Previously posted on SSRN.

Abstract

Insufficient labor policies contribute to poverty, while those poverty conditions contribute to limited employment opportunities and labor rights abuses. Traditional multilateral lending institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, provide development aid but tend to treat labor policies as incompatible with efficient market functioning. The International Labor Organization (ILO), on the other hand, provides development assistance specifically targeting labor policies. Unlike traditional lending institutions, the ILO's assistance imposes no conditions. Instead, the ILO's mandate requires it to design its programs in consultation with the recipient country's government and social partners.

This article studies the ILO's assistance under the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Closely examining two SADC Member States, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, it finds that the ILO's assistance fails to strengthen labor rights in countries that do not already have strong social partners and social dialogue platforms. In those cases, the ILO cannot second-guess its requisite consultative structure; yet, it must still use the results of those consultations - however dominated by the stronger factions - to design its assistance programs.

This article concludes by arguing that prior to designing its assistance programs, the ILO must invest its resources, when needed, to strengthen the social dialogue platform and social-partner capacity in the country.

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