Abstract
The chapter analyses how constitutional law influences private-public arbitration in the United States. Its central thesis is that constitutional law exerts a powerful indirect influence on arbitration law. While the US Constitution does not directly regulate arbitration, its underlying norms—such as separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights—impact arbitration law indirectly. The chapter explores the ways in which these constitutional principles influence public-private arbitration through statutory interpretation, treaty design, and private protocols reflecting constitutional norms. This pattern of influence manifests itself in public arbitration (i.e. arbitration involving states or state-owned entities) just as it does in private arbitration. Highlighting how due process norms and federalism concerns shape arbitration practices, the chapter demonstrates that constitutional principles subtly permeate the framework of public-private arbitration in the US.
Repository Citation
Peter B. Rutledge,
Whither Leviathan? The Seepage of Constitutional Law into Public-Private Arbitration in the United States
(2025),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1755
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Previously posted to Oxford Academic.