Abstract
What does it mean to discriminate on the basis of health status? Health is, of course, relevant in a number of ways. It can speak to the length of our lives, our ability to perform mentally and physically, our need for health care, and our risk of injury and incapacity. But the mere relevance of a particular attribute does mean that considering it should be legally permissible. Moreover, the potential harms that may result from health-status discrimination raise important moral questions. This Essay explores when differentiating on the basis of health is socially acceptable and, by contrast, when it is normatively problematic. Given that variations in health may correlate strongly with the kinds of cost- and performance-related factors identified above, the authors provide a theoretical framework for assessing when considering health-related status is justifiable — perhaps even desirable — and when it is discriminatory.
Repository Citation
Jessica L. Roberts and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,
What Is (and Isn't) Healthism
, 50 Ga. L. Rev. 833
(2016),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1115
Originally uploaded in SSRN.