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Publication Date

2024

Abstract

The Georgia Constitution’s Just Compensation Provision is textually broader than the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause because it entitles Georgians to just compensation not only for property “taken” but also for property “damaged”—the Damage Clause. The Georgia Supreme Court rarely contends with the Damage Clause when reviewing land-use regulations, like zoning laws. Instead, the court applies the analyses articulated by U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the narrower federal Takings Clause. This approach, however, ignores the Georgia Constitution’s unique text, context, and history.

This Note analyzes the original public meaning of Georgia’s Damage Clause and argues that, when the Georgia Supreme Court reviews zoning laws, it should adopt the original public meaning of the Damage Clause as understood by the court’s canon of constitutional continuity and not its canon of consistent construction. This is because the latter canon’s one-hundred-and-fifty-year construction of the Damage Clause is based on a word not within the Clause’s text. By applying the correct original public meaning of the Damage Clause, Georgians should and would receive just compensation from certain injurious zoning laws.

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