Abstract
Recently, the United Kingdom Supreme Court decided that only natural persons can be considered inventors. A year before, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a similar decision. In fact, so have many of the courts all over the world. This Article analyzes these decisions, argues that the courts got it right, and finds that artificial inventorship is at odds with patent law doctrine, theory, and philosophy. This Article challenges the intellectual property (IP) post-humanists, exposing the analytical and normative perils of their argumentation, and recommends against getting rid of the nominally central place of humans in the law. This response to IP post-humanism rests in equal measure on patent doctrine, legal causation, and the mythology which creates and justifies the law.
Repository Citation
Mateusz Blaszczyk,
Impossibility of Artificial Inventors
, 16 U.C. L. Sci. & Tech. J. 73
(2024),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1806
Previously posted on SSRN.