Publication Date
2025
Abstract
Debates over constitutional interpretation rage on—with most parties staking out preferred theories, their justifications, and assertions of their utility in predicting, explaining, and critiquing court opinions. The United States Constitution and the Supreme Court take center stage, despite a rich set of cases and constitutions at the state level. At the same time, state constitutional discussions tend to steer clear of federal interpretive theorizing.
This article seeks to bridge the gap between these literatures, arguing that state constitutional interpretation practices demonstrate a pluralist approach that may inform broader theoretical debates. State courts frequently employ different methods—sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly—both across different cases and within single cases. I taxonomize these pluralist approaches and argue that courts that explicitly recognize multiple theories of interpretation within single cases exemplify a level of candor and nuance often missing in federal cases and commentary. At the federal level, singular theories tend to be the focus, with pluralism drawing relatively few supporters—a state of affairs I argue should change in light of lessons derived from state constitutional interpretation.
Recommended Citation
Smith, Michael L.
(2025)
"Pluralism in State Constitutional Law,"
Georgia Law Review: Vol. 59:
No.
4, Article 2.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol59/iss4/2