Abstract

This LL.M. thesis provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of the role of market power in vertical-agreement doctrine under United States antitrust law and European Community competition law, tracing the doctrinal development from the Sherman Act's Section 1 and the landmark decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania through the adoption of the EC's new single block exemption regulation (Commission Regulation No. 2790/1999). Topics include the rule-of-reason and per se dichotomy, the burden-shifting model developed by U.S. lower courts, the theoretical underpinnings of market power measurement (including the Lerner Index and the structural approach of market definition), and the influence of Chicago School economics on vertical restraint analysis.  The thesis analyzes divergent lines of U.S. circuit court cases and the Supreme Court's decisions in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. and California Dental Association v. FTC, as well as the EC's shift from individual exemption procedures under Regulation 17 to the new block exemption regulation's 30% market share threshold and blacklist approach.   The thesis concludes that a mandatory market power screen impedes empirical accuracy and proposes a flexible burden-shifting model with varying presumptions of illegality — applicable to both price and nonprice restraints — as the framework best suited to reconcile administrability with correct outcomes in individual cases.

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