Abstract
This article argues that the prospects for Artificial Intelligence (AI) to impact corporate law are at once over- and under-stated, focusing on the law of Delaware – the predominant jurisdiction of incorporation for US public companies. Claims that AI systems might displace human directors not only exaggerate AI’s foreseeable technological potential, but ignore doctrinal and institutional impediments intrinsic to Delaware’s competitive model – notably, heavy reliance on nuanced applications of the fiduciary duty of loyalty by a true court of equity. At the same time, however, there are discrete AI applications that might not merely be accommodated by Delaware corporate law, but perhaps eventually required. This would appear most likely in the oversight context, where loyalty has been interpreted to require good faith effort to adopt a reasonable compliance monitoring system, an approach driven by an implicit cost-benefit analysis that could lean decisively in favour of AI-based approaches in the foreseeable future.
Repository Citation
Christopher Bruner,
Artificially Intelligent Boards and the Future of Delaware Corporate Law
, 22 J. Corp. L. Stud. 783
(2022),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1554