Abstract
Several states have enacted specialized limited liability company legislation in an attempt to attract decentralized autonomous organizations. In this way, the regulatory competition debate surrounding states such as Wyoming, Tennessee, and Vermont, attempting to dethrone Delaware, has found a new battleground. According to Professor Lynn LoPucki, this will entail a regulatory race to the bottom, that is, a race to “laxity.” I disagree. In fact, deregulation has already been achieved in the traditional limited liability company form. The decentralized autonomous organization limited liability company is no laxer or more attractive to investors, who will likely prefer the traditional limited liability company or even other entity forms, given the diversity of investors’ needs and aims. Moreover, some decentralized autonomous organization organizers may wish not to incorporate at all, hoping to avoid the law altogether. While increasingly risky, this strategy rests on the belief in the alegality liability shield, further diminishing the impact of the lex specialis approach. After analyzing the statutory developments and the scholarly and industrial commentary, I conclude that in decentralized autonomous organizations, as elsewhere, the regulatory race to the bottom is a fad.
Repository Citation
Mateusz Blaszczyk,
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations and Regulatory Competition: A Race Without a Cause
, 99 N.D. L. Rev. 107
(2024),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1804
Previously posted on SSRN.