Abstract

This thesis examines restrictions on price-fixing cartels under Japan's Antimonopoly Law (AML) in comparison with U.S. antitrust law governing horizontal price-fixing under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Written against the backdrop of the 1989–1990 Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), in which the United States urged Japan to enforce its antitrust laws more aggressively against exclusionary cartel practices, the thesis traces the legal history of the AML — from its 1947 enactment under U.S. occupation influence, through its 1953 relaxation (which deleted the strict per se illegality provision and introduced cartel exemptions), to the renewed push for aggressive enforcement in the 1970s and beyond. On the U.S. side, the thesis reviews the evolution of horizontal price-fixing jurisprudence from the per se rule established in Socony-Vacuum to the hybrid approaches seen in cases like BMI and NCAA, which narrowed the per se doctrine for restraints with procompetitive justifications.

The thesis identifies several key differences between the two regimes — including the AML's requirements of "substantial restraint of competition" and conduct "contrary to the public interest," its exclusion of vertical restraints from the concept of "unreasonable restraint of trade," broader cartel exemptions (such as depression and rationalization cartels), and the unique surcharge mechanism that strips illegal profits as an administrative penalty. However, the thesis concludes that because the AML was originally modeled on U.S. antitrust principles, and because the Japanese government has been progressively tightening enforcement in response to the SII recommendations, including publishing the 1991 FTCJ Guidelines, increasing surcharge rates, expanding investigation budgets, and reviewing exemption systems, the substantive differences between the two laws have been steadily narrowing and are likely to continue converging.

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