Abstract

This thesis analyzes the direct and indirect impacts of Articles I, II, III, VI, XVI, and XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on three broad catetgories of national environmental protection measures: (1) those offsetting environmental compliance costs, (2) those incentivizing volutnary environmental efforts, and (3) those promoring environmental protection in foreign countries. This thesis discusses the applicability and scope of government subsidies and countervailing duties as present in Articles XVI and VI and how they deviate from the standards of Articles I and II, the non-discrimination obligations set forth in Articles I and III, including the "like product" concept, the remedies set forth in Article XXIII, the "Polluter-Pays-Principle," the general prohibition on quantitative restrictions set forth in Article XI, the prohibition on increased tariff rates set forth in Article II, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade—better known as the Standards Code—and the necessity exception permitted by Article XX. It concludes that while GATT does not unduly restrict genuinely environmental measures, it offers industrialized nations few tools to offset competitive disadvantages from strict production standards, as export subsidies are prohibited and countervailing duties against lax foreign regulation are impermissible.     Nonetheless, the thesis proposes an environmental tax/subsidy scheme — taxing polluting end-products (including imports), rebating upon export, and channeling proceeds to fund voluntary pollution control — as a GATT-consistent means of incentivizing cleaner production without impairing competitiveness.

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