Georgia Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 473-487


Professor Richard Fallon delivered a thoughtful Sibley Lection which then served as the stimulating subject for an agreeable afternoon Symposium. The papers collected here offer some evidence of the richness of the conversation Fallon opened. I aim to extend that conversation, and so pay tribute both to the Symposium and its honoree, by submitting some afterthoughts. Fallon's paper, with its breadth and subtlety, resists reduction; however, if I do violence and force it into three sentences in an attempt at understanding, the result runs this way: Interests underlie both individual rights and government powers. These interests are conceptually related. It is thus incorrect to think of rights as independent constraints on governmental power and correct to hink of persons' and government's interests as interdependent. For the purpose of dialog and so for my own education, I question this analysis and its consequences.