Publication Date
2024
Abstract
This Article reviews the recent emergence of the space-cyber nexus as a distinct warfighting domain, solidified during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and analyzes the (missing?) laws of space-cyber warfare. The Article further suggests a roadmap for the development of norms and rules under the constraints of contemporary geopolitics and difficulties in multilateral rulemaking. As space-based infrastructure became critical to modern militaries and economies, it has, as a result, become a prime target. While only four countries possess antisatellite missiles (United States, Russia, China, and India), cyberattacks require much less in terms of funds and technological sophistication and can also be launched by nonstate organizations. They are powerful asymmetric weapons that allow an attacker to cover their tracks, leaving the attacked country uncertain about attribution, thus rendering retaliation and deterrence challenging. The war in Ukraine, dubbed by some as “the first space-cyber war,” saw, for the first time, the targeting of space-based services as part of a military campaign. Significantly, this was achieved through cyberattacks—a telling choice given that Russia, to which the attack was attributed, also possesses antisatellite missiles. This Article suggests that current multilateral regimes are insufficient to address the new space-cyber nexus and that there is an urgent need to develop an integrated, flexible, multilateral regime. Considering the gridlock in traditional international lawmaking and the rise of nonbinding international agreements, the Article suggests a polycentric approach to regime building. Advocated by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom for commons governance, polycentric governance is increasingly used to address a diverse range of global collective action challenges. The Article thus envisions multi-track diplomacy in which multiple forums introduce a series of nonbinding international agreements that together would amount to a feasible and flexible, albeit imperfect, corpus of the laws of space-cyber warfare.
Recommended Citation
Tepper, Eytan; Shackelford, Scott; Romano, James B.; and Dmitriachev, Sergei
(2024)
"The Sixth Warfighting Domain?: Governing the Space-Cyber Nexus,"
Georgia Law Review: Vol. 59:
No.
1, Article 3.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol59/iss1/3