Abstract
There is something useful, indeed beautiful, about a work that carefully and eloquently explores a new idea or reexamines an old one. The Nature of Legislative Intent is therefore useful and beautiful, and it offers much of philosophical value for textualist and non-textualist alike. but it offers little of practical consequence and is therefore unlikely to advance the ball outside of the hall of academia, not simply because of the failure of judges to take legal scholarship seriously (which is there loss, as well as sosciety's), but because on its own terms it cannot.
Repository Citation
Hillel Y. Levin,
Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love
, Const. Comment. 30 89
(2015),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1017
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