Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes

Authors

John J. Flynn, University of Utah School of Law
James F. Ponsoldt, University of Georgia School of LawFollow

N.Y.U. Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 5 (November 1987), pp. 1125-1152

Abstract

Cognizant of historical shifts in the methodology and standards applied in antitrust analysis, particularly in the analysis of vertical restraints, this Article first considers the underlying jurisprudential nature of legal reasoning as background for determining what the law of vertical restraints ought to be. The Article then explores the implications of substitution "economic analysis"--in the narrow sense of the economic analysis advocated by the Chicago School of "law and economics"--for legal reasoning in disputes arising under the antitrust laws. A more accurate, multivalued background for antitrust policy is explored. This Article finally proposes a method for analysis of vertical restraints that will allow antitrust law to implement the goals Congress has mandated, yet address constructively the commercial practices it must regulate.

Repository Citation

John J. Flynn and James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes (1987),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/303