Analogies between criminal trials and union disciplinary hearings are easily drawn. Both involve charges of prohibited conduct, the presentation of evidence, and decisions by competent and impartial tribunals. Whereas one’s physical freedom is at stake in a criminal proceeding, his economic freedom is often imperiled in a union disciplinary hearing. It is not surprising therefore that the requirements of due process have been extended to the labor setting. Embodied in section 101(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, due process in the union sphere has been as elusive of definition as in judicial proceedings. Examining section 101(a)(5), Professors Beaird and Player attempt to clarify this area through a discussion of the application of the preemption doctrine to the section, the scope of statutory coverage, the definition of “discipline,” and the section’s procedural guarantees.