Publication Date
2009
Abstract
The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provide that a defendant has the right to defend himself in person. The bounds of this right, however, are nebulous. There have been few self- representation cases at the ICTY, but what has emerged in these cases is an ongoing conflict between the defendant's right to self-representation and the desire for a "fair and expeditious" trial. On one hand, the pro se right is extremely personal because the defendant is the only person who bears the consequences of losing at trial. On the other hand,high profile defendants are often politically motivated and disruptive in their self-representation. They often lack legal education,which slows the legal process. The conflict between these competing interests manifested itself in the case of Radovan Karadzic indicted at the ICTY in July 2008. This Note seeks to decipher the disorganized and sometimes contradictory case law from the ICTY on the matter of self-representation and offers a more comprehensive way of determining when, if ever, counsel should be imposed on Karadzic and other pro se defendants appearing at the ICTY. Although the ICTY claims to provide a broad right to self-representation,in practice the right is narrowly limited. The tribunal has not only chosen to limit the practice of self-representation when the defendant intentionally delays the trial, but also when the defendant unintentionally delays the trial. This Note concludes that in order to prevent imposition of counsel, Karadzic -- and other potential future defendants-must utilize all resources provided to avoid unintentional trial delay, because any substantial delay warrants the imposition of counsel in the ICTY.
Recommended Citation
Jones, Rachel K.
(2009)
"Untangling the Right to Self-Representation in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,"
Georgia Law Review: Vol. 43:
No.
4, Article 7.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol43/iss4/7