Abstract
[This article is intended to supersede and replace an article with the same title published by the Arizona State Law Journal. That article, in its printed form, was disapproved by me prior to publication, and did not correctly state my views on the subject.] It is the thesis of this article, which may as well be stated first as last, that: (1) the received learning of the doctrine of conditional relevancy is erroneous, being based from the start on an incorrect analysis of relevancy; (2) the doctrine is inconsistent with the definitions of relevancy adopted in the Model Code, the Uniform Rules, and the Federal Rules of Evidence; (3) the attempts, as in Federal Rule 104(b), to provide an escape from the consequences the doctrine might have if it were correct, have done more harm than good to the body of the law of evidence.
Repository Citation
Vaughn C. Ball,
The Myth of Conditional Relevancy
(1980),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/107
Georgia Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Spring 1980), pp. 435-469