Event Title
Conflicts of Interest in Multi-district Litigation
Location
Classroom A, Hirsch Hall
Start Date
23-2-2018 1:00 PM
End Date
23-2-2018 2:10 PM
Description
While multi-district litigation promises plaintiffs and defendants flexibility in litigating and settling mass tort claims, it also presents conflicts of interest, some of which are familiar from the class action setting, and some of which are just being explored by scholars, litigants, and courts. This panel will discuss cutting-edge questions about the economic incentives posed by MDL practice and procedures. In
class actions, class counsel must act in the best interest of the class members as a whole, but in nonclass MDLs, lead attorneys’ ethical obligations to their individual clients may conflict with their fiduciary obligations to the plaintiffs as a whole. And lead attorneys have a strong economic incentive to encourage all claimants to agree to a settlement package. Settlements can provide substantial benefits to lead plaintiff
attorneys in the form of common-benefit fees, but only if enough plaintiffs opt-in to the settlement program to meet a defendant’s closure goals. The panel includes some of the leading MDL plaintiff attorneys in the country and the leading scholars on MDL procedures and incentives.
Conflicts of Interest in Multi-district Litigation
Classroom A, Hirsch Hall
While multi-district litigation promises plaintiffs and defendants flexibility in litigating and settling mass tort claims, it also presents conflicts of interest, some of which are familiar from the class action setting, and some of which are just being explored by scholars, litigants, and courts. This panel will discuss cutting-edge questions about the economic incentives posed by MDL practice and procedures. In
class actions, class counsel must act in the best interest of the class members as a whole, but in nonclass MDLs, lead attorneys’ ethical obligations to their individual clients may conflict with their fiduciary obligations to the plaintiffs as a whole. And lead attorneys have a strong economic incentive to encourage all claimants to agree to a settlement package. Settlements can provide substantial benefits to lead plaintiff
attorneys in the form of common-benefit fees, but only if enough plaintiffs opt-in to the settlement program to meet a defendant’s closure goals. The panel includes some of the leading MDL plaintiff attorneys in the country and the leading scholars on MDL procedures and incentives.